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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The thesis examines advertising behaviour and quality-setting 
behaviour at the firm level. In both cases economic theory is used to 
discover theoretically optimal behaviour patterns which may then be compared 
with the behaviour patterns exhibited by firms operating in the real world. 
The 'neoclassical' economic model of advertising is reviewed and a 
general version embodying the 'marketing mix' concept is developed. 
Possible means of testing for optimal advertising behaviour at the firm 
level are discussed. The usual method of testing for optimal advertising 
behaviour was shown to rely on a method which provided no information 
about the behaviour of firms, the usual test relies on a 'snapshot' 
comparison of values of the firm's discretionary variables and parameters 
of the demand function facing the firm. An alternative method of testing 
is developed the use of a stock-adjustment approach in conjunction VJith 
an loptimality rule' allows the construction of a test which views firms' 
behaviour. The test is applied to advertising data for the five major 
U. K. motor manufacturers during the period 1958-68. 
The 'quality' problem is analysed at the model or variety level. 
The problem of defining 'quality' is discussed, and it is suggested that 
if 'quality' is suitably defined there will be a useful relationship 
between the prices and 'qualities' of a varieties of a given product. 
The possible theoretical bases a price-quality relationship (and hence 
the 'Hedonic' technique) are analysed and shown to indicate different 
forms for the price-quality relationship. Appropriate methods of estimating 
the price-quality relationship are suggested. A model of variety demand 
allowing for quality differences by incorporating the residuals from the 
estimated price-quality relationship in the demand function is proposed. 
Price-quality relationships and demand functions are estimated using data 
for U. K. passenger cars. 
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I. 
CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION. 
A central problem in 'industrial' economics and the 'theory of 
the firml is the analysis of the product differentiation activities of an 
individual firm taking into account that firm's existence within a partic- 
ular market structure. Naturally what is meant by 'product differentiation' 
depends crucially on the definition of 'product' which is employed. In 
traditional microecohomic analysis a 'product' seems to have been defined 
in terms of substitutability. Two objects were the same product if they 
were perfect substitutes for one another. Thus a green freezer was only 
the same product as (an otherwise identical) white freezer if the consumer 
considered them perfect substitutes; i. e. if the variable 'colour' was one 
to which the consumer was completely indifferent. The inability of tradit- 
ional analysis to tackle the realistic situation where several similar 
brands of essentially the same product (e. g. medium sized family saloon 
cars)' coexist stems from the restrictive definition of 'product' which is 
employed. Clearly there are two dimensions to the satisfying of wants,, 
quantity and quality. Thus a freezer is desired for its ability to preserve 
food, to make ice and to fit into a particular kitchen colour scheme. A 
theory which attempts to explain the buying and selling of almost any 
'product' must take account of desires for both quantity and quality. 
There is a third dimension of competition which is present in 
all 'imperfect' market structures, i. e. advertising. 2 Advertising may take 
many forms and may be conducted in different regions and different media; 
i. e. there is an allocation problem as well as the problem of deciding upon 
2. 
the amount. ' It is customary in economic analysis to deal only with the 
magnitude of the advertising budget, and to leave suboptimisation problems 
to areas more concerned with the internal management of the firm. 
Thus finding the optimum position for the firm (in terms of 
some set of objectives) requires optimising at least four sets of discretion- 
ary variables, the prices of the products, outputs, total advertising 
expenditures on the different products and the levels of the different 
'qualities' embodied in the products. 3 We may reduce the number of sets 
of variables to three by equating sales to production, and making sales 
per unit of time a function of price, advertising and 'quality'. This is 
a reasonable approach provided we are interested only in the profits and/or 
sales of the firm and not in its balance sheet, that is if we are willing 
to ignore inventory problems. 
Economic analysis nearly always deals with aggregates in some 
form or other. Even in the analysis of the individual firm consumers are 
usually treated in the aggregate. The firm is often said 'to face a demand 
function', that is the consumers are treated as a 'black box'. The firm - 
stimulates consumers (and rival firms) by offering a product at some price - 
quality - advertising combination. How the 'black box' (i. e. consumers in 
the aggregate) reacts is assumed to be a function of its contents, and the 
mathematical expression of its responses to the various stimuli is known as 
the demand function. Thus in its simplest form the pattern of reactions 
and stimuli in a given market can be represented by the simple flow diagram: 
FI RIN A 
, r, 
FIRMS 
(Black arrows represent stimuli and dotted arrows responses. ) 
The two problems are not necessarily independent. 
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Firm A offers a price - quality - advertising mix to the consumers who 
react according to the demand function faced by firm A. The oligopoly 
problem is more complex. Firm A knows how consumers will react in any 
given situation (i. e. a situation where competing firms' product mixes 
are known with certainty), that is he knows the demand function which faces 
him. If firm A knew exactly how competing firms operated he would be 
able to determine his optimum product mix. Several possibilities admit 
themselves : 
each firm knows exactly how the others will react in 
any given situation. 
each firm assumes that the other firm will follow a 
specific behaviour pattern in any given time period; 
i. e. firm A can always enter competing firms' product 
mixes as parameters in his demand function. In both 
cases (i) and (ii) the firms can be said to be operating 
under conditions of certainty; case (ii) behaviour being 
Cournot type behaviour. 
(iii) each firm can assign some probability to each of the 
other fi rms' possible reactions. In this case the firm 
is operating under conditions of risk. 
V) no firm knows how the others will react, but each firm 
knows what the others' possible reactions are. In this 
case the firms are said to be acting under uncertainty. 4 
In all these cases the firms take account of the fact that they are inter- 
dependent, the essential conceptual difference betieen the cases is the 
amount of knowledge each firm has, or believes it has, about the actions 
and reactions of other firms. It is largely within this kind of framework 
that the problem of optimising the values of any single firm's discretionary 
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variables is of interest to the economist. 
ADVERTISING AND THE FIRM. 
Advertising is a subject of interest to both economists and 
management scientists. Roughly speaking economists are usually interested 
in the overall problem of optimising the total advertising budget, whereas 
the management scientist is interested in the suboptimisation problems of 
allocating the budget to the different media, in addition to the aggregate 
appropriations problem. s In recent years, however, such a division has 
become blurred, and a literature of the 'mathematical analysis of marketing' 
has grown up. 
6 Management scientists, operations researchers and economists 
have all contributed to this literature. The existence of a widespread 
interest in a quantitative approach to marketing problems provides a 
compelling reason for studying it, since if we are seeking to explain the 
behaviour of firms, and if managers (and marketing men in particular) are 
developing this approach to business problems, then an analysis of the 
literature on the mathematical analysis of marketing should yield some clues 
to the behaviour of firms. Whether or not the rigorous, analytical approach 
to marketing which is provided by modern management science textbooks has 
yet had its influence on large company decision-making is another matter. 
Advertising and promotional expenditures have become significant 
in the marketing of many products. The extent of advertising has been 
pointed out by Doyle (1968a), Kaldor and Silverman (1948), the Economists 
Advisory Group (1967) and Treasure (1971) amongst others. The marketing 
manager faces many decisions with respect to advertising. Decisions must 
be made with regard to the goals of advertising, the size of the overall 
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budget and the choice of media, appeals and copy. If these decisions are 
interrelated, for example if the appropriations decision is not independent 
of the choice of media, we may not (as economists) be justified in consider- 
ing the overall advertising budget (the appropriation) as the only variable. 
As Treasure (1971) puts it : 
'The effectiveness of an advertising campaign is a function 
of three variables : the creative content; the media mix; 
and the appropriation. Thus one cannot measure the sales 
effectiveness of an advertising campaign for a brand simply 
in terms of changes in the size of expenditure. This is a 
point which most economists and outside students cannot 
bring themselves to believe. ' 
Treasure probably misrepresents the views of most economists on this point. 
' 
It is possible to accept his argument, but the economist usually tackles 
problems where it is reasonable to assume optimising behaviour at the 
distributional level .7 Nevertheless when economists look at a specific 
point in time then obviously there is an oversimplification in the economists 
usual approach to the problem of advertising. It might also be true that 
many economists would accept Treasure's point, but are hampered in tackling 
such detailed studies of advertising by lack of data. At the very minimum 
an economist would require data brand by brand, medium by medium, but 
unfortunately such disaggregated data is a rarity. Thus the firm (or the 
marketing department of the firm) will have to reach a large number of 
decisions with respect to its advertising policy, but the single decision 
which is of most interest to economists is the size of the appropriation. 
It is of some interest to note the methods which firms in fact 
employ to set their advertising budgets. The Institute of Practitioners in 
Advertising (I. P. A. ) have listed commonly employed methods of budgeting for 
industrial advertising. 'ý Briefly these are as follows : 
(1) set the budget as a percentage of last year's turnover 
% but see Doyle (1968a) 
t Institute of Practitiopers, in Advertising (1968) 
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(2) set the budget as a percentage of next year's anticipated 
sales 
(3) set the budget as a percentage of profit 
(4) set the budget to keep up with competitors 
a 'points system' 
the 'task method' 
Methods 1,2 and 3 may be characterised as 'rules-of-thumb'. Method 4 is 
only possible if there is a market 'leader' whom the firm can 'follow'. 
Method 3 recognises the notion that liquidity problems may exert an influence 
on the size of the advertising budget. Methods 1 land 
2 will yield similar 
results where demand is inelastic and production capacity inflexible. The 
practice of working out appropriations by systems of points allocation 
suffers from the weakness that the allocation of points depends on the 
arbitrary judgement of an individual. The I. P. A. clearly favours; the task 
method, which relates advertising directly to marketing objectives. The 
objectives of the advertising are established and the cost of achieving each 
objective assessed. The grand total of these costings shows the overall 
appropriation required. 
8 The task method means itemising and building up 
in contrast to the practice of starting with a lump sum appropriation and 
breaking it down to the various channels of advertising only so far as it 
will go. The relevence of economic analysis in a situation where the task 
method is employed depends on the objectives of the advertising. 9 Fortunately 
these objectives are often stated in terms which are familiar to economics. 
An American survey McNiven ed. (1969)) stated 
'For product or service advertising,, the objectives most 
frequently mentioned are associated with marketing plans 
or expectations, which may be expressed in terms of volume, 
revenue, income,, profits, earnings, market shares or other 
measures. ' 
Jastram has suggested a distinction between 'mechanistic' and 'non-mechanistic 
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appropriations policies. { see Jastram (1950ý A 'mechanistic' policy is 
one which makes the advertising appropriation depend on some other variable 
within the firm's operations. Once the value of that variable is 'known',. 
the size of the advertising budget is 'known'. A 'non-mechanistic' policy 
encompasses all other appropriation methods. Jastram's data shows that in 
the 1930's two thirds of the (American) companies surveyed used mechanistic 
methods. A more recent British study'{ Taplin (1959) 1 confirms the 
popularity of mechanistic approaches. Taplin notes an exception in the case 
of declining brands, where firms frequently take corrective action. Mechan- 
istic methods are most frequently employed in the advertising of established 
brands. The two approaches most frequently observed by Taplin were the 
practices of a) setting advertising appropriations as a fairly stable 
percentage of sales, and b), treating advertising expenditure as a discret- 
ionary deduction from profits. Despite the apparent simplicity of the 
decision rules described above, the problem of deciding on an advertising 
appropriation is a complex, one. If 
This thesis examines the problem of advertising at the fi rm 
level. In particular it is concerned with advancing various economic models 
of optimal advertising behaviour at the firm level and testing these models 
against reality. Thus the economic models are used to generate predictions 
about the optimal level of the discretionary variable advertising, and these 
predictions are then compared with empirically observed levels of advertising. 
The thesis does not attempt a comprehensive survey of all possible contrib- 
utions of economic analysis to advertising problems, but concentrates on 
extending and refining the traditional techniques of microeconomics in the 
field of advertising behaviour. 
ii see Taplin (1963), Chýpter 7. 
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'QUALITY' AND THE FIRM. 
'Quality' 3 competition has been much more neglected as an area 
of study than has advertising (or price) competition. This is not altogether 
unexpected when we recall that the classical definition of 'product' does 
not allow the same 'product' to have different collections of characteristics. 
Nevertheless the marketing division of a firm may be faced with a greater 
array of problems connected with product characteristics (or 'qualities') 
than it is with advertising. The problems are particularly pronounced where 
the firm markets a consumer durable, 
' 0 where the physical characteristics of 
the product are (in part) discretionary variables in the promotional mix. 
Paralleling the advertising problem is the question of the optimal levels 
of all the different 'qualities' of a given product. Again it is possible 
to discover theoretically optimum levels of 'quality', and compare these to 
actual levels of quality chosen by firms. 
However there is a (perhaps) more practical reason for applying 
microeconomic analysis to quality competition in consumer durables. Micro- 
economic theory may be able to aid us in a search for a method of predicting 
brand or model shares in a consumer durable market. The efficient estimation 
of demand curves is a necessity both for the prediction of model shares, and 
as a prelude to the application of economic analysis in evaluating firms' 
behaviour. The estimation of demand at the model level is crucial to the 
firm for planning and investment purposes. An efficient method of demand 
estimation requires that we not only take into account the prices ofand 
advertising expenditures on. all competing products, but the quality mix of 
all competing products as well. The thesis attempts to develop a method of 
estimating brand or model market shares on the basis of microeconomic theory. 
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The method is then tested using data referring to the U. K. market for small 
And medium sized passenger cars. The remaining chapters of the thesis are 
as follows : 
CHAPTER 2 presents a discussion of the economic theory of 
advertising in the monopoly case. The simple static profit-maximising 
model is extended in various directions. 
CHAPTER 3 generalises the model of chapter 2 in two important 
ways. Firstly a competitive industry is considered and secondly the 
treatment of promotional competition is generalised to allow compet- 
ition of a 'marketing mix' type. Various empirical approaches to 
testing the-models against firms' behaviour, or vice versa, are 
discussed. A stock-adjustment approach to the problem is proposed 
and developed. 
CHAPTER 4 extends the work of Chapters 2 and 3 by considering 
some alternative theories of firm behaviour. A particular area of 
concern is the role which oligopolistic interdependence plays in 
determining competitive strategies with respect to advertising and 
price ( 'quality' is dealt with in Chapter 6). 
CHAPTER 5 tests the stock-adjustment model of Chapter 3 using 
data relating topassenger cars. 
CHAPTER 6 discusses the problems raised when 'quality' is to 
incorporated into a model of demand. Existing work in the field is 
discussed and a detinition ot 'quality' is sought. The relationship 
between price and 'quali. ty' is analysed; in particular the 'hedonic' 
technique proposed by Griliches (1961) is discussed. The nature and 
limitations of 'quality' competition in an oligopolistic industry 
I are discussed. 
CHAPTER 7 attempts to provide theoretical underpinnings for 
an intuitive method of incorporating quality differences into a 
11 
model of, demand at the brand or model level. A method for testing 
optimal quality setting behaviour at the firm level is proposed. 
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respect to the different marketing variables, particularly price, 
(above-the-line) advertising and quality. 
CHAPTER 8 specifically examines pricing behaviour. A dynamic 
model of demand is developed from the discussion of chapters 
4 and 6, 
an optimal pricing path is derived from it. Estimates of various 
market parameters are obtained and used to examine the theoretically 
optimal path and compare it with the actual pricing path. 
CHAPTER 9 tests the theory of chapters 5 and 7. The proposed 
forms of the price-quality relationship are estimated using the 
passenger car data. 
CHAPTER 10 estimates the proposed model demand functions of 
chapter 7. 
CHAPTER 11 provides a summary and conclusions. 
At some points the links between the treatment of advertising 
and quality competition are very strong. At the extreme theoretical level 
of Chapter 3 advertising and quality variables are treated identically. 
they are merely different elements of the 'marketing mix'. A direct descend- 
ent of this kind of treatment is the model presented in the Appendix to 
Chapter 7 which allows a test for optimal quality-setting behaviour to be 
developed; that test is very similar to the tests,, of optimal advertiting 
behaviour which occur in the literature ( e. g. Cowling (1972) . Lambin 
(1970b) ) and as developed in the early part of this thesis. Optimal quality- 
setting behaviour has received little theoretical, and virtually no, empir- 
ical attention in the past. Nevertheless treating advertising and quality 
variables in the same way does have drawbacks. Advertising and quality 
competition are in many ways different, and Chapters 4,6 and 7 examine these 
difterences; they are an attempt to draw out the distinguishing features of 
different promotional variables. For example it is suggested that advertising 
levels can be varied quickly whilst 'qualities' can only be altered over a 
longer period. Hence at some points in the thesis-advertising and quality 
sit easily together whilst at other times they are deliberately separated. 
There is nothing wrong with this approach; existing theory is developed 
and exploited where this fruitful, and new theory is suggested where exist- 
ing theory has shortcomings. The progression (in simple terms) is from the 
Tamiliar theory of advertising competition to the more general marketing 
mix approach and then (abstracting from all that has gone before) to some 
considerations of the 'theory of quality competition'. 
Chapters 2,3,4,6 and 7 attempt to build a strong theoretical 
foundation for the empirical work of the remaining chapters. That is not 
to say that all the empirical work is valeless in the absence of the theory 
advanced in the text. Only the empirical work of Chapter 5 is necessarily 
closely identi-ried with a particular theoretical model advanced in this 
thesis. Chapters 8-10 are of particular interest even without the associated 
theoretical background as it is advanced here. The results reported in those 
chapters are susceptible to commonsense interpretations as. well as to int- 
erpretation in the light of a particular body of theory, and perhaps this 
is a major attraction of such empirical work. The price that is paid for 
such general interest is perhaps that the theoretical justification Tor 
the work may appear to be less tight. 
Much of the data used in this .. thesis wz(s collected by Keith 
Cowling and John Cubbin of the University of Warwick in connection with 
their own research. I am extremely grateful for its use. Although data was 
available for the whole of the period 1956-68 inclusive my own checking of 
the data revealed some doubts about the accuracy of the 1956 data. The 
research reportes here uses data referring to the pe-riod from 1957 onwards. 
The data consisted of the specifications, list prices and sales for individual 
models of car's listed in Appendix 9.1. Although some additional data on 
larger cars was also available it was not used. In addition to the data 
already mentioned the advertising shares for the major U. K. motor manufact- 
urers and industry above-the-line advertising expenditures as used in 
Chapter. 5 was made available to me from the same source. At points where this 
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data is used acknowledgement is made. Other data used was collected from 
primary sources as detailed in the text. 
I am grateful to John Cubbin for commenting on an earlier* 
version of Chapter 4. Dennis Leech gave me advice on the interpretation 
of results in Chapter S. Norman Ireland read and commented on an earlier 
version of Chppter 8.1 repeat my thanks to my supervisor for help 
received. Charles Rowley and John Cable commented on an earlier version 
and I have benefited greatly from their suggestions. Any errors wnich'remain 
are mine alone. 
1m 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 
1. 'Product' is here defined on an ad hoc basis, but nevertheless in 
a commonsense fashion. 
2. Some economists might argue that some minimum level of expenditure 
required to ensure perfect information in the market is consistent 
with perfect competition. 
3. 'Qualities' are to be defined later, but may be considered to be 
those attributes of a product for which the product itself is 
desired, for example passenger room in a car. 
4. For an alternative classification of cases see McGuire (1964), 
Chapter 6. We have assumed that consumers cannot influence firms 
without acting through the market. In fact consumers may be able 
to express or 'voice' their opinions without actually 'consuming'. 
However it is the purpose of this thesis to study actual demand, 
not the protestations of consumers. 
5. Clearly where there has been a tradition in a firm of appropriating 
advertising expenditures by rule-of-thumb (for example making advert- 
ising expenditures a proportion of immediate past sales or retained 
profits), and the decision is taken at a high level, then only the 
suboptimisation problems are of interest to the firm's marketing 
experts. Rule-of-thurrb advertising appropriation behaviour is 
described by Keuhn (1961) and Taplin (1959). 
6. The first contribution was, I believe, the excellent book by Bass 
et al. (1961). 
7. As a particular example of this we may postulate a model in which 
the effectiveness of an advertising campaign, E. is a function of 
the number of units of advertising used in each of the n media 
14. 
a, ....... an e. 
E (a, a n) 
If the prices of the n media, Pl"**O*)Pn are given, cod the size of 
the advertising appropriation is fixed at A then the marketing manager is 
faced with the problem of maximising E subject to the constraint 
I piai =A, for i=I....... n The n+1 first-order conditions 
for the solution to this problem are 
aE +X Pi 0 aai 
where x is the Lagrangian multiplier, and 
I pi ai - 
If the effectiveness function E is homogeneous to degree k, then by 
Euler's theorem, 
ajEE kE 3a 
Multiplying each of the first n first-order conditions by ai 
i=I..... .n, and summing, 
i. 
LE a aa. i+ 
pi ai 
Combining with Euler's theorem we have 
XA= kE a 
15. 
Thus the optimum effectiveness of the campaign is uniquely determined 
by the size of the appropriation alone. We are therefore (in this 
model) justified (as economists) in treating the appropriation as 
the only advertising variable of interest, provided we assume optimis- 
ation at the level of the problem solved above. The parallels between 
the effectiveness function E and production functions are obvious. 
Homogeneity in such a function may not be an unreasonable assumption. 
On the other hand a businessman might argue that effectiveness is 
not merely determined by the number of units of advertising purchased 
in each medium. Approaches to measuring advertising 'effectiveness' 
or 'performance' are given in Montgomery and Urban (1969), Chapter 3, 
Murdick (1971), Chapter 32 and Narver and Savitt (1971), Chapter 12. 
8. An obvious objection to the method is that the objectivýes may no 
longer be optimal when achievement costs are taken into account. 
9. If the controlling interest in a company were to change hands, and 
out of sheer pride the new owners insisted on product name changes 
which were heavily publicised, economics would not provide a suitable 
framework for analysing the situation. 
10. The empirical work contained in the thesis refers to a consumer 
durable, passenger cars. 
11. A similar method is employed by Cowling and Cubbin (1971a), 
Cowling (1972) 
16. 
CHAPTER 2. 
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ADVERTISING : THE MONOPOLY CASE. 
INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter reviews the application of microeconomic theory to 
problems connected with advertising at the firm level. In particular the 
classical case of pure monopoly is considered in detail. It is shown how 
changing the assumptions of the model alters the basic results of the simple 
model of advertising behaviour. 
STATIC ANALYSIS. 
The basic reference work in the static. analysis of optimal 
pricing and advertising behaviour is the article by Dorfman and Steiner (1954)ý 
The demand function facing the monopolist is taken to be a continuous, (twice) 
differentiable function of price (p) and advertising expenditure (A) ; 
2.1 q (p , 
total costs assumed to be given by : 
2.2 TC = c(q) +A 
where c(q) is a continuous differentiable function of output (q). 
Profits (n) are then : 
1 2.3 11 =pq (p , A) - c* (q (p , A) )-A 
U 
17. 
The two first-order conditions for the maximisation of profits are : 
2.4 np=q+pqp- cl(q) qp =0 
2.5 11 A=pqA- cl (q) qA-1= 
Elimination of the term (p - c'(q) from equations 2.4 and- 2.5 
yields the optimising condition : 
2.6 -1 qq qp 
Defining the price elasticity of demand (n) as P- q and the advertising pqp, 
elasticity of demand ( "A) as 
R qA , 2.6 may be rewritten q 
2.7 
"A A 
nppq 
2.7 is a restatement of the theorem proved by Dorfman and Steiner. It 
states that for a profit-maximising monopolist the optimal level of advert- 
ising intensity (the advertising-sales ratio) is equal to the modulus of 
the ratio of the advertising to the price elasticities of demand. Appendix 
2.1 gives the second-order conditions for the problem. Equation 2.7 
gives a basic result of great importance. It refers to the simplest possible 
case, but fortunately it is easily generalisable to other situations. 
As a first generalisation consider a utility-maximising firm. 
2 
Let the manageri al uti 11 ty f uncti on have prof i ts and sal es, revenue - (R) 34 
as arguments: The firm is assumed to maximise its utility subject to the 
const raint of the accounting relation 
2.8 pq c(q) -A 
Fom the Lagrangian function : 
2.9 L=U( ii, R 4. x [p q - c(q) -A 
where is the Lagrangian multiplier and R= pq. The first-order 
conditions for a constrained maximum on U are 
2.10 0=u+u aR X [q +p aq - c(q) 
aq 
pR ýp ap ap p 
2.11 0=U 11 +U BR x [p 
aa 
nAR -a TA 
2al 
-cq)ý; 
j 
- A] 
2.12 0= Uli -x 
Equation 2.10 may be written : 
2.13 Ull (p - cl(q) 
21 
= ap - 
k(q 
'ý P 
2alp) 
+ Uwq] 
Equation 2.11 may be written 
2.14 Ul, (p - cl(q) )aa 71B 0-ýURPA '- UI]r 
Combining equations 2.13 and 2.14 and simplifying yields the optimis- 
ation condition 
2.15 
nA Au il 
nppqUR+ Un 
19. 
We can see immediately from 2.15 that where sales revenue enters the man- 
agerial utility function as an argument the optimum advertising-sales 
ratio will be higher than It would be if profits were the only argument in 
the managerial utility function. 
5.6 
The result 2.15 is similar to the one which obtains in the 
case where the firm has some preference for advertising. For example if 
the fi rm has an expense preference for advertising, then advertising will 
be taken beyond the point at which it maximises its contribution to profits. 
We may conceive of this situation in a generalised sense by taking advert- 
ising expenditure to be an argument in the firm's utility function. Follow- 
ing the method of equations 2.8 - 2.15 the optimising condition can easily 
be shown to be 
2.16 
"A A Ull uA 
nppqU 
a result which is qualitatively similar to 2.15 . 
If we feel uneasy about treating advertising in the simple way 
outlined above, it is easy to generalise the model by including more than 
one advertising variable. Let Ai be expenditure on advertising in medium 
i9i=1,,..., n . Demand is a function of the price charged and the 
advertising appropriations in the n media. The total advertising approp- 
n 
riation is Ai* Profits are given by 
2.17 
. 
11 =p q(p, A1...., A n) - c(q) - 
JAj 
The n+I first-order conditions for a maximum on 11 are : 
20-. 
2.18 [p - cl (q)] 
ýq +q=0 ap 
2.19 [p - cl (q)] =0 
2.18 and 2.19 yield the familiar optimisation condition 
2.20 p aq = pa q ap 
p2ali -pi) is the marginal product of advertising in medium i 
Summing the n conditions 2.20 we obtain : 
I 
2.21 np 
An alternative method of writing the usual Dorfman - Steiner condition 
(equation 2.7) is 
2.22 -n ;q TA 
But in a situation where advertising is supplied by a competitive market. 
and where the monopolist is maximising profitst the marginal products of 
the n media are all equal at the optimum. Conditions 2.21 and 2.22 
are equivalent. Condition 2.20 may also be written : 
2.23 i -- 
i 
np pq i=I..., n 
where n ý4 is the elasticity A 
of demand with respect to advertising 
expenditures in medium i q 
Summing the n conditions 2.23 
yields the condition 
2.24 
I'OA 
i JAj 
Ilp pq 
I. F. zl. 
which corresponds to condition 2.7 . 
An interesting alternative analysis of the monopoly situation 
has been proposed by Brems (1967). He recognises the point that the 
decision-maker has to know how far to employ each advertising medium, not 
just the optimum total expenditure on selling effort. Actually this quest- 
ion is already answered (by equation 2.23). Brems employs the techniques 
of input-output analysis to arrive at the same solution. Whilst the Brems 
approach is an interesting one it has the saw major defects as the neo- 
classical analysis of equations 2.17 to 2.24 . Demand and cost functions 
must still be assumed to be continuous and differentiable with respect to 
all dimensions of selling effort. Brems reaches the same results by a 
longer route with no less a restrictive set of assumptions. 
A feature of many markets is the multiplicity of brands of a 
similar product, where each brand has a significant cross-elasticitY with 
respect to every other brand. A monopolist may choose to sell more than 
one brand of a given product for several reasons. Firstly it may be true 
that the total size of the market is a function of the number of alternative 
brands available. Thus a monopolistic cigarette manufacturer might find it 
profitable to market filter and non-filter cigarettes in a variety of sizes, 
qualities and packages. By building advertising campaigns around specific 
brands 'brand loyalty' may be induced. Clearly where the costs of intro- 
ducing new brands are low there will be a greater tendency towards prolif- 
eration. Secondly the common ownership of several brands may be an entry 
preventative mechanism. Consider the simplest possible Markov-switching 
situation where there are n brands. If x per cent of consumers tend to 
switch in any period and redistribute themselves equally over all other 
22. 
brands, then a new brand can expect to gain xT per cent of the market n+ 
in its initial period. The greater is the number of existing brands (n) 
the smaller is the market share a new entrant can expect to gain both 
initially and ultimately. Thirdly since there are diminishing returns to 
advertising for each brand it will be profitable at some point to stop 
advertising existing brands and 'launch' a new brand. Consider a firm 
9 
producing and selling n brands. The prices of the n brands are pj 
j=1,..., n and the advertising budgets attached to them Aj 1,..., n. 
The demand function for brand j is 
2.25 qi= qj (PI 9*'*'Pn ; Als ... 9A n) 
and the total cost function faci. ng the firm is : 
n 2.26 TC 
n) +A 
the profit function is 
n 
2.27 1 p. q. (pls ... sp A ..., A - c(q,,,., q 
JA 
j=l JJnI n) n) i 
The problem of maximising profits is formally identical with finding the 
profit-maximising collusion solution for a group of oligopolists! The 
2n marginal conditions for a maximum on 11 are : 
2.28 0np 
aq k+ 
qj 
n ac aq k I k-ap -I aq k=l i k=l k ýpj 
2.29 0n 
;qkn ac ;qk 
-1 
PkDA- I -- '97, k11 k=l 5ýk j 
i=1,.. f., n 
i=1,..., n 
s see Henderson and Quandt (1971), pp. 175 - 184 . 
23. 
Consider the brand j, for optimality : 
!q aq c 41 k 
- 
I& )ý -P, 2.30 (P j -qj - 
(p, q q Bpi k apj 
kt-i 
aC aq .I 
aq k 2.31 IC Pj-j -qj ) 
--a 
7'ýj (Pk -aq ) TVj 
kAj 
k 
If 'A i 
and npj are the own advertising and price elasticities, 
AA BC ) 
;qk 
j 2.32 
nA k;! j 
(pk - aq k 577 
ll Pj aq k pjqj- BC 77 1 1{ (Pk - aq Dp,. Pi k0i kj 
Since 
; qk 
<0 and 
;qk>0 
for substitute goods it follows from i-Pi 
2.32 that at the optimum 
Aj nA 
2.33 pj q5 n pj 
aqk ýq k If the goods were complementary then DF >0 and 0 pj 
and the inequality in 2.33 would be reversed. However, at the firm level 
A. "A - 2.34 pjqý -nPI ij 
The precise relationship between advertising intensity at the firm level 
and the individual brand elasticities will depend on (amongst other factors) 
the relative market shares of the n brands. , 
We may also generalise the Dorfman - Steiner theorem to take 
- 
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account of the fact that the monopolist may be acting under conditions of 
uncertainty. Suppose the firm faces the stochastic demand function 
2.35 q (p , 
where u is a continuous random variable with density g(u) and expected 
value 0. Further suppose that its variance is 
2.36 r. U2g (u) du >0 
where a is the lower bound of u !0 If we know something about the 
attitude towards risk adopted by the firm we may be able to reach some 
conclusions regarding optimal policy. Horowitz (1970a) assumes the model 
of equations 2.35 and 2.36 that management's attitudes towards. 
risk are summarised in a Neumann - Morgenstern risk preference schedule 
expressed solely in terms of profits. The basic conclusions of Horowitz's 
analysis are of interest. The Dorfman - Steiner conditions are inviolate 
for a price-setting, quantity-taking monopolist who is linear in risk, the 
elasticities can simply be interpreted as expected values. In other situat- 
ions (risk-aversion or risk-taking) where the optimum price and advertising 
levels are to be determined simultaneously, no unambiguous predictions can 
be made about the equilibrium conditionsýi Nevertheless, at any given price 
risk aversion encourages the firm to advertise more than it would if acting 
under certainty, or if the firm were linear in risk or risk-taking. The 
increase in the advertising budget raises the expected demand at the given 
price, and reduces the variance in revenues, costs and profits. 
12113 
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We may also note in the current context that uncertainty may sometimes 
be eliminated from the situation, but at some cost. Stigler (1961) provides a 
model in which advertising is seen as an "Instrument for the elimination of ignor-- 
ance". The usual marginal cost- marginal revenue equality emerges as an equi- 
librium condition, but in addition Stigler snows that the monopolist will advertise 
more the higher the "death rate". The "death rate", b says, is defined in the foll- 
owing terms. In any given period some fraction, b, of potential consumers will be 
"born" and "die" in the population. "Death" includes not only physical departure 
from the population (or potential market) but also forgetting the seller. Stigler 
suggests that b will be large for seldom purchased, expensive commodities. Thus 
the more 'uncertain' is the population (potential market) the greater the level 
of advertising the monopolist will adopt. Uemsetz (1964) rightly points out that 
promotional activities (including advertising) are, in part, joint products with 
the things they promote; information is being sold along with the advertised 
good. Where product quality etc. is 'regulated' by some external agency or by 
consumerss the activities of branding, labelling and advertising reduce the costs 
of policing the regulations. Promotional activity may (in part) reduce the trans- 
actions costs which the consumer would otherwise face. 
over 
2*6. 
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS. 
Static analysis has been employed to show how the Dorfman - 
Steiner theorem is modified when the basic model of a uniproduct profit- 
maximising monopolist is extended to take into account other (monopoly) 
situations. However it has long been recognised that there are dynamic 
effects of advertising. Current demand is affected by both current and 
past advertising expenditures, and current advertising expenditures affect 
both current and future demand. Several theoretical models have been 
advanced to take account of the dynamic effects of advertising, notably by 
Nerlove and Arrow (1962), Jacquemin (1971), Jacquemin and Thisse (1972), 
and Schmalensee (1972) . We may take the Jacquemin (1971) model as being 
representative. The demand function facing the monopolist is. assumed to be 
2.37 q (p, A, K. t) 
where A is current advertising expenditures and K is the level or "stock" 
of product differentiation, a variable which summarises the sole effect of 
current and past advertising on current demand. We assume 
;q 
ap 
-al 0 
a2q 0 
aA2 
0 2a < 
aK2 
We assume that K depreciates over time at the constant proportional 
rate 
2. 
2.38 k= aA - OK aqa 
The firm's profit function at time t is 
2.39 11 (t) =pq (p, A, K, t) - c*{q (p, A, K, t»- A 
The firm attempts to maximise the present value of the stream of profits (V): 
2.40 V=. re-pt ii(p, A, K, t) dt 
0 
given the transition equation 2.38 .p is the discount rate, taken to 
be positive and constant. Using the Maximum Principle I the relevent 
Hamiltonian is 
2.41 H(t) = e-P 
t. { pq(pgAsKst) - c( q(p, A, K, t)) - A"+ x(t)(aA - ýK)l 
I 
The first-order conditions for a maximum are : 
H 2.42 -L - (p - cl(q)) 
ýq +q-0 ap ap 
2.43 aH = (p - c'(q)) 5T -la -1+ ax(t) 0 
2.42 and 2.43 yield the 'optimising condition I 
2.44 A rA 
pqp (1-. ax) 
A where nA = .4and np 
P- ;q 
nA 'qq 
ap 
T a, -X may 
be considered to be the long-run advertising elasticity of demand. 
The long-run advertisipg elasticity is greater than the short-run advertising 
I see Intriligator (1971). 
28. 
tm 
elasticity when ax <1, and the optimum advertising intensity is less 
than that predicted by the static analysis. When there is no long-run 
effect of advertising . 
(x - 0). 2.44 becomes the static Dorfman 
Steiner condition. 
This analysis takes no account of the fact that the long-run 
price elasticity may not be the same as the short-run price elasticity. One 
way in which this might be taken into account is as follows. Define a 
variable S which summarises the sole effect of current and past sales on 
current demand. The sign of -ý is ambiguous, for some habit-forining prod- 
ucts we clearly expect 
2R >0, but for some durable goods we might expect as 
-4a <0 Knowing the transitional equation f(R, S) where R is 
current sales, we could find a maximum for the present value of current and 
future profits. There would however be two state variables (K and S) and 
two transitional equations. The solution will be in stage form. In the 
first stage the firm will devote its resources to building up either sales 
goodwi 11 (S) or advertising goodwill (K) . In the second stage the other 
type will be built up. This process will be repeated until eventually the 
firm is able to maintain both types of goodwill at, or near, ' the optimum. 
It is interesting to note that this pattern implies that at any point in 
time the firm may be pursuing optimising behaviour, but that advertising 
intensity can range above or below the predicted optimum depending on the. 
stage the firm is going through. 
Finally we may note that the situation where there are 'bandwagon' 
or 'snob' effects in demand has been analysed by Eeckhoudt (1972) and Ireland 
(forthcoming). If demand in period t is given by : 
2.45 q(t) = ex(t) q[ p(t)s A(t)] 
see Ireland and Jones. (1972). 
29'. 
then we have a bandwagon effect if x(t) >0 and a snob effect if 
X(t) <0. If x(t) is some function of past sales, then clearly past 
pricing and advertising policies affect current demand. 
14 In this situation 
we would not expect the Dorfmaii - Steiner theorem to hold, and this is 
indeed the conclusion reached by Ireland. 
Advertising may also raise barriers to entry. The monopolist 
(or oligopolist-focithat matter) must concern nimself not only with ex- 
isting competition but also potential competition by raising barriers to 
entry. in the industry. Thus tne monopolist would adopt a higher level of 
current advertising than suggested by the model given above when the pot- 
ential competition reducing effect of promotional expenditure is taken 
into account. Advertising may be seen as reducing the probability of new 
entry given the existing market structure (as suggested by Baron (1973) 
or raising the barriers to entry, i. e. raising the 'limit price'. (see 
Schupack (1972)*). 
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APPENDIX 2.1. 
The Second-Order Conditions for the Dorfman - Steiner Theorem. 
The demand function facing the monopolist is taken to be a 
continuous, (twice) differentiable function of price (p) and the advert- 
ising appropriation (A) : 
2.1.1 q= q(p, A) 
The total cost function is 
2.1.2 TC = c(q) +A 
where c(q) is continuous and twice differentiable. 
Profits (11) are : 
2.1.3 TI =pq (p, A) -c[q (p, A) ]-A 
The first-order conditions for a stationary value of 11 are 
2.1.4 iip =0q+p 2A -c1 (q) 2R ap ap 
2.1.5 =0=p"-. O(q) aq "A aA Tx 
For il to be a relative maximum ; 
1 
2.1.6 &= 11 pp "AA -( llpA 
31. 
, pp <0 c> il AA < 
0. 
where 
32 
2.1.7 =pq-cI (q +2 
ýq 
-c 11 (q ) (2R2 ,pp 
ap2 3P2 
ýp ; P) 
= P12ýL 2.1.8 RAA 
A2 
- cl (q) 32q - cll(q)(-12 
I ZA2 
2.1.9 ; 
2q I (q) ; 2q R ýq pc PW + c"(q) - 'TpA TP-5x -5ýc M Zp 
Substituting for [p - cl(q)] from equation 2.1.4 in 2.1.7 we have : 
N- 2.1.10 ap ppq -L2A +2( 
ýq 
c 11 (q 
;p2 2p 2p 
Substituting for [p c'(q)] from equation 2.1.5 in 2.1.8 we have 
2.1.11 11 -2ý-q - cll(q)(-Rý 
A 
AA 0 2A 2 
2q Since >0 and 
A<0, two necessary second-order conditions for 
a maximum of n are 
2.1.12 2q 0 2p $p 
Conditions 2.1.12 are : 
;q 21 3 2.1.13 -q+ 2'( )-c 11 (q ) (ýý) > 
;p2 ap p 
32. 
2.1.14 a2- c"(q) 
aA 
If marginal costs are constant or rising (c"(q) a 0) , 2.1.13 and 
2.1.14 are satisfied if 
2.1.15 a 
2q 
0 
; p2 
2.1.16 0 
Condition 2.1.16 states that there must be diminishing returns to advert- 
ising expenditure. 
If marginal costs are falling ( c"(q) < 0) , additional condit- 
ions will have to be met to ensure a relative maximum. These conditions are 
of a complex nature. 
15 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 AND APPENDIX 2.1. 
1. A useful reprinting of the articles with discussion and alternative 
proofs of the Dorfman-Steiner theorems is contained in Bass et al. 
(1961). 
2. "Managerial" theories ot the firm (such as those postulated by Baumol 
(1959), Marris (1963), (1964), and Williamson (1963)9 (1964) ) have 
been reformulated as problems of utility maximisation subject to 
constraints. The.. necessary links between the proposed arguments in the 
utility function and theories of the sources of managerial utility have 
been developed by these and other writers. 
3. In order for the second-order conditions to be satisfied the utility 
function U (r, R) would have to yield indifference curves convex to the 
origin. Azariadis et al. (1972) have shown that " all separable utility 
functions provided tnat both marginal utilities, U 
7r and 
UR I are non- 
negative, non-increasing functions of w and R respectively" yield the 
desired indifference curves. 1he first writer to apply a partial utility 
approach to the sales maximisation hypothesis seems to have been Peston 
(1959). 
4. Peel (1973) considers the less general case OT a firm maximising utility 
where only profits and, output are arguments. The case considered by 
Peel produces the rather odd-looking (but easily shown) result tnat 
inclusion of output as an argument in the utility function has'*h6 effect 
on the size of the optimum advertising-sales ratio. Output is, however, 
higher and profit smaller than in tne pure profit maximising case. 
5. Although this need not always be the case. In a three-way discussion 
(Kafoglis (1970), Hawkins (1970) and Haveman and De Bartolo (1970. ) ) 
ofthe strict Baumol model it was shown that under some conditions 
revenue maximisation 
, 
could lead to higher production expense and lower 
price that profit maximisation. However this was not put forward as 
34. 
a common case, nor was a partial utility approach used. Baumol's 
own views on revenue maximisation are put forward in Baumol (1958), 
(1959) and (1961). 
6. We may also demonstrate %nat happens when payments to one factor of 
production also enters the utility function (as say payments to 
managers might). Suppose that the only arguments of the utility 
function are profits (n) , sales revenue (R) and payments to 
factor X j, pj xi Utility is then maximised subject to the constraints 
qS = q(Xlt ... Ix n 
the production function, qD= q(p, A) the 
n 
demand function and n= pq pIXI -A, the account identity. 
Equilibrium (qS =q D) is assumed. The Lagrangian function is 
L= U(ii, R, pjXj) txl[q - q(X 1 9* 0 eqx 
A+ X2[q - q(p, 
11%3[11 - pq +X piX i+ A] 
The equilibrium conditions are : 
0 IJ +A3 
Zq 
_X+ q] R ap 2 ap 3P2; 
Cpl 
U ;R_X R'W 24 + X3 
0 Pi Upjxj 47 + ýPj 
0 + 3Pk 
k 
I Eliminating the Lagrangian multipliers from the equilibrium conditions 
we have : 
I 
35: 
Aq 
Pk aq/ aX k 
Pi aq/ axi k. ikj, i 
P. aq/ aX u 
Pk UIC U Pi xi 
i. e. the factor j is paid a price higher than would normally be the 
case. A feature of the managerial ciscretion models discussed by 
Williamson (1964,, Chapter 4) is that the firm sets output and price 
in accordance with the conventional MC, = MR rule, but costs are 
I 
'inflated' by the higher usage of, and payments to, staff. Thus some 
of the available possible profit is diverted Trom I owners I to 
managers,, who receive it in terms of higher salaries and discretionary 
payments. Extension of the model here will confirm the Williamson 
results. 
7. Firms might nave expense preferences for advertising because advert- 
ising can create a barrier to entry; a firm may be able to consolidate 
or maintain its market position by advertising heavily. Alternatively 
managers may like to associate themselves with a widely known product; 
or the association of a given firm with a highly advertised product 
may make recruitment easier. In essence firms may have an expense 
preference for advertising because they feel tnat advertising yields 
greater sevuri ty. 
is also the marginal productivity of advertising in medium i p aL 
sincl the marginal cost of advertising is 1. We may also note that 
tne model assumes that 'advertising' in the difterent media can be 
treated as independent activities. If there is interdependence between 
advertising activity in the different media then we must include 
interaction terms of the form aR. M. i=l....., n ...... n; aia 70i 
i; in 2.19, If we wish to relax the assumption of independence of 
36. 
advertising activity, then an example of an appropriate model is given 
in note 7 to Chapter 1. Alternatively we may include the Interaction 
terms in the model OT equations 2.17 to 2.24. Such a Change would 
necessitate the redefinition of the advertising elasticities nA to 
take account of the interaction terms. 
9. n may or may not be the optimum number of brands. 
10. Thus we are concerned with the model due to Horowitz. See Horowitz 
(1970a) and (1970b). 
11. If one believes that 'large' firms (i. e. those with some market power) 
are likely to be conservative, that is risk-averting, then the analysis 
is of little practical help. Much of the literature on large firms and 
the objectives of their managers would seem to support the notion that 
the management of such companies are 'likely to act in a conservative 
risk-averting fashion. (see for example Marris (1964) and his discussion 
ot the 'security motive' of managers and Fellner (1949) on the asymmetry 
of rewardiv. to managers. ) 
Increased ad verti sing rai seS the probabi Ii ty 0fs ell in gwh at has 
been produced. 
13. The Horowitz analysis assumes a cost function which is continuous 
and differentiable. Many economists feel that a linear programming 
approach (assuming discrete production processes) is more realistic 
in many cases. Liviatan (1971) has examined a linear programming 
model in the context of uncertain demand. The firm is assumed to 
face a random exogeneous demand requirement which is specified by 
some known and bounded density function. Liviatan's major conclusion 
is that uncertain demand leads to a 'smoothing' of the isoquants, the 
production process in effect becomes continuous. 
- -. t---. - #-- .. . . -. -p . --', . '.,.,, . -. - 
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14. Ireland (forthcoming) in fact chooses the function 
X(t) = ft a[p(t), A(t) 
] dt 
0 
that is X(t) depends on cumulative past sales. 
15. The 'proof' given by Bass et al. (1961) that the first-order conditions 
always give a relative maximum is false. They correctly derive an 
expression for n pp 
but then in effect partially differentiate 
the equation np =0 and substitute the resulting expression into 
the (correctly) derived expression for lipp . showing that H pp =0 
Continued application of this method would yield A=0, in which 
case the method for determining the nature of the stationary value 
fai Is. 
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THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ADVERTISING': COMPETITIVE SITUATIONS. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Chapter 2 considered the economic 
applied to the monopoly case. This chapter e: 
ries where the number of competitors is small 
degree of mutual interdependence exists, i. e. 
situations of Chapter 2 are generalised since 
results of those generalisations would be. 
A GENERALISED STATIC MODEL. 
analysis of advertising 
Ktends that analysis to indust- 
enough to ensure that some 
oligopolies. Not all the 
it is clear what the end 
We assume that the demand function facing the fi m may be 
written as the definitional equation 
3.1 
where s is the market share of the firm and Q is industry demand. We 
further assume that : 
3.2 s (m, M) 
and 
3.3 NMI ms Z) 
where. m is an n-vector of marketing variables controlled 
I 
by the fi m 
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M is an n-vector of marketing variables controlled 
by rival firms 
Z is a vector of variables exogeneous to the fi rm 
which influence industry demand. 
Thus m includes the firm's price and the advertising expenditures in 
the different media, as well as other possible items of promotional expend- 
iture. M refers to the values of marketing variables adopted by rival 
firms, and hence the marketing share function s(m, M) is a function of 
the prices and advertising allocations of all firms in the market. The 
implicit assumption of equations 3.1 to 3.3 is that the vector of 
variables Z does not affect the 'balance' between the firms in the market. 
Thus if there is a rise in real incomes,, we can expect the overall size of 
the market to increase (if the goods in the market are superior), but the 
respective market shares to remain the same, ceteris paribus. Although this 
is a frequently employed assumption, and a very useful one, it is as well to 
remember that it has been made. It might be violated in a market where the 
good is superior and the different brands cover a wide range of prices and 
the change in Z involves an increase in income. In this case we might 
expect a substitution of dearer for cheaper brands. provided dearer brands 
were of a higher quality! Thus the demand function facing the firm is 
3.4 s (m, 11) Q (m, M, Z) 
Suppose that the competitive interaction between firms can be expressed by 
the vector of marketing reaction functions 
2: 
3.5 -M= 
40-. 
Often the restriction is placed on reaction functions of type 3.5 that 
variations in one promotional variable attract reactions in terms of that 
variable only -, the rivals are assumed to react to a price change by chang- 
ing price and to an advertising increase by altering their own advertising 
budgets etc. That restriction need not be placed on reaction functions 
3.5 . Let the total cost function of the firm be 
ý. 6 TC =c (q , m) 
Profi ts are then : 
3.7 11 = pq - c(q. m) 
and the m first-order conditions for a profit maximum are : 
all 3.8 rp- =q+p c'(q) ap ap 
311 a ac 3.9 0==P-; IM - c'(q) 
which yield the (m - 1) optimisation conditions : 
mm ac 3.10 
np 
where nm are the. el asti ci ties of demand wi th respect to the m marketi ng 
elements (=212R) and n is the price elasticity of demand RL q "ým pq ap 
In the case where m is measured in terms of expenditure on a promotional 
;c activity, 1 as in the usual advertising case. 3.10 is merely a 
restatement of the usual Dorfman - Steiner theorem, but now the elasticities 
nm and np take into account market-share effects$ aggregate market effects 
41: 
and the (m x n) competitive interaction effects which take place. (In 
the case where we are considering the one elasticity nm (rather than 
the vector of elasticities nm) there are only n possible reactions to 
take into account. ) The elas"t-Acites nm can be broken down into these 
effects as foll OWS3: since 
3.11 s (m, M) Q (m, M, Z) 
then 
aq. 
=m . 
ýs 
s+ 
DQ L 3.12 Q+ Ds aM +L DM am i-m am DM am 
If Dm is a (n x n) diagonal matrix of the elments of vector n, then 
multiplying both sides of 3.12 by Dm/q yields the equation : 
3.13 
om 
aq 
-R-s DR+ 
as aM DR+ 22 D1+ ;Q aM DS q am am mq 57 -a Fm Mq am mq 59 -5-m Mq 
or 
ýM ýM 
Is DM 
. 
22 + 
DM 2s D __+ m22 3.14 -+ q am s DM 7DM am s am 7 am 
or in matrix notation 
3.15 "q,, m = E, + R] 
[nQ 
sm 
+ns M] 
where 
I is the identity matrix 
R is the matrix of reaction terms ;M 
Im 
is the elasticity of demand with respect to m 
"Q'M is the elasticity of aggregate (market) demand 
with respect to m 
's 
'M 
is the elasticity of market share with respect to M. 
42*. 
In the case of one particular dimension of marketing effort, mi * we may 
write 
3.16 ni=E+ 2-M ns, m +n qmIi am il 
IiQ, 
mi 
I 
where Ej is the vector [O..... l. ... 0] A th I in the i 
th 
column, and 
am is a row vector of interaction terms. When the marketing variable am i 
under consideration is price 3.16 becomes 
3.17 nE+; 
ml 
+ ri q, p "PFJ 
Is, 
p PI 
T, 
3.15 and 3.16 may be simplified in a number of commonly encountered 
4 
cas es . Consider equation 3.16 in the following cases 
Monopoly 
zM 
q=Q, -Fm- .0 for all i 
3.16 becomes 
3.18 'lq mi= rIQ mi 
(i'l) Cournot oligopoly5 where market size is fixed 6 
v00=0 for all i 2mi 'IQ Im i 
3.16 becomes 
3.19 ýjm = 
Cournot oligopoly 
;M- 
5F =0 for all i 
3.16 becomes 
.1 43-. 
3.20 nq, m i= nsomi 
, "Q. mi 
(iv) Oligopoly where market size is fixed 
nQsmi 0 for all i 
3.16 becomes 
3.21 1+ am n inq 
smi 
ýý ami 
Is 
sm i 
Oligopoly ; 
3.16 remainsý 
Equations 3.16 and 3.17 in conjunction with equation 3.10 yield a 
general statement of the Dorfman - Steiner theorem where the firm is 
assumed to be a prof i t-maximiser. 
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF COMPETITIVE ADVERTISING BEHAVIOUR. 
When we attempt to formulate a dynamic model of marketing 
behaviour, that is we recognise that current demand is affected by both 
current and past levels of marketing variables, we are forced to sacrifice 
much of the generality of the model outlined in equations 3.1 to 3.17 
We are simply not able to cope with the situation where several variables 
are to be 'controlled' through time. Instead we concentrate on one such 
variable, advertising expenditures. The problem then is to discover what 
the optimum level of current advertising expenditures should be,, given 
that advertising has a 'stock' effect. One of the first contributions to 
the area was that of Vidale and Wolfe (1957). however the work was designed 
for more limited ends. Like that of the Vidale and Wolfe articl6,, the 
Sasieni (1971) approach is designed for more 'practical' ends. Nevertheless 
the Sasieni article illustrates an earlier contention, that where the sub- 
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ject of advertising is concerned, management scientists and economists 
are not necessarily distant from one another. Both models attempt to 
determine what the optimal rate of advertising expenditure should be when 
the decision variables are linked by the relationship = g(SI, A, t) 
where S= S(t) is the sales rate at time t, and A A(t) is the rate 
of advertising expenditures at time t. The classic economic contribut- 
ion is that of Nerlove and Arrow (1962). Using a variational approach they 
were able to show that at the optimum (for a monopolist) 
3.22 KA 
pq p (T-FP"7 
where K is adver*tising 'goodwill'. i. e. a variable which summarises the 
effects of current and past advertising outlays on demand,, nA and np 
the (short-run) elasticities with respect to advertising and price, P is 
the discount rate and 6 is the rate at which 'goodwill' depreciates over 
time. Several writers have since presented generalisations of the Nerlove - 
Arrow type of model. In particular control theory has been applied to the 
problem. 8 The Nerlove - Arrow model has been criticised on the grounds 
that if the actual stock of goodwill is below the optimum, then the optimal 
policy is to advertise infinitely for an instants that is, the optimal 
policy is an instantaneous jump. In, a practical sense the Nerlove - Arrow 
model tells us nothing about the path the firm should adopt to reach the 
long-run optimum, but merely outlines the nature of the long-run optimum. 
Consider a variant of the model employed by Jacquemin (1971),, 
(1972a). 9 Let the demand 'function facing the firm be written 
3.23 
.q- q(p, p r, 
Aq Ar9K, 
. 
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where p is the price charged 
Pr is the vector of rivals' prices 
A is current advertising expenditures by the firm 
Ar is the vector of rivals' current advertising expenditures 
K is the stock of goodwill, a variable summarising the effect 
of past advertising outlays on current demand 
wi th a ýR 
ap aPr 
4>0 
_ý2 
q0 
ý aA 2 
<0 
>0; 
ZK 
2<0 
aKa r 
Oligopoly theory suggests that 
3.24 pr g(p) 
Arf (A) 
wi th 
2A r>0 
lpr 
>0 ;p 
The level of goodwill, K, is assumed to depreciate over time at the 
constant rate 6 such that 
3.25 A- 6K 6 ), 0 
I 
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The level of goodwill in the initial period is known (K 0 
). The firm is 
assumed to maximise present-valued profits f (" e -Pt 11(t) dt subject to the 0 
transition equation 3.25 .P is the discount rate$ taken to be positive 
and constant. Using the Pontryagin Maximum Principle I we define the Hamil- 
tonian function, H(t) , as 
3.26 H(t) = e-Pt {11(t) + X(t)(A - 6K)l 
where 
3.27 IT(t) = pq(p, p r, 
A. A 
r. 
K. t) - c(q) - 
and X(t) may be interpreted as the shadow, price of a unit of goodwill 
at time t. The first-order conditions for maximising H(t) are 
3.28 pH =0 Dp 
3.29 ýH =0 ag 
3.30 ýH m- (xe pt) aK 
Conditions 3.28 and 3.29 yield the equations 
2ýq ;pr 3.31 (p - cl(q))( 
4p 
+ Tp- 
r; r-) 
-q 
3.32 (p - cl(q))( 
BA 
r 1_ X(t) 
Define nA j, the advertising elasticity of demand taking into account 
reaction, as +r and np , the price elasticity of demand q PA 
1 Oq taking into account reaction,, as' R+-; a 
I 
-Ir then equations 3.31 q LTP' ap rzp 
and 3.32 yield 
3.33 AA 
pq iP(l_Ä) 
see Intriligator (1971). 
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3.33 is a condition which relates to the optimum level of current advert- 
ising expenditures. We may also derive a condition for the optimum stock 
of goodwill, K. Condition 3.30 yields the equation 
3.34 ýH= pxe-pt - 
ie-pt 10 
3K 
whe re 
3.35 3H = e-pt 
[(p 
- c'(q)) 
3.34 and 3.35 yield 
;q 3.36 (p - cl(q)) -; X = X(p + 6) 
Defining the goodwill elasticity of demand (n K) as lqý 3.36 and 
3.31 yield 
3.37 K 
TI 
KI 
pq np X(P+6)-X 
in the special case where A (the shadow price of a unit of goodwill) is 
equal to the price of a unit of advertising, Pa , 3.37 may be written 
3.38 KKI pq np Paýp*'5)-Oa 
3.38 is the result given by Tsurumi (1972)P One advantage of using the 
control theory approach is that it allows us to say something about the 
path the firm should adopt to reach the optimum. Indeed,, we could solve 
the model in order to obtain the path of K. Jacquemin (1972a) shows that 
the optimal policy when K(O) < K* . where K* is the desired level of K 
is to advertise more heavily in the initial periods and gradually decrease 
the fevel of A(t) as K* is approachedý 
2 
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A STOCK-ADJUSTMENT MODEL OF ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES. 
The results 3.37 and 3.38 may be considered representative 
of the results derived from all similar models of firm behaviour with 
respect to advertising. All the models derive conditions which relate 
some measure of the firm's behaviour (usually the goodwill intensity, L pq 
or the advertising intensity, 
A_ ) to observable parameters of the firm's ý7q 
situation (elasticities, the price of advertising, the discount rate etc. ). 
One of the problems of such conditions is the difficulty of measuring the 
stock of advertising goodwill K. We may avoid this problem by incorp- 
orating the results of 3.37 and 3.38 into a stock-adjustment model of 
advertising behaviour. Assume that the firm 'knows' what the optimum level 
of K (= K*) is, and that K* is defined by equation 3.37 or equation 
3.38 . or the optimality condition resulting from some other model of advert- 
ising behaviour. Suppose that K*t can only be approached in the simple 
fashion13 
3.39 AKt =a 
[K*t 
- Kt_, 
] 
where AK t is the net goodwill investment in period t and 0ca41 
Current i advertising expenditures are given by the discrete version of 
equation 3.25 , i. e. 
3.40 At= AKt + SK t-I wi th 0 
Combining 3.39 and 3.40 gives 
3.41 At= SK*t + (6 - 0) K t-I 
We 'know' what K*t is, but we have to measure K t- I 
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Given the identity 
3.42 Kt=At+K t- 1 
and equation 3.40 we obtain 
3.43 Kt= At+ (1 - 6) K 
and hence 
3.44 Kt_l ýA t-I + 
(I - 6) K t-2 etc. 
Successive applications of 3.44 yields the equation 
3.45 K. t_l At_, + (I - 6) A t-2 +0- 6)2 A t-3 + 
+0 6) 
'A 
t-L + (1 - 6) K t-L-1 
where period t-L is the first. period for which data is available. 3.45 
may be more compactly w ritten 
3.46 K t-I 
L 
6)'-'A t-i + (I _ 6)L K t-L-1 
Substituting from 3.46 in 3.41 we have 
L i-i L 3.47 At $K*t + 0) At_i + (1 Kt-L-1 
Application of the Koyck 
I transformation to 3.47 yields, in period t-l 
3.48 (1 - S)A OKt_l*(1 + (6 t-I t-i 2 
(6 00 6) LKt-L-1 
Subtraction of 3.48 from -1-47 -yields 
see Koyck (1954). 
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3.49 A BK* - B(l K*t_l + (1 - 0) At_, t 
From equation 3.38 we have 
3.50 K*t -K Rt 
1 
in p Patýp+"-Fa 
where Rt= ptqt . Substitution of 3.50 in 3.49 yields 
Rt 1 Rt_l 1 
3.51 At oc, Pat (P+6)-Oa 
6)cl Pat-1 (P+6)-Oa + 
Fa 
t 
ýat-l 
+ (1 - 
where c 
"K 
. i. e. we assume that the elasticities N and np are 1 np 
constant through time. 3.51 can be estimated by 'gradient' methods, and 
this is done in Chapter. 5 . The stock-adjustment model can be used in con- 
junction with other optimality rules for advertising behaviour, provided a 
technique is available for estimating the resulting equation. Form 3.51 
has the advantage that one of the independent variables is the price of 
advertisings, which is known. Alternative specifications which include the 
terms x(t) or i in place of Pa( t) and Oa cannot be so easily estim- 
ated. 
Equation 3.51 cannot be seen as an advertising appropriations 
relationship. Rather 3.51 is an expression of the form of behaviour which 
would be observable, ex postg if we could identify a firm which conformed 
to the assumptions of the model, or acted so that the end result were that 
it conformed to the assumptions of the model. It could be used as an advert- 
ising appropriations relationship provided the fi rm had some independently 
or simultaneously derived estimates of Rt and p at 
A possible simult- 
aneous model would contain 
'both 
equations 3.51 and a function for Rt 
. 
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based on the demand function facing the firm. Ex post,, 3.51 may be con- 
sistent with the firm following other patterns of behaviour. In partic- 
ular 3.51 may possibly be observed where the firm adopts rule-of-thumb 
behaviour with regard to setting advertising appropriations. In this latter 
case, however, the parameters of the model may not fall in the expected 
16 
ranges derived from the profit-maximising model. 
A potentially serious criticism. of the inodel outlined in equa- 
tions 3.23 to 3.51 is raised in footnote 13 to this chapter. Equation 3.39 
can be said to be a constraint on the firm's advertisUg behaviour and that 
as such it should be recognised in the Hamiltonian 3.26. If the tirm is un- 
aware ot a constraint such*as 3.39 then no objection to the model is raised. 
On the other hand recognition of 3.39 by the firm would lead it to set art- 
iticially high target values of K tor itself; in falling short of the 'high' 
target value of K it could reach its truly desired target value as given by 
condition 3.38. The artificially high target value of K the firm would choose 
Wt _1 
)+ Kt_l . The end result of such a choice of target is 1,, (K* - Kt 
would be the same as having a=I and sticking to the original K* as target. 
The fi rm can follow such a procedure only if the setting ot artificially 
high targets is costless; if there are costs of adjustment attached to changes 
in the advertising stock ( other than the costs of the advertising itself 
then the firm is no longer 'free' to adopt such a strategy. The appropriate 
theoretical approach to such a problem would be to incorporate adjustment 
costs into the control model of equations 3.23 to 3.38. 
Alternatively, 3.39 may not be an active constraint at-all. Adj- 
ustment to new equilibrium levels of Kt may be possible within a period; i. e. 
a=1s and the lagged advertising term in 3.51 disappears. Only If the price 
of advertising is also constant, 'i. e. p at 0 Pat-1 and hence 
pa will 
3.51 become a simple equation linking current advertising expenditures to 
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the change in sales and lagged sales. Use of the stock-adjustmdnt procedure 
permits the derivation of 3.51 which retains most of its interest and inform- 
ationeven if a =1. Hence if the firmbelieves thats - 1, or, o is actually 
equal to unity no problems are raised by the use of the stock-adjustment pro- 
cedure in conjunction with the control model of equations 3.23 to 3.38. For 
3.51 to be consistent with the control model we would require aI or 
if the firm only believes that a=1); 046p 
u T'K etc. 
So even though the stock-adjustment model is essentially a model 
without a theory* inasmuch as it says nothing about the derivation of the opt- 
imal value of the advertising stock, we must at least concern ourselves with 
the question of whtner the stock-adjustment approach can be consistent with 
any given theory of determination of K*. In the current case this depends on 
the assumption that a can be treated as if it were equal to unity, because that 
is actually the case, or the firm believes that it is actually the case, or the 
firm acts so that the end result is that a=1. This latter case is not unlikely 
if one views the fi m as a hierarchical structure. The firm's decision makers 
may frequently set targets for lower levels of the hierarchy which are unreal- 
istic in the sense that the decision makers do not expect them to be achieved, 
the realistic and desired target ( to which only the decision makers are privy), l 
being less than the stated target. We may also note that 3.38 implies not OnlY 
that the firm is optimising but also that it is in equilibrium, i. e. Kt - Kt 
For consistency between the control model and the stock-adjustment model it is 
essential that the stock-adjustment model permits equilibrium to be not only 
attained, but also maintained. This requirement again implies that a=1; equation 
3.51 will be unaffected except for the tact that a takes on the value one. 
Use of the stock-adjustment model has one potential advantage over 
other methods which has not yet been pointed O. ut. The model does not require us 
to know what the values of the elasticities N and np are, we need only make the 
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assumption that they are constant. Thus the model does not rely on an assumption 
of any given kind of tirm behaviour, for example Cournot behaviour, estimates of thel 
elasticities,. clg can be obtained whatever the form of the 
, 
demand function 3.23. 
Estimates of c, can be compared with the 'known' values of the advertising stock- 
sales ratio since an estimate of a can also be derived from equation 3.51. 
Condition 3.50 unambiguously defines K*t * 3.50 is only a valid 
condition if (p+ 6) >P /p that-', is the sum of the discount rate and the ad- a at, 
vertising decay rate should be greater than the proportional change in the price 
of advertising, Thus if the price of advertising is increasing rapidly 3.50 will 
no longer indicate a ýsensiblel value of the advertising stock. Whetherlor not 
the price of advertising is likely to increase at such a rate as to render 3.50 
unrealistic as a predictive rule is a question of expectations. Where the estimat- 
ion of an equation such as 3.51 is concerned the question is simply answered by 
inspection of the relevant price series for advertising. 3.51 will be satisfactory 
as a description of the behaviour of A as long as (p + 6) is greater than t 
Pa /pai for all t. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3. 
A perhaps more important example of the importance of this restrict- 
ion is that the cross-6asti cities of demand between any brand includ- 
ed in the demand function and any particular excluded product must be 
equal. Thus if the demand function refers to margarine, and the price 
of butter is one of the exogeneous variables Z, the assumption is 
that a change in the price of butter will affect all the brands of 
margarine equally. 
2. Thus we are assuming that the firm is a Stackelberg-type 'leader' 
The pattern of marketing reaction functions will be different for a 
'follower'. The model includes Cournot-type behaviour. Stackelberg 
disequilibrium may exist, all firms can think of themselves as lead- 
ers; the model takes the standpoint of an individual firm. 
3. The proof given here is the same as that given by Lambin (1973). 
4. A similar set of cases is discussed by Lambin (1973) and Lambin 
et al. (1973) 
5. For a discussion of the Cournot model see Henderson and Quandt (1971). 
Chapter 6; Stigler (1968a), Chapter 4, Addendum 1; and (1966) , 
Chapter 12 ; Fellner (1949), Chapter 2. Mathematical expositions of 
the Cournot model are given in Intriligator (1971); Cohen and Cyert 
(1965) and Hadar (1971). 
6. That is, market demand depends only on the vector of variables Z, 
which are assumed to be exogeneous to all firms in the industry. 
Thus no firm can expand market demand through its own efforts. 
-7. More accurately, 3.16 remains only for a Stackelberg leader-type 
firm. A follower would fit into categories (ii) and (iii). 
8. See Gould (1970); Jacquemin (1971), (1972a); Jacquemin and Thisse 
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(1972) and Schmalensee (1972). Plessner (1972) gives an interesting 
alternative approach. 
9. The model is continuous* which many would claim is a serious dis- 
advantage. However, discrete models are rare and discrete models 
which yield testable predictions even rarer, but see the papers by 
Ireland and Jones (1972) and Tsurumi (1972), 
10. For a discussion of the meaning of the first-order conditions see 
Jacquemin (1972a). 
Tsurumi used a variational approach to obtain this result. If the 
specification of the advertising variable in the model of equations 
3.23 to 3.38 is altered so that A and Ar are measured in 
physical units and the expenditure on advertising at time t is 
Pa(t) A(t) , then the optimality condition with respect to advert- 
ising becomes A (p nA 
pq a- A) =-- When the stock of nP 
goodwill, K, is optimal and ý= Pa then the optimal level of 
advertising is undetermined. Equation 3.38 was derived by Tsurumi 
in the context of a model where the price of advertising was allowed 
to vary through time. This specification of the model (where 
advertising is measured in physical units and the advertising is 
admitted as an independent variable) is pursued in Chapter 5. 
12. This kind of policy applies in a variety of market situations other 
than advertising. See Jacquemin (1972b). 
13. A potentially serious objection can be raised to this approach. If the 
firm maximises profits subject to 3.39 then the optimal level of the 
stock variable, K* . may no longer be given by 3.38 .* Three possible 
'escapes' exist. Firstly, the firm may not know that it is restricted 
by 3.39 , it may believe that the optimal stock, once known, can be 
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attained within a time period. Secondly, 3.39 will be consistent 
with 3.38 if $=1. that is if in fact the optimal stock can 
indeed be attained within the time period. Thirdly. if the firm 
realises it is restrained in the manner j ndi cated by 3.39 it will 
adopt a higher level of K* than indicated by 3.38 and. aim for 
that,, knowing that it cannot reach it but in falling short may fulfil 
3.38 . (Provided sett, ing high but 'artificial' targets is costless. ) 
In this case K* will no longer be given by 3.38 . but the actual 
optimal path 'of advertising expenditures through time may be unaffect- 
ed. 
14. Methods wich test for optimal advertising behaviour directly by att- 
empting to measure the elasticities nK and nP usually have to 
employ the same assumption. 
15. Pat may be known ex ante from the 'price list' of suppliers of ad- 
vertising to the firm. 
16. Thus if the firm is adopting rule-of-thumb behaviour, and 3.51 
provides a good fit,, then there is no reason to expect 0401 
01004P41,0<nK<I etc. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF FIRMS' BEHAVIOUR. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Previous chapters have analysed the situations of monopoly 
and non co-operative oligopoly. We now turn to a further set of situat- 
ions which are of some importance in the real world, as even casual observ- 
ation will confirm: co-operative or collusive solutions to the competitive 
situation. The variety of available collusive arrangements is varied and 
complex, Scherer (1971 ) notes : 
The variety of collusive pricing arrangements in industry is 
limited only by the bounds of human ingenuity. " 11 
Scherer's observation applies not only to collusion over prices, but also 
to col lusion over the discretionary variabless for example promotional act- 
ivities, quality, outputs of specific products, geographical location and 
extent of markets and so on. We are not interested here in discussing 
explicit collusive agreements,, or collusion in general. On the other hands 
it may be possible to identify behaviour patterns marked by the degree of 
inter-firm co-coperation which are common to several industries; price- 
leadership is a frequently discussed example. Since no precise definition 
of co-operative or collusive behaviour can be given we follow the practice 
of discussing a few situations which might be classed under the 'co-operative, 
heading in the hope that results emerge which can be distinguished from 
the results that emerge when non co-operative behaviour is assumed. Co-op- 
eration is seen as one solution to the oligopoly interdependence problem. 
Implicit co-operative behaviour arises because in certain circumstances it 
ý may pay all firms in an industry to follow the same rules in setting the 
Scherer (1971). P. 158. 
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values of their own discretionary variables. For example, each firm may 
recognise the group's common interest in orderly pricing, and hence each 
firm may adhere to the existing price structure. The existing price struct- 
ure would have to be satisfactory in the eyes of all firms, and the threat 
of entry must be small at the existing set of prices. If it is not there 
is a significant probability that the composition of the group will alter 
to the detriment of some or all members of the group. Adherence to the 
accepted price structure has two important features. Firstlys it permits 
price stability in the short run and secondly, each firm is able to remove 
a great deal of uncertainty from its expectations. Balanced against this 
is the fragile nature of oligopolistic co-operation. 'Signals' from one 
firm to another can easily be misinterpreted. Firms may then only alter 
prices in response to clear-cut changes in industry demand and cost cond- 
1 
itions, when there is little fear of misinterpretation of a price change. 
The approaches to facets of the oligopoly problem given here are not meant 
to exhaust the possibilities. Rather, an attempt is made to discuss some 
of the more common solutions to the interdependence problem in the dual 
hopes of casting more light on, and integrating (at least in part), the 
approaches of this chapter into the framework of Chapters 1-3. 
PRICE LEADERSHIP.. 
The price-leadership model is developed through the medium of 
conjectural variations in the setting of an industry producing different- 
iated products. Analytically, it may make no difference whether all firms 
in an industry explicitly agree to follow one another's price increases, or 
whether over some period of time all firms in an industry happen to find it 
, 
expedient to follow the price changes instigated by some members of the ind- 
ustry. The important point is that we may be able to make reasonable assump- 
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tions about the firms' expectations concerning rivals' reactions to price 
changes. 
Price-leadership can arise in many ways. It might be the prod- 
uct of industry structure as in the "dominant firm" case. The industry is 
structured such that one firm supplies a large section of the market, and 
a 'fringe' of smaller firms supplies the rest of the market. Fringe firms 
are considered individually too small to influence the overall industry 
price level. Dominant firm price-leadership is perhaps the least interest- 
ing case, and is not further discussed. Situations other than the dominant 
firm type have sometimes been classified under the headings of "collusive" 
and "barometric". Here we dispense with that distinction and attempt to 
analyse the problem as a wholeý 
Consider an industry of n firms each producing one variety 
of a (differentiated) product. If the i th firm knows its current price 
and the prices of its n-l rivals, and if the i th firm can predict the 
prices its rivals would charge, given that it charged some other price, on 
the basis of the given set of prices alone,, then we have price leadership 
where the i 
th fim is the leader. Such a situation will occur if the 
firms j=l....,, n .jAi, have no alternative (the dominant firm case) 
or if the following firms find it in their interests to follow the leader's 
change. The latter cases may be roughly divided into three sub-sets. 
Firstly, price-leadership may emerge essentially from the structure of the 
industry. Fim i may alter its price knowing that if it does so and all 
other firms in the industry follow, then all firms in the industry will be 
in a better position after the change in price. Price-leadership may in 
effect lead the industry towards a position of industry profit maximisation,, 
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or the joint maximisation of whatever set of objectives is important to 
the individual firms. Structural elements are important for the same 
reasons that they are important in cartelisation. All firms must have 
similar costs and similar objectives, otherwise some firms will not wish 
to follow the leader's move and the system will tend to break down. This 
situation corresponds fairly closely to the 'collusive' price-leadership 
situation, described by Scherer as "... that type of price-leadership esp- 
ecially apt to facilitate monopolistic price solutions. " I 
Secondly, all firms within an industry may face the same set 
of circumstances which make it desirable for any given firm to alter price, 
provided all other firms in the industry make a similar price change. The 
circumstances which lead to such a situation may be only indirectly related 
to industry structure. Examples are an industry-wide fall in demand; ris- 
ing input costs common to all firms in the industry; the emergence of a 
substitute product produced outside the industry; the availability of a 
new technique, and so on. Appendix 4.1 illustrates the second of these 
examples with reference to the reaction of U. K. motor companies to the 
1968 steel price increase. A pre-condition for the emergence of price- 
leadership in such a situation is that all firms must be aware of the cir- 
cumstances, and reach a common conclusion as to their effect. A second 
necessary condition for price-leadership to emerge is that the leader must 
accurately reflect the changed state of the industry through his price 
change. This second case of price-leadership corresponds toughly to the 
'barometric' firm case. As Stigler has neatly put it, the barometric firm 
"commands adherence of rivals to his price only because, and to the extent 
that,, his price reflects market conditions with tolerable promptness. "t 
The most common pattern of responses is that prices are lowered when market 
I Scherer (1971 )s P- 166 
t Stigler (1947), pp. 445-446 
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conditions are depressed, and raised when demand and cost conditions 'supp- 
ort' the higher level. In a world where market conditions are rapidly 
changing and industrial concentration is high, the emergence of such price- 
leadership should be unsurprising. The maintenance of such price-leadership 
requires that all firms in the industry have similar objectives. The third 
sub-set of cases is simply an amalgamation of the first two. We might reas- 
onably expect that in the majority of cases of price-leadership both struct- 
ural and circumstantial factors will be at work. Indeed, for price-leader- 
ship to emerge as a solution to the problems raised by changing circumstances, 
the industry structure must be 'right'. 
Consider a simple static formal model of price-leadership, 
where firm I is the leader. Let the demand function facing firm I be 
q, 
. 
(P,,..., p n* 
Al...., a n; 
zl) 
where qi ,i=1,,...,, n are the outputs of n differentiated products,, 
Alq..., An are advertising outlays of the n companies and Z, is a vec- 
tor of exogeneous variables which affects the demand for q, . The profit 
function for firm I is 
4.2 n, = p1q, - c, (q, ) -A 
and for a profit maximum 
4.3 Bp 0 
4.4 0 
S .. 62o. 
Assuming competitive interdependence with respect to both advertising and 
price variables 4.3 and 4.4 may be written 
4.5 
;c1 
(Pl - 'Fq-l 
r ; ql 
L Bpl +n 
; ql 
iy27P-i 
Bpi 
5PI -q 
na aA 
4.6 (PI -1[1+q, 
I aq I i=2 i 
Consider price-leadership and assume that the price-leadership takes the 
form of maintaining constant ratios between different prices, that is if 
firm 1 raises its price by x per cent the others will do likewise, hence 
4.7 Pi kip, 
and 
4.8 
zpi 
ki n ap, 
Appendix 4.1 provides some evidence that at least over part of the period 
1967 - 71 ihe U. K. motor manufacturers seemed to behave (outwardly, at 
least) approximately in this fashion. 4.5 may be rewritten as 
ýc, r p, aq, 
+n 
aq, 
(Pl - aql' Lýj ýP-j q, 
ýiýpi ki -PI i 
or 
[, 
Ipl + 
in 
aq, 
. 
LC p 
4.10 (PI - zq PI 
-2 
q, api 
where n Pi 
is the own price elasticity of demand for product I and 
pi aq I 
q, ap i 
is the cross-elasticity between demand for product I and the 
price of product 
.i. 
Equation 4.6 may be written 
4.11 acl) + 
A, 
(PI 
[n n aq, 
11 
Mi 
_ _ 
1 AI 
Bql Al qI i 0 Fi =2 B7 1 q, 
630 
If there is 'advertising-leadership' similar to the price-leadership of 
above, i. e. if 
4.12 Ai hiA I 
and hence 
;A 
.Ih 4.13 BA, 
then 4.11 becomes 
4.14 (PI - Bql) 
["A 
I 
ýcl 
i=2,. .. 
i= 
A ;q 
q, 
i- ; 
ali-l 
where nA 
1 
is the own advertising elasticity of demand for product 1 
Li NI 
and. is the cross-elasticity between demand for product 1 and q, j 
the advertising outlay on product i. Consider the following four cases 
the fi m acts as a Cournot oligopolist with respect to both 
price and advertising. In this case 
; Pi 
0 for i= 29 ... n BPI - 
2A i=0 for i=2,..., n V, - 
I 
and the optimality condition is 
"A A, 
Týj p1q, 
2) the firm acts as a leader with respect to price and a Cournot 
oligopolist with respect to advertising. In this case 
L' 
=ki for i= 2j ... n Bpi 
2A i 0 for in 
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and the optimality condition is 
nAl A, 
(n PI +PCE) p1q, 
where PCE is the sum of the n-I price cross-elasticities 
Pi NJ 
ql' Mpi 
3) the fi rm acts as a Cournot oligopolist with respect to price 
and as a leader wi# respect to advertising. In this case 
the optimality condition is 
(nAl +ACE) A, 
n PI p1q, 
where ACE is the sum of the n-l advertising cross-elastic- 
ities of demand 
Ai Zql 
i=2,,...., n ý -I M11 
4) the firm acts as a leader with respect to both price and 
advertising. In this case the optimality condition is 
( nAl +ACE) A, 
_ (npl+PCE) p1q, 
The results will be unaltered if firm 1 is a 'follower' rather than the 
'leader'. Suppose firm j is the leader, then 
Pi = zi Pj 
then 
and 
and hence 
PI =ZIpi 
Pk z kPi 
P1 
I 
'Z-k Pk 
i=1,..., n ,iii 
kjj 
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i. e. the form of the price reaction functions is maintained. Since the 
products 1, ... n are substitutes, the price cross-elastici 
ties will be 
positive and the advertising cross-elasticities negative. Thus optimal 
advertising intensity will be higher in case 2 than in case 1, and low- 
er in case 3 than in case 1. The net effect of the cross-elastici ties 
on optimal advertising intensity in case 4 is a priori unknown. Whe- 
ther co-operation over price or non-price variables is more likely is 
open to question. On the one hand a firm may easily escape detection of 
its 'price changes' by making changes which do not represent alterations 
in list price. Equally, it may be easier for firms to monitor one anoth- 
er's advertising activities. In this situation case 3 seems most lik- 
ely. On the other hand we might argue that in some industries prices are 
closely monitored by rival firms, by consumers and the press. Thus price 
changes in the new car market are widely known, as Appendix %. I shows. 
Equally, promotional activities in the new car market may be very difficult 
to monitor because of the widespread nature of the retail motor trade. 
Case 2 would then be most appropriate. This topic is discussed further 
below. Cases I-4 listed above are, of course, a subset of the general 
cases (i) - (v) (equations 3.18 - 3.21) ot Chapter 3. In particular we are 
restricting ourselves in cases I-4 to the situation where reaction takes 
place in kind, i. e. one where price changes attract only retaliatory price 
changes and so on. 
RULE-OF-THUMB PRICING. 
There seems to be little doubt that a large number of fi rms 
make their pricing decisions with the aid of 'rules-of-thumbl. On the 
surface, at least, such rules-of-thumb do provide the necessary basis for 
oligopolistic co-operation. The major difference between the commonly en- 
countered rules-of-thumb pricing policies and the traditional marginalist 
approach is that the use of rules-of-thumb does not take into account the 
possible demand conditions facing the firm. The most typical such rule is 
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the 'full-cost' or 'cost-plus' pricing principle in which a 'normal I or 
desired profit margin (or percentage return on invested capital) is add- 
ed to the estimated unit costs in order to calculate the unit price of 
the product. Thus if all firms in an industry have similar costs and 
employ similar cost-plus pricing schemes, the uncertainty which clouds 
oligopoly is lessened, rivals' reactions are more predictable. Cost- 
plus pricing linked with price-leadership is a very pcwerful weapon for 
reducing oligopolistic uncertainty. Whether or not full-cost pricing 
takes into account demand conditions and is consistent with the notion 
of a firm maximising some set of objectives depends on how the margin is 
determined. Some light may be shed on this question by briefly consider- 
ing a sophisticated version of the full-cost pricing principle. 4 The 
firm adopts some long-term objective, say earning 15% after taxes on 
invested capital over the years. Since the firm is unsure of demand in 
the coming period, costs are calculated on the basis of some assumption 
about volume; for examples operation of the available plant at 80% of 
conservatively rated capacity. A 'price' is calculated by adding to the 
calculated average cost a sufficient margin to ensure that the stated obj- 
ective is met. This 'price' is then used as a basis for deciding the act- 
ual price, taking into account factors other than costs. Whether or not 
this procedure is consistent with profit (or utility) maximisation depends 
on how the adopted margins vary between products, and how the margin on 
any given product varies through time in response to changing demand con- 
ditions. Marginalist approaches do relate the mark-up over marginal cost 
to market parameters, for example the price-elasticity of demand. If,, over 
the range of output in which we are interested, average costs are approx- 
imatel. y constants then the mark-up of marginalist theory is the same as the 
, 
mark-up in full-cost pricing rules. The full-cost rule will then be qual- 
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itatively consistent with marginalist economic theory if the adopted 
margins vary between products in the same way as do the predicted mar- 
gins under marginalist theory. For example, if a firm chose a higher 
margin on a product with few close substitutes than on a product with 
many close substitutes (i. e. one where demand was relatively elastic) 
then the pricing behaviour of the firm would be qualitatively consist- 
ent with the predictions of marginalist theory. 
THE KINKED DEMAND CURVE. 
The kinked demand curve theory does not attempt to explain 
how an individual oligopolist sets price, rather it seeks to explain why 
oligopoly prices tend to be 'rigid'. that is tend not to alter in the 
short-run in response to short-run fluctuations in cost and demand con- 
ditions. The-kinked demand curve theory adds weight to the notion that 
prices might be rigid in the short-run by imputing expectations about 
rivals' reactions to the individual oligopolist. Essentially, the orig- 
inal Sweezy proposition" assumed that an individual oligopolist would 
adopt a 'pessimistic' view of rivals' reactions, that if he raised price 
no rival would followl, but if he lowered price all rivals would follow 
with the possible consequence of a price war. No individual oligopolist 
would then find it worthwhile to alter price unless the ruling industry 
price (the price at the' 'kink') was above the price which would maximise 
industry profits. . 
The opposite behaviour pattern is also possible, illustrated 
by the so-called 'reverse kink'. The implication is that if an individ- 
ual oligopolist raises price all rivals will follow, but if he lowers 
see Sweezy (1939). 
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price no rival will follow. This situation may occur where all firms 
are operating at or near full capacity, and hence may be less keen to 
increase sales than to increase profits. Increasing costs will add weight 
to this common desire to increase prices but not decrease them. Again 
t Appendix 4.1 provides some evidence for the'reverse kink'inasmuch as 
nearly all price increases were followed, but the only price decrease 
reported was not followed. 
Two major problems come to the fore in any discussion of kink- 
ed demand curves. Firstly, there is the question of how the ruling price 
was initially arrived at, and secondly, the fact that change in the ruling 
price will have to occur as changing demand and cost conditions render 
the existing price obsolete. The first question is somewhat irrelevent, ' 
it has some of the properties of the chicken and egg paradox. The second 
question tends to answer itself. The kinked demand curve theory is an 
explanation of short-run price rigidity; the kink will only exist if the 
majority of firms in the industry are happy with the price at the kink. 
When the ruling price becomes obsolete, and the majority of firms would 
prefer a new price, then there is little doubt that a new price will be 
found. How it is found the kinked demand curve theory does not say, but 
some form of barometric price-leadership would seem to be the answer. The 
kinked demand curve theory and the notion of barometric price leadership 
have the common element that some price changes will be followed whilst 
others will not. Recent experience in the U. K. motor industry, as describ- 
ed in Appendix 4.1 is consistent with both barometric price leadership 
and reverse kink explanations,, due to a combination of rising costs and 
reasonably high levels of demand. Analytically, the two situations are 
identical given that price rises are always followed whilst price decreases 
are never followed and hardly ever occur. 
t see Efryomson (1955) for discussion of the 'reverse kink'. 
A 
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ADVERTISING. 
As a description of the real world the marginalist model of 
advertising is clearly misleading. However, we have not nece. ssarily 
tried to put foyward the marginalist model as a description of firm be- 
haviour, but rather we have used it to provide loptimality' rules relat- 
ing to some of the firm's discretionary variables. We may briefly turn 
away to ask the question of whether the likely actual behaviour of firms 
is capable of being qualitatively consistent with theoretically optimal 
behaviour. 
At the outset it was noted that many fi rms adopt some form 
of rule-of-thumb to set advertising budgets. The most commonly employed 
rule-of-thumb is that of setting the advertising budget as a fraction of 
anticipated sales. The theoretical models presented above have the com- 
mon property that the advertising intensity be proportional to the advert- 
ising elasticity of demand and inversely porportional to the price elast- 
icity of demand. The rule-of-thumb method of setting advertising approp-, 
riations will be qualitatively consistent with the marginalist model if 
the chosen advertising intensity varies between products in the same way 
that the advertising elasticity and the inverse of price elasticity do. 
Whether or not the 'task method' of setting advertising budgets" is con- 
sistent with optimising behaviour depends very much on what objectives 
are chosen for the task method. If the objectives are stated in terms of 
variables which are of interest to the economist,, for example profits, 
sales or market sharess then consistency at the qualitative level exists. 
Other rules-of-thunb, for example setting advertising expenditures as a 
residual from profits are clearly not consistent with optimising behaviour. 
T see Chapter I. 
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For example, one way of moving from a loss-making to a profit-making pos- 
ition may be to increase expenditure on advertising, hence increasing sal- 
es and moving the firm to a lower average cost position. The residual- 
from-profits method would have the fim do the opposite. 
The preceding three sections have considered the possibility 
of co-operative pricing behaviour emerging in the absence of explicit agree- 
ments. We may profitably consider the same problem in relation to promot- 
ional expenditures in general and above-the-line advertising in particul- 
ar. It is clear that some firms do set advertising budgets defensively, 
that is they set their advertising budgets to keep up with competitors. 
They may do this because of their attitude toward promotional competition 
or because they have very little discretion in the matter (i. e. they are 
followers after a dominant firm). Perhaps the most interesting question 
is whether oligopolists are more likely to co-operate over price or non- 
price variables, or both. We may put forward two major supporting reas- 
ons for the assertion that co-operation is more likely over price. First- 
ly,, co-operation over price is more effective in preserving monopoly prof- 
its than is co-operation over non-price variables. Secondly, co-operation 
over price may be much more easily accomplished than co-operation over non- 
price variables. The former reason, which may alternatively be given as 
that price competition is much more effective in increasing output and re- 
ducing profits than non-price competition, is a common belief amongst econ- 
omists and others. In the context of a very simple model, Stigler (1968b) 
was able to show that in order for this belief to be true marginal costs 
of production must not rise so rapidly as the marginal costs of non-price 
variables. Stigler suggests that such a state of affairs is very plausible. 
The second reasons that co-operation over price may be easier to achieve 
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than co-operation over non-price variables, follows from the variety of 
non-price variables. Leaving aside quality competition of a major kind, 
non-price competition encompasses changes in above-the-line advertising,, 
below-the-line promotional activities, packaging changes and so on. 
The opposite argument may be advanced. Co-operation over non- 
price variables may be held to be more likely than co-operation over price. 
Firms may easily be able to escape detection or price changes by making 
various changes which do not represent changes in list price. In partic- 
ular, as Stigler (1964) points out, the 'price' we are concerned with is 
not the easily observed list price, but the private transactions price be- 
tween buyer and seller. On the other hand, advertising, to be effective, 
has to be readily available to all, and hence monitoring is easy. Clearly, 
which argument we accept depends on the particular features of the market 
under consideration. Some markets may be characterised by a great deal of 
promotional activity at the buyer-seller level, which is very difficult to 
monitor. For such markets the sales force is an important element in the 
promotional mix. The retail car trade may be an example of this type of 
market. 
Above-the-line advertising is easily detected by rivals, in- 
deed there may even be considerable advance notice of changes in advert- 
ising policy via the trade journals of the advertising industry. (Above- 
the-line) advertising-leadership might be expected to emerge where all 
firms in an industry face a set of circumstances which make it desirable 
for any given firm to alter advertising outlays provided all other firms 
do likewise. For example, firms in an industry where advertising intens- 
ity is high may. all be faced with a fall in demand which squeezes profits; 
all firms may then wish to reduce their advertising outlays, ana advertising 
leadership can emerge as a solution. 
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SUMMARY. 
The first part ot Chapter 3 presented a generalised (static) 
model of promotional activity at the firm level. Chapter 4 has outlined 
some situations which may be considered special cases ot the mooel in 
Chapter 3. The cases were selected because there is good, reason to believe 
that tne behaviour implied by them is encountered in the rea. 1 world. 1he 
first section of tne Chapter (on price-leadership) and Appendix 4.1 suggest 
that price-leadership is a possible explanation of the pricing behaviour 
of motor manufacturers in recent years. It was also suggested that 'price- 
leadership' was more likely to occur (in the context of the motor industry) 
than 'advertising-leadership', implying a higher 'optimal' aavertising-sales 
ratio than that predicted by the usual version of the DorTman-Steiner 
theorem. The 'kinked' dem and curve explanation ot behaviour was also con- 
sidered and it was suggested that it was consistent with the notion of 
price leadership in the context, of the motor industýy. 
Tne existence of rules-of-thumb Tor setting prices and advert- 
ising budgets was also considered. It was concluded that the fact that rules- 
of-thumb were frequently used by firms in practice was not necessarily a 
bar to the attainment of theoretically optimal positions as described by 
the theory of Chapters 2 and 3. 
u. ý 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
THE PATTERN * OF PRICE CHANGES * IN'THE' U. K. MOTOR INDUSTRY * 1967 - 71 .. 
In this appendix the price-changes initiated by the "big 
four" U. K. motor manufacturers are listed. Both the extent of the in- 
creases and the date of their announcement has been reported. Some oth- 
er illustrative items of information have been reported where they seem- 
ed relevent. The manufacturers operate in more than one market segment, 
but only the price changes affecting family saloon cars are reported. The 
object of the exercise is not an attempt to prove that the U. K. motor ind- 
ustry was characterised by price-leadership or any other explanation of 
pricing behaviour, but merely 
pricing behaviour during this 
tains the devaluation of the 
sharply rising (money) wages. 
of "The Times". except where 
are underlined. 
to report the outward signs of "big four" 
period. We may note that this period con- 
pound, a rise in the price of steel and 
The information was obtained from editions 
stated. The dates of the relevent editions 
January 18,1967, British Leyland announce price increases to take effect 
from January 30th. Increases : basic pricet of Mini 
de luxe up by M, basic prices of 1800 range-up by U9. 
February 25,1967 Ford increase basic prices of all Anglia and Cortina 
models by E25 from March Ist. Corsair models (except 
2000E) to go up by flO. 
March 23,1967 Rootes announced yesterday (March 22) 05 price increases 
for Hillman Imp de luxe, Hillman Super Imp and Singer 
Chamois. 
I British Leyland,, Ford, Vauxhall and Chrysler (Rootes Group). 
t price net of purchase tax. 
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April 1,1967 Statement of March 31st. reported by "The Times": 
"The price of some models of Vauxhall cars is to be 
increased"o Mr. M. B. Marr, manager of Vauxhall Motorsq 
Luton, said last night. The increases to be announced 
next week "will probably be in the same range as other 
makers have made". he said. " 
March 18,1968 Vauxhall prices increased by 3-8% , 15 out of 17 mod- 
els in range to go up, the other two having only just 
been repriced. Increases partly in response to purch- 
ase tax increases. 
March 20,1968 In addition to purchase tax increases, Rootes increase 
prices by 7% . 
May 6,1968 B. M. C. increase prices by 3-5% 
May 11,1968 Ford increase prices of all models by an average of 4% 
(Standard - Triumph raised prices by 21-3% on July Ist. )l 
July 10,1968 Rootes lower prices by an average of 7% on five medium 
saloons. It was also reported that Rootes were holding 
very big stocks and suffering from falling sales. 
September 3,1969 Vauxhall increase prices of all cars except Victor and 
Ventura range by an average of 4% from September lst. 
Septenber 11,1969 British Leyland increase prices of Mini saloons and 
Minor 1000 saloons by 4% from September 15th. 
1 "The Times" JOY Is 1968. 
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October 1 '1969 Ford raise prices on some models by 3-5% from 
September 30th. 
October 130 1969 British Leyland raise Austin-Morris prices (except 
Mi ni and Mi nor model s) - by 5% 
February 21,1970 British Leyland announce price increases of 2J-6% - 
"The Times" reported that the increases "surprised the 
motor industry which had been expecting something far 
higher. " The report went on to say, "It was understood 
that at least one company was having to reconsider its 
own revisions which it had hoped to announce next week. " 
April 1,1970 Prices of Ford cars go up by 3-4% . 
April 2,1970 Rootes announced on April lst. increases of 2-4% on 
basic prices of most Rootes cars. 
April 30,1970 "The Times" reports : "Prices of Vauxhall cars are to 
be increased. An announcement from the company is be- 
lieved to be imminent and the increases are expected 
to be about 5 per cent. " 
August 20,1970 Vauxhall is to increase prices of seven of its models 
in the Victor, Ventura and VX 4/90 ranges by 4-7% . 
Septerber 25,1970, Ford announce a new, more powerful and more expensive 
range of Escorts. Capri prices are also increased by 
3-4% . but a modified interior is introduced. 
Septenber 30', 1970 Some British Leyland prices increased by 4% from 5th. 
October. "The Times" reports : "Ford and Vauxhall have 
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already announced similar rises and Chrysler is expect- 
ed to follow shortly. 
October 1 1970 Chrysler increase prices by an average of 4% 
, 
October 5,1970, Vauxhall increase prices of larger cars by 3-9% from 
8 October. 
January 1, 1971 Chrysler cars are to go up in price by an average of 6% 
January 9, 1971 British Leyland are to raise some prices by 2-5% from 
January 11. "The Times" reports : "Although Ford and 
Vauxhall would not comment further, it was understood 
last night that despite the companies' normal practice 
of raising prices in unison, neither group has any short- 
tem plans to increase prices. " 
March 25,1971 "The Times" reports : "British Leyland are to raise 
the prices of all their "bread and butter" cars early 
next month... " 
"The rises are on all Austin-Morris division models 
and other specialist models not included in the January 
price rises. They average between 5 and 7j per cent... " 
"Other motor groups are expected in the near future to 
follow Leylandq who blamed the rises on "continuing 
cost inflation". " 
April 10,1971 The Ford Motor Company is to raise prices from April 
16th. Rises range from 137.86p (5%) on a2 door Escort 
to 1106 (6%) on a Zodiac. 
May 1.1971 Vauxhall increase prices of all their cars by an average 
of 7% 
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May 25,1971 Chrysler announce increases of 2% on several models 
including the Avenger. 
December 9,1971 Ford raise prices of Escorts, Cortinas, Capris and 
Zodiacs by an average of 3.3% 
December 17,1971 Vauxhall cars to cost an average of 3j% more from 
January Ist. 1972 .. 
(British Leyland prices went up in the week 15-22 January 
1972 by approximately 3J-4% on all cars in the Austin-Morris 
range. Chrysler raised prices by approximately the same 10 
amount in late February. )' 
We may summarise the information given above in the form of Table 4.1.1. 
The rounds of price changes referred to are groups of similar price chan- 
ges which take place within a short space of each other. Column 5 gives 
the time elapsing between the first company's announcement of a price in- 
crease (Column 1) to the last company's announcement of a price increase 
(Column 4). The seventh block of increases January Ist. - 1971 - May 25th. 
1971 contain two separate announcements by both British Leyland and Chry- 
sler. The announcements have been considered complementary. 
Ford, British Leyland and Vauxhall seem to act very much in 
concert, whilst Chrysler in one period (rounds 3 and 4) acted in a cont- 
rary fashion to the other three companies. Ford and British Leyland to- 
gether accounted for approximately 70 per cent of the market during the 
period. The lags between similar price changes between Ford and British 
Leyland were much shorter than those stated in the fifth column of Table 
78. 
TABLE 4ý1, L 
'Rounds' of price increases in the U. K. motor industry 
January Ist. 1967 to February 29th. 1972 . 
ROUND' Ist COMPANY TO 2nd COMPANY 3rd COMPANY 4th COMPANY TIME ALTER PRICES t SPAN 
1 British Ford Rootes Vauxhall 74 
Leyland 
2 Vauxhall Rootes British Ford 56 
land 
3 Rootes 
(downward change) 
4 'a Vauxhall British Ford 41 
Leyland 
5 British Ford Chrysler Vauxhall 69 Leyland 
6 Vauxhall Ford British Chrysler 48 
Leyland 
7 Chrysler British Ford Vauxhall 126 Leyland 
8 Ford Vauxhall 
1 
British Chrysler 73 
1 
Leyland 
I approx. 
ti. e. time elapsed between first company announcing changes and last 
company announcing changes in days. 
b 
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Although it is not intended to discuss the results given in 
this Appendix in the context of a formal model of firm pricing behaviour, the 
results d6 tend to suggest some 'models' rather than others. One feature 
OT the pattern of price changes outlined above is clearly that little or no 
list price competition is evident where 'established' models are concerned. 
In addition the general direction of price change has been upward, and upward 
price changes are frequently associated witn rising input costs. *lhus the 
evidence of tnis Appendix may be seen as consistent with both the barometric 
price-leacership' and 'reverse kink' explanations of pricing behaviour. In 
many practical situations tne two 'theoretical' explanations may be indist- 
inguishable. 
0 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 AND APPENDIX 4.1. 
I. A fuller account of collusion is given by Scherer (1971). 
2. Scherer (1971). Chapter 6s discusses price-leadership using the 
collusive-barometric distinction. 
3. For a general di*scussion of pricing strategies see Silbertson (19/0). 
4. Actually based on tne one used by General Motors. See Scherer (1971) 
pp. 1/4-5. 
5. For the original statement of the 'theory' see Sweezy (1939). Alter- 
native views are given by Stigler'(1947) and Efryomson 
. 
(1955). 
6. Information obtained by comparing weekly price lists of cars given in 
in the magazine "Motor". 
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CHAPTERS 
EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF THE ADVERTISING MODEL. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The perspective adopted so far has been a micro-analytic one. 
The (not uncommon or particularly original) argument is advanced that if 
we wish to know more about advertising effects and about factors affect- 
ing the level of advertising then a logical place to look is the brand 
level of competition. The micro-analytic approach is not capable of taking 
into account all the problems encountered when considering advertising; on 
the other hand it is not entirely devoid of predictive content, particularly 
when quantitative-information is available! The chapter discusses the 
methods used to give the approach a quantitative basis, and applies the 
model developed in Chapter 3. 
'DIRECT' METHODS OF TESTING THE THEORY. 
Consider the Dorfman - Steiner theorem as an example of the 
kind of result generated by the theory. The Dorfman - Steiner theorem may 
be tested 'directly' by deriving estimates of the. appropriate elasticities 
and comparing those estimates with actual values of firms' decision var- 
iables. Divergence of actual behaviour from the apparent optimum can then 
be explained, at the quantitative level at least, in terms of differences 
in the degree of competitive interdependence, differing attitudes to risk, 
and so on. The studies by Lambin are an excellent example. ' Two relation- 
ships-turn out to be of great importance in the Lambin studies, and in all 
similar studies. The first has already been extensively explored, that the 
Lambin (1969). (1970a), (197.0b), (1972). (1973). 
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modulus of the ratio of the 
appropriately defined given 
2 
advertising-sales ratio .T 
the optimisation conditions 
function be 
51 
advertising and price elasticities of demand, 
the assumptions of the model,, should equal the 
he second relationship is simply derived from 
of the usual model. Let the firm's profit 
n= pq - c(q) - 
where q= q(p) . The first-order conditions for a maximum are : 
alT 
5.2 (p - MC) 
2R 
+q0 Bp 
all 
5.3 aT = (p - MC) 0 
5.2 and 5.3 may be written 
5.4 p- MC =I pInp 
5.5 p- MC =A1 p pq nA 
where n and nA are defined as before. The term p- 
MC is the gross pp 
profit margin, provided we assume constant costs over the range of output 
we are considering, that is marginal cost is equal to average variable cost. 
if is the short-run elasticity with respect to advertising, the long- 
run condition corresponding to 5.5 is 
5.6 p- MC A (I-X) 
P pq nA 
nA 
where is the long-run advertising elasticity and X is the 
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advertising decay rate. 
2 Estimates of nA' TI P and 
X can be derived 
and compared with known values of measures of the fi rm's performance, i. e. 
the gross profit margin and the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales. 
A more complex approach to the problem would be to estimate the same demand 
function in different ways, thus obtaining estimates of differing elastic- 
ities for the same product. Thus if a demand function were estimated in 
both absolute sales and market share form, the difference between the two 
derived elasticities could be attributed to competitive interaction, prov- 
ided industry demand was inelastic. 3 The limits and pitfalls of the econ- 
ometric approach to the study of advertising have frequantly been pointed 
out. 
q In particular a simultaneity problem arises in the estimation of 
demand functions when advertising expenditure is included as a variable. 
4 
Current advertising expenditures influence current sales, and if the imp- 
lications of the analysis are accepted, current advertising expenditures 
are set with reference to current sales. Recognition of this simultaneity 
should lead us to adopt an estimation method which takes it into account,, 
for example two-stage least squares. A suitable model would then consist 
of, say, the demand function and an advertising appropriations relation- 
ship consistent with optimising behaviour. ' Such a method has been employ- 
ed by Cowling (1972). 5 On the other hand it may be that this simultaneity 
problem does not exist. It is possible for the firm to set the advertising 
appropriation on some basis other than the level of current sales or the 
expected level of sales in the period when the advertising is to take place. 
In this case our interest is in whether or not the firm in fact appears to 
act in an optimal fashion, ex post, or at least how far the firm's actual 
behaviour is in accord with the predictions of the theoretical model, with- 
out undue regard for the question of whether the firm 'fits' the assumptions 
a 
see Quandt (1964). 
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of the theoretical model. 6 If such a set of circumstances prevails then 
single equation estimation methods are acceptable. Thus there are two 
distinct viewpoints we may take. We can attempt to build a model which 
is in accord with what we believe firms actually do, in which case the 
model must be operational and the problem of simultaneity must be faced, 
or we may simply compare estimated parameters of the market situation, 
with actual behaviour, asking only the question whether or not actual be- 
haviour is consistent with optimal behaviour. The advantage of the first 
method is that it tells us something about how firms actually behaveg its 
disadvantage is that it is a difficult method of investigation, requiring 
the construction of a model of the firm. The second method tells us noth- 
ing about the way firms behavel, particularly with regard to the actual 
method of appropriating advertising expenditures, but is relatively simple 
to apply to specific markets. This second method will be applied to the 
U. K. passenger car market as part of this thesis. 
Typically researchers have considered non-durables markets, 
and results have been quite good in the sense that estimated parameters 
of the market situation have been of the expected magnitude, and often 
actual policies have appeared to be quite close to the suggested optimal 
policies. Cowling (1972) reports measured values of the ratio 
"A 
il 
n pi 
Ai /R 
(where n Ai 5n Pi are 
the estimated elasticities of market share with 
respect to advertising share and relative price for the average firm in 
the market and Ai/Ri is the market average adverti si ng-s ales ratio) of 
1.41 for margarine, 4-15 for coffee and 0-78 for toothpaste. The 
$expected' value of the ratio is unity. For the two durables markets stud- 
ied by Cowling the values of this 'optimality ratio' are 13-7 (cars) and 
10-88 (tractors). Several reasons may be advanced for the failure of the 
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method where durables are concerned. Firstly, there is bound to be a 
serious error of omission problem; much promotional activity in the two 
markets discussed by Cowling takes place at point of sale or is dealer 
(rather than manufacturer) instigated. The measure of advertising used 
was expenditure on national press and television advertising. 7 Secondly, 
advertising may be linked to new model introductions giving measures of 
the advertising share elasticity an upward bias. Thirdlyq the essential 
effect of advertising may be on the timing of purchases rather than the 
level of purchases within a period. 8 Lambin (1970a) reports values of 
the marginal profit contribution per dollar of advertising expenditure in 
the range 10 - 28 cents for three brands of a "small electrical appliance 
whose rate of ownership among households is as high as 75 per cent. " 
I 
Lambin (1970b) reports another result for a consumer durable good (unspc- 
ified in the paper). In this case the opposite finding to the Cowling 
one emerges, that the firm seemed to overspend on advertising, although 
only to a fairly small extent. Expressing Lambin's result in terms of a 
Cowling-type optimality ratio gives a value of 0-736 when short-run 
market share elasticities are employed. Peles (1971b) reports a net rate 
of return to advertising expenditures of 10 per cent for a "beer firm" 
and a net rate of return of approximately 50 per cent for cigarette firms. 
Both results assume a period of influence of advertising expenditures of 
1-75 years and a rate of amortisation of advertising expenditures of 40 
per cent. Samuels (1972) gives estimated advertising elasticities in the 
fruit squash market of approximately 0-065 
1968) and 0.18 (August 1968). 
-0 
(September 1967), 0-265 (June 
11 Lambin (1970a), p. 233 . 
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AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE DIRECT METHODS : THE STOCK-ADJUSTMENT MODEL. 
The 'direct' methods of testing for optimality in fi rms' 
advertising behaviour present a paradox. We are interested in firms, 
behaviour, but we examine a relationship which is determined by the behav- 
iour of consumers, the demand function facing the firm, in order to test 
for optimality. Recognition of the simultaneity problem does not help 
much, since any advertising appropriations relationship incorporated into 
the model is picked without any reference to the model of optimal behav- 
iour. At best an advertising appropriations relationship which is general 
enough to include optimising behaviour must be chosen. An alternative 
method is derived in Chapter 3. In general the method is based on discov- 
ering optimality rules for the optimal stock of advertising goodwill, and 
incorporating those optimality rules into a stock-adjustment model to yield 
an estimating equation which relates the fi rm's current advertising expend- 
itures to current and/or past values of other measures of the fi rm's per- 
formance. The particular model developed in Chapter 3 yielded the estim 
ating equation 
RR 
At= sc I 
"t I- t- II 
PA 
t 
(P+6) 'OPA t 
PA 
t-I 
( 
ýP+6)-APA t-'l 
PA 
t 
PA 
t- 
+0- OA 
where c 
"K 
np 
11K is the elasticity of demand with respect to the 
stock of advertising goodwill 
np is the price elasticity of demand taking into 
account competitive reaction 
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p is the discount rate 
6 is the goodwill decay rate 
PAt is the price of 
. 
advertising in period t 
Rt is the value of sales in period t 
At is advertising expenditure in period t deflated 
by the price index of advertising (pat) 
The advantages of testing for optimal behaviour by estimating equation 5.7 
are firstly, that firms' behaviour is examined to test for optimality and 
secondly, that the model from which 5.7 is derived deals specifically 
with the advertising stock. In addition, 5.7 has the particular advant- 
10 
age that the price of advertising is incorporated as an explanatory variable. 
The disadvantages of the model are that it still only allows an ex post view 
11 
of firm behaviour, and that it requires non-linear methods of estimation. 
One other feature of the model is of interest. Provided we assume that nK 
and nP are constant (i. e. that the demand function is log-linear in K 
and p) it is not necessary to estimate them. The advantages of this are 
two-fold. Firstly, nK is very difficult to estimate and anything which 
circumvents this problem is desirable. Secondly, nP may be defined as 
widely as we like, in particular we may define nP to take into account 
reaction by competitors. The disadvantage is clear : the supposed constancy 
Of nK and nP is a large assumption. 
ESTIMATION OF THE STOCK-ADJUSTMENT MODEL. 
Estimation of 5.7 requires the use of non-linear methods. 
The particular method chosen was probably the simplest. 5.7 was estimated 
for different values of (p + 6) which were chosen on theoretical and 
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practical grounds. A 'point' estimate was obtained by choosing that value 
of (p + 6) which minimised the residual (unexplained) sum of squares 
(R. S. S. ). Given this value of (P + 6) 5.7 is exactly identified. An 
estimate of a can be obtained from the estimated coefficient of A t- i 
knowing a, c, can be obtained from the coefficient of the current sales 
term, and hence knowing 8 and Cl , an estimate of 6 (and thus of P) can 
be obtained from the coefficient of the immediate past sales term. Some 
problems are raised by the fact that the non-linearity in 5.7 occurs in 
the denominator of two variables. Thus 5.7 breaks down when 
(0+ 6) '4' ' ýPA t 
IPA 
t. 
We would expect that as (13 + 6) - APAj/PAt"' 0, 
R. S. S. -ý- -. Thus we would expect the function linking (P + 6) to the 
residual sum of squares to have (n + 1) discontinuities, where n is the 
12 
number of periods for which data is available. The consequences of this 
fact are not serious provided vie expect the global minimum value of the 
residual sum of squares to occur at a value of (P + 6) outside the range 
where such discontinuities occur. However, preliminary investigations using 
the data intended for estimation of 5.7 showed that this could not be 
safely assumed. 
Initially investigations were unaertaken for tfie range of 
values U. 1 <(p+0.75.. In this range no complications arise since 
the maximum value Of'O'PA 
t 
ýPA 
t 
was 0.0636 for the perioa under consideration. 
(see Table '5.1 ). If the estimates of equation 5.7 were to be consistent with 
the model advanced in Chapter 3 we would -.. require that the minimum value OT 
the R. S. S. should occur for a value of (p+6) greater than the maximum 
value Of APAtl, PAt recorded in the period of observation. It was apparent 
4 
W. 
as a result OT the preliminary investigations that this was not to be the case, 
and that turther investigation ot equation 5.7 was necessary. The usual "hill- 
climbing" routines for estimating non-linear relationships coula not be usea 
since the non-linearities in tne estimating equations occ6rred in tne denom- 
inators of tne indepencent variables and could therefore give rise to dis- 
continuities in the R. S. S. (given that initial explorations showed that the 
minimum values of the R. S. S. dia not lie in the expected positive range). 
* 
It was therefore decided to adhere to the estimation method outlined above. 
Careful choicd of values ot (p+6) bearing in mina the known values 
where discontiniuties would occur permitted a useful mapping of values 
of the K. S. S. 
.. 
In'order to obtain a complete mapping of the values of the 
residual sum of squares a large number of values of (P + 6) had to be 
tried. In each case 87 values of (p + 6) in the range 
-0.9 <, (p + 6) < 0.95 were used. 60 of the chosen values occurred withinp 
or close to, the range where all the discontinuities occurred 
-0.0386 4 (p + 6) < 0.0636.17 of the chosen values occurred in the range 
0.1 to 0.95 and 10 in the range -0.9 to -0.1 . The range 
0.1 4 (P + 6) 1 0.95 is consistent with the profit-maximising model, given 
that reasonable values for the discount rate, P, might lie in the range 
0.05 to 0.35 and reasonable values for the decay rate of the advertising 
stock might be in the range P-05 to 0-6- (evidence on the likely size of the 
decay rate cap be found in Peles (1971b) and Cowling et al. (1973) ). 
i 
I am indebted to Dennis Leech of the University of Warwick for advice 
on this point. 
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THE DATA. 
q. 7 was estimated using data for the (then) five major U. K. 
motor manufacturers for the period 1958-68 inclusive 
ý3 The data is annual, 
giving a total of eleven observations 
McGuinness (1973) price index for adv 
APA 
t-l 
IPA 
t-l 
are shown in Table 5.1. 
of the table are those at which 5.7 
for each company. The values of the 
ertising and the terms APAt/PA 
t 
and 
The values in the right-hand columns 
is undefined, i. e. the values of 
(p + 6) for which the R. S. S. becomes infinite. 
TABLE 5.1. 
The McGuinness Price Index for Advertising : index based on the average 
cost per 1000 readers in national newspapers. 
PA 
t '&PA t 
'PA 
t '&PA t-1 
/PA 
t- 1 
1956 1.1932 
1957 1.1925 
1958 1.2735 0.0636 -0.0059 
1959 1.2915 0.0139 0.0636 
1960 1.2880 -0.0027 0.0139 
1961 1.3090 0.0160 -0.0027 
1962 1.3685 0.0435 0.0160 
1963 1.3417 -0.0200 0.0435 
1964 1.4264 0.0524 -0.0200 
1965 1.4545 0.0193 0.0524 
1966 1.4382 -0.0113 0.0193 
1967 1.3751 0.0386 -0-0113 
1968 1.4463 0.0492 0.0386 
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RESULTS. 
The results of the estimation of equation 5.7 are summarised 
in Table -5.2 and figures 6.1 to 5.10 inclusive. 
Figures 5.1 to 5.10 
plot the derived values of the residual (unexplained) sum of squares against 
the chosen values of (P + 6) . Table 5.2 reports the regression results 
where a global minimum value of the residual sum of squares was reached 
for each of the five companies. Thus for each company two graphs and one 
regression result are reported. The first graph in each company pair shows 
values of the R. S. S. for values of (P + 6) in the range 
-0.9 4 (P + 6) 4 0.95 , but excluding those values of (P + 6) which 
fall 
within the range of the values of (P + 6) where it is predicted that dis- 
continuities will occur . The two dotted lines indicate the bounds of this 
range. The second graph in each company pair shows values of the R. S. S. 
for values of (P + 6) within the range where it is predicted that discon- 
tinuities will occur. The dotted lines indicate the critical values of 
(P + Between any pair of dotted lines we would expect the plotted 
paths to form a U-shape. Inspection shows that this does not always seem 
to be the case, although further points would have to be plotted before we 
can be certain that the results do not conform to expectations. In a few 
cases the expected U-shape emerges very clearly. The one regression result 
reported for each company is that one containing the value of (P + 6) 
which gives the minimum value of the R. S. S. for all the values of (P + 
tried (called above the global minimum value of the R. S. S. ). The regressions 
are well determined, but in none of the cases do the results conform to the 
predictions of the model, In order for the reported results to be consist- 
ent with the'proposed stock-adjustment model we would (at the very least) 
require that the estimated coefficient on the current sales tem be positive 
92. 
and that the estimated coefficient on the immediate past sales term be 
negative. Confidence intervals for (P + 6) may be derived using a 
method proposed by Goldfeld and Quandt (1972). The confidence ihterval 
for (P + 6) may be derived from the R. S. S. using the formula 
5.8 n log R. S. S. 
(. E+6) -n log R. S. S. 
(0+6) 
X2 n-np 
where n is the number of observations 
R. S. S. (ý-+6) is the value of the R. S. S. at the bounds 
of the confidence interval 
R. S. S. (P+6) is the value of R. S. S. at the global 
minimum 
p is the number of restrictions placed on the 
estimating equation 
C1 is the level of significance 
In the current example a five per cent level is chosen and p=1. The 
test implied by 5.7 is only applicable where the function linking (P + 
and the R. S. S. is continuous. Since the global minimum values of the R. S. S. 
for B. M. C. and Ford lie within the range of discontinuities, no confid- 
ence interval can be derived for (p + 6) in these two cases. For Standard- 
Triumph the C. I. is 0.08 < (P + 6) < 0.22 . For Vauxhall a lower bound 
to the C. I. is not available, since it falls outside the range of observ- 
ations; the upper bound of the C. I. is -0.07 . For Rootes an upper 
bound is not available, the lower bound being 0.19 . 
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Tne t-values reported in Table 5. Z indicate contidence intervals 
for the parameter estimates conditional upon a-particular value of (p+6) 
being used in estimation. Normally, of course, 'all paramters are estimated 
jointly, hence the t-values (and D-W statistic yalues) quoted in Table 5. t^ 
do not permit the usual interpretation. 3hey can however be used as a guide 
to the degree of*determination of the individual parameter estimates. We 
might expect the t-values to be larger than they would be in the (hypotnet'l., 
case of joint estimation of (p+6) along with the other parameters, an, ý 
thus tney should-be treated with caution. Caution is particularly ind'. calt-C. 
given the width of the confidence intervals on the estimates of (p 
ted Thus the results for Vauxhall and Rootes in Table. 5.2 might well be iný. 
as if the regressions were not significants despite the 'reasonable' F-scorc: ý 
reported. 
The results reported in Table 5.2 are difficult to assess. 
counting tne results in the Vauxhall and Rootes columns since they are bast 
interpreted as being not significant leaves the results for B. M. C. , Fora 
and Standard-Triumph to be explained. In none of these cases do the sizes OT 
the coeffidents correspond with the sizes predicted by the model of Chapter 
3. In particular all of the coefficients on At_, are significantly different 
from zero, in two cases the estimate of a(1 minus the coefticient on At_, ) 
is itself not significantly different from zero. On the basis of Chapter 3 
we would expect the sign on tne current sales term to be positive and the sign 
on the immediate past sales term to be negative. In none of the three cases 
is this prediction borne out. In addition to the sign problem the coefficients 
themselves are very small. Were the signs 'correct', advertising-stock/sales 
ratios of considerably less than one thousandth would be indicated in all 
three cases. 
Clearly the results given in Table 5.2 and in Figures 5.1 -;,. D 
5.10 are not consistent with the model in Chapter 3. Nor do the results seem 
to be consistent with any other theory of advertising behaviour. In particular 
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when (p+6) falls in the range of the discontinuities a very erratic path 
for At can be produced. Clearly such an erratic patn is an unsatisfactory 
prediction and reflects-on. the---results given in Table 4.2. For example the Tirms 
do -not* seem,, ex posts to be adopting the 'rule' that advertising expend- 
itures should be a constant proportion of sales. Table 5.3 illustrates 
this contention by giving the meanst standard deviations and ranges of 
advertising intensity for the five companies over the period under invest- 
igation (1958-68 inclusive). 
Table 5.3 might not tell the whole stbry. The theory defines 
ex ante advertising intensity and Table 5.3 examines actual advertising 
intensity. Thus planned advertising intensity could deviate from actual 
advertising intensity, particularly due to variations in actual sales rev- 
enue. We should therefore examine the variance in advertising and sales 
revenue separately. One way of doing this and hence testing for rule-of- 
thumb behaviour with respect to advertising appropriations is to regress 
advertising on current sales and/or immediate past sales. This may ba 
done in absolute form or first difference form. Table 5.4 reports resu! -,,!: ý 
for the five companies. The negative coefficients are difficult to exp! z'-. r_ 
but the regressions in which they feature are poorly determined. Except in 
the case of B. M. C. , who appear to be behaving roughly in accord with the 
constant advertising intensity rule-of-thumb, the regressions fail to yield 
any fresh information. 
Although the empirical results must cast doubt on the theoretical 
moael, it would be foolish to reject the model without any reference to the 
quality. of the test of it. Ihe results of Table 5.2 represent a potentially 
and the nature of the car market. Above-the-line aavertising does not seem 
to be-an important promotional variable in the car market (except for new 
poor test of the model OT Chapter 3 given the size of the estimated coefticients 
models), advertising intensities are typically lows and a previous study 
Cowling_(1972) ) has indicated that car manufacturers may not be adopting 
Vli* 
when (p+a) falls in the range of the discontinuities a very erratic path 
for At can be produced. Clearly such an erratic patn is an unsatisfactory 
prediction and reflects on the results given in Table 4.2. For example the Tirms 
do -not, seem, ex post, to be adopting the 'rule' that advertising expend- 
itures should be a constant proportion of sales. Table 5.3 illustrates 
this contention by giving the means, standard deviations and ranges of 
advertising intensity for the five companies over the period under invest-- 
igation (1958-68 inclusive). 
Table 5.3 might not tell the whole story. The theory defines 
ex ante advertising intensity and Table 5.3 examines actual advertising 
intensity. Thus planned advertising intensity could deviate from actual 
advertising intensity, particularly due to variations in actual sales rev- 
enue. We should therefore examine the variance in advertising and sales 
revenue separately. One way of doing this and hence testing for rule-of- 
thumb behaviour with respect to advertising appropriations is to regress 
advertising on current sales and/or immediate past sales. This may ba 
done in absolute form or first difference form. Table 5.4 reports resuý-, -, 
for the five companies. The negative coefficients are difficult to exp! "-r. 
but the regressions in which they feature are poorly determined. Except in 
the case of B. M. C. . who appear to be behaving roughly in accord with the 
constant advertising intensity rule-of-thumb, the regressions fail to yield 
any fresh information. 
Although the empirical results must cast doubt on the theoretical 
moael, it wouid be foolish to reject the model without any reference to V". 2 
quality. of the test of it. Ihe results of Table 5.2 represent a potentially 
poor test of the model OT Chapter 3 given the size of the estimated coefticients 
and the nature of the car market. Above-the-line aavertising does not seem 
to be. an important promotional variable in the car market (except for naj 
models), advertising intensities are typically low, and a previous study 
Cowling (1972) ) has indicated that car manufacturers may not be adopting 
profit-maximising behaviour. It Would be useful to repeat the procedure of 
this Chapter using data referring to a product market where it is known that 
above-the-line advertising is an important promotional variable. 
14 
We must 
not forget however that the results of Table 5.2 can be used as evidence 
of non-optimising behaviour by car manufacturers. 
SUMMARY. 
The stock-adjustment model of Chapter 3 was estimated using data 
referring to the five major U. K. *motor manufacturers over tne period 1958- 
68. Whilst the results cast grave doubts on the theoretical model it was 
suggested that the test was not a good one. It would be of considerable 
interest to apply the model to a non-durable market. 
An alternative approach which maintains the standpoint of 
exami . ning firms' (rather than consumers') behaviour would be to derive 
an optimal path for advertising at the firm level from a model of optim- 
is 
ising behaviour. There is no guarantee, however, that such a method will 
yield an equation which is any easier to estimate, or more empirically 
useful than 5.7. The results of Tables 6.2,5.3 and 5.4 do not 
seem to support any of the hypotheses concerning fi rms' advertising behav- 
iour which have been mentioned so far. 
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TABLE §., 2 
Rýgression results for values of (P + 6) which produce a 
global minimum value of the Residual Sum of Squares. 
B. M. C. FORD STANDARD VAUXHALL ROOTES 
TRIUMPH 
p+6 0.05 0.047 0.1 -0.3 0.7 
i 
CURRENT SALES -1.5511 3.7975 -3.558 -1.2135 -5.8475 
TERM x10-6 x10-6 x, 0-4 xl 0- 
3 
xl 0- 
31 
(3.6245) (3.1969) (3.2261) (1.8443) (0.8875) 
IMMEDIATE PAST 2.4631 2.0316 8.5957 -0.7316 10. -`043 
SALES TERM xjO-6 X1 0- 
6 
xjO-4 xjO-3 xi 3" 
1., 
(2.4466) (0.8983) (6.7372) (1.0492) (1.763ý) 
A t-1 1.0225 1.0221 0.5937 -0.0222 0.3240 
(2.9085) (23.2274) (4.2403) (0.6476) (0.8503) 
d. f. 3.8 3.8 3,8 3.8 3.8 
F. 290.671 190.768 90.4042 17.1097 i 12.9163 
D-W 2.1214 2.3006 2.5441 1.7847 2.5381 
values in brackets. 
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TABLE 5.. 3 
Means, Standard Deviations and Ranges of the Advertising Intensities 
(At /Rt . where At is measured in expenditure terms) for the 
period 1958 - 68 inclusive. 
MEAN STANDARD RANGE 
DEVIATION 
B. M. C. 0.005091 0.001150 0.003071 - 0.007496 
FORD 0.005823 0.001628 0.003477 - 0.008279 
STANDARD 0.032703 0.01839 0.012247 - 0.082344 TRIUMPH 
VAUXHALL 0.007474 0.003753 0.001612 - 0.01638 
ROOTES 0.009443 0.006226 1 0.002641 - 0.02894 
98; 
TABLE . 5.4 
Regression of AA t on AR t and 
AR t-l for the 
period 1959 - 1968 inclusive. 
B. M. C. FORD STANDARD 
TRIUMPH 
VAUXHALL ROOTES 
AR 0.001912 0.009453 0.002355 0.001471 -0.01505 t 
(1.6809) (0.6618) (0.2544) (0.3524) (1.4560) 
AR t-l 0.001975 0.017133 -0.002046 -0.001321 0.003804 
(1.7635) (0.8939) (0.2165) (0.2996) (0.3743) 
d. f. 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 
F. 1.7274 0.4080 0.04149 0.1048 1.06173 
D-W 2.5053 1.0437 2.1478 3.3920 3.0277 
values in brackets. 
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FIGURE 5.9 
Graph of Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) against value-s of (p + 6) 
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FIGURE 5.10 
Values of Re sidual Sum of Squares (RSS) for values'of 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5., 
1. At. the qualitative level,, however, the model is largely 'empty'. 
The reasons for this are now well known, and were extensively discuss- 
ed by Archibald (1961), (1964) and Lancaster (1962). (A replay of the 
Chicago - Archibald debate is contained in Rowley (1972). ) Archibald 
(1961) has written of this kind of model "... significant qualitative 
predictions cannot be obtained without quantitative information. " 
2. The long-run elasticity of demand with respect to advertising may be 
easily derived empirically. Suppose that 'goodwill' is given by 
CO IN 
t- 1 where 0<x<I. Use of this definition of goodwill i =0 
in the demand function and application of the Koyck transformation 
yields an estimable demand function. See for example Lambin (1969). 
The general result of such a treatment is that the long-run elasticity 
is equal to the short-run elasticity divided by (I - A). X (the 
decay rate) has itself been the subject of many studies, for example 
Palda (1964); Lambin (1969). (1972); Peles (1971b) and McGuinness and 
Cowling (1972). Otherlag functions may be applied, giving different 
results. Geometrically declining lags are, however, the most common- 
ly assumed type, and give good results empirically. 
3. Lambin (1973) uses this approach extensively. When the demand funct- 
ion is estimated in absolute sales form, the independent variables are 
expressed in absolute units also. Similarly a market share function 
has independent variables expressed as shares. 
4. This problem has recently been extensively discussed by Schmalensee 
(1972). 
S. -Thus Cowling (1972) adopts an advertising appropriations relationship 
of the fom 
A'. 
t= 
-yo S 
ýl Si -Y2 
t t- I 
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I where Ai 
t 
is the firm's share of industry advertising in period t 
and Si is the fi m's market share in period t. This appropriat- 
t 
ions relationship is held to be'consistent with both theoretical opt- 
imality rules and rule-of-thumb, behaviour of the type described by 
Taplin (1959) and Kuehn (1961). 
6. Thus we embrace the positive approach to methodology espoused by 
Friedman (see Friedman (1953)). 
7. Clearly one has to assume something about the relationship between 
unmeasured promotion and the measured advertising input. A possible 
solution to this problem was given in Chapter 1. note 7. 
8. Evidence from an advertising appropriations relationship estimated 
by Cowling suggest that retaliatory advertising was important. Allow- 
ing for this in the car market reduces the observed optimality ratio 
by about half. 
9. Samuel? model is, however* open to severe criticism. Other studies 
which examine the relationship between advertising and sales, but 
are not necessarily directed toward discovering whether actual firm 
behaviour is optimal or not from the economic point of view are 
Vidale and Wolfe (1957); Palda (1964); Telser (1962b); Kitchener and 
Rowland (1971); Sexton (1972) and Schnabel (1972). 
10. Indeed it is this feature of the model which allows us to estimate it 
at all. Most models assume that the price of advertising is constant, 
a highly unrealistic assumption. (See McGuinness in Cowling et al. (1973)1, 
11. As pointed out earlier 5.7 suffers from the simultaneity problem if 
it is to be treated as an advertising appropriations relationship. 
12. Clearly when (P + 6) - APAtIPAt-"- 0 small changes in the chosen 
value of (p + 6) will result in very large changes in the value of 
the tem ,Rt1 resulting in the level of determination of 
PA 
t 
(p+6 )-6PA 
t 
PA 
t 
Ill. 
the regression altering very rapidly as (P + 6) approaches 
0 (n + 1) discontinuities will occur 
because of the APA 
t 
'PA 
t 
lagged variable PA 
t-I 
(P+")-APA 
t-1 
PA 
t-I 
13. British Motor Corporation, Ford, Vauxhall,, Rootes and Standard 
Triumph. Over the period of observation British Motor Corporation 
and Standard Triumph merged. Rootes has been taken over by Chrysler 
since 1968. Sales data was provided by the companies involved. 
Advertising data was obtained from Statistical Review of Press and 
T. V. Advertisings, Legion Publishing Co. The price index of advert- 
ising is from McGuinness in Cowling et al. (1973). The advertising 
and sales data was originally collected for other purposes, notably 
papers by Keith Cowling and John Cubbin in connection with research 
undertaken with finance from the Centre for Industrial, Economic and 
Business Research$ University of Warwick. I am extremely grateful 
for the use of this material. 
14. It would be of interest to apply the model to a market which on the 
basis of other tests seemed to be characterised by 'optimal' advert- 
ising behaviour on the part of its constituent firms. The margarine, 
instant coffee and toothpaste markets may fall into this category 
(Cowling (1972). ) 
15. Such an equation is proposed by Jacquemin (1971). 
I 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ANALYSIS APPLIED TO QUALITY. 
INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter attempts to explore the problems which arise 
when quality differences between similar products are integrated into a 
model of demand. Previous work in the field is reviewed, and an attempt 
to define 'quality' is made. The possible relationship between prices 
and 'qualities' in a group of competing products is discussedg and in par- 
ticular the so-called 'hedonic' technique If is considered. 
DEFINITIONS. 
Marketing men and management scientists often speak of product 
'quality' as being an important element in the marketing mix. Another, but 
similar, usage of the term appears in the term 'quality control I. Econom- 
ists often refer to the concept of 'quality competition'. The consumer 
takes 'quality' into account when making a purchasing decision$ or when 
comparing current to past products. Thus the housewife may complain that 
the 'quality' of potatoes or milk is not as 'good' as it was. Clearly the 
word 'quality' is being used differently in these examples. It is therefore 
helpful to have a definition of 'quality' before proceeding to incorporate 
the term into a theory of demand 
Given a product, which is already specified in the sense that 
its characteristics have been decided upon, its 'quality' may vary because 
the quality of the raw materials and labour inputs incorporated in its 
ii see Griliches (1961).. 
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manufacture may vary. Hence variation in 'quality' occurs between differ- 
ent units of the same variety or 'brand'. Firms recognise this and usually 
employ some checking procedure to ensure that the finished product is up to 
a minimum standard. On a different level the housewife may well claim that 
potatoes are of 'poorer quality' because a greater percentage of them are 
damaged or inedible, are difficult to scrape, or become mushy when boiled. 
She will frequently be prepared to pay a higher price for potatoes which 
do not have as many faults. In this case the housewife is concerned with 
the'quality' differences which occur between different brands or varieties 
of the same product. It is this latter source of quality differentiation, 
the inter-variety type, which is of importance to economics. 'Quality' 
control, where 'quality' differences are of the within brand or variety 
type, is of importance to production managers and those who wish to optim- 
ise at the production line level. 
We may briefly distinguish four different views of 'quality' 
which appear in the economics literature. The simplest view occurs in the 
early attempts to incorporate quality into the marginalist framework; an 
example of this approach is contained in the work of Dorfman and Steiner 
(1954). A continuous index of quality is assumed, where quality is defined 
as "..,, any aspect of a product, including the services included in the 
contract of sales, which influences the demand curve. " Any number of 
different quality indexes can be incorporated into the model, provided the 
demand function is a continuous and differentiable function of price and 
each quality index. One extra marginal condition can be derived for each 
quality index added to the demand function. A graphical analysis of the 
problem, with only one quality index, but which nevertheless contains some 
useful insights, has been given by Abbott (1953,1955). 
1 134. 
Brems (1967) argued that some aspects of product quality are 
non-quantitative (and could not be incorporated into a continuous index 
of the Dorfman - Steiner type). He therefore proposed a model which borr- 
owed the methods of input-output analysis. The model is not discussed 
here since it turns out to be marginalist in practice and the results are 
directly comparable to those derived by Dorfman and Steiner. 
Lancaster (1966). amongst others, has recognised products as 
'bundles of characteristics'. Drawing on this concept he has presented 
a theory of consumer behaviour based on activity analysis postulates. This 
conception of 'product' is useful and is retained for this thesis; however, 
considerable attention will have to be paid to the question of what is 
meant by 'characteristics'. 
Griliches (1961) and Griliches and Adelman (1961) were concerned 
with the failure of price indexes to take full account of quality changes 
through time. The problem was tackled on a theoretical and a practical 
level. Griliches (1961) points out that the reason why different varieties 
of the same product sell at different prices "must be due to some differen- 
ces in their properties, dimensions, or other 'qualities, real or imagin- 
ary. " 1 The idea of the so-called 'Hedonic Price Principle' is thus quite 
simple : to derive implicit specification prices from cross-sectional data 
on the price of various varieties or 'models' of the particular product. ' 
The discussion of 'quality' presented below takes in ideas from Abbott, 
Griliches and Lancaster. 
Following Abbott (1955) we may make a distinction between 
'vertical' quality differences and 'horizontal' quality differences. An 
I Griliches (1961, p. 175) 
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attempt is made to make the Abbott distinction more rigorous by defining 
the two types of quality differences on the basis of the preference functions 
associated with them. 
Vertical quality differences exist when one variety of a product 
can be said to be "better" or "worse" than another. For example, if we have 
two tyres which are identical in the services they provide to the consumer 
except that A gives more mileage than B, then we can say that A is 
"better" than B. More strictly we can say that for all rational consumers 
for whom mileage enters into the utility function (assumed to be a monotonic 
increasing funýction of mileage) in a positive way APB if 11 is taken 
to be some increasing index of mileage then A(p) > B(O) APB ceteris 
paribus. More generally consider any two varieties of the same products 
A and B say, which are identical except for the level of the vertical 
quality v. If. P A' PBI QA and QB are the prices and sales in units 
of varieties A and B respectively and all consumers are rational, then 
A(v) > B(jj) -c> APB for all consumers 
and if 
A(P) > B(v) and PA f4 PB . then QB =0- 
In the second case if consumers are rational only A will be produced. 
If A(ij) > B(ij) and both A and B are produced, we expect PA>PB 
We expect therefore to observe an increasing one-to-one correspondence 
between levels of u and prices for different varieties of the same prod- 
uct. An implication of the above is that if the level of vertical quality 
in a given variety of a given product is increased, then the demand curve 
for that variety will shift to the right. Also the total production cost 
is an increasing function of the level of vertical quality. Hence if both 
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varieties A and B are observed in the market and A(p) > B(u) -then 
PA >PB and MC(P) >0. The definition of vertical quality implied by 
2 
the above is fairly broad. 
Consider two varieties of a prodUCt, A and B, which are identicall 
except in one aspect. If AKB for some consumers and BPA for some others (irr- 
espective of the cost differences between A and B) then the difference between 
A and B is a horizontal quality difference. Examples might be the different 
paint tinishes on cars,, or the choice between automatic and manual transmission I 
on cars. 
PROBLEMS. 
The two-way classification proposed above does not have the 
desirable property of completeness. There are quality difterences which contorm 
to neither of the preference patterns given above. Three examples of the 
problems which can arise when attempts are made to use the distinction given 
above are given together with possiblL. - solutions. 
3 
(i) The differences in cost between mild and bitter beer are not 
incidental; mild usually costs less to produce and is often cheaper to buy. 
Some consumers prefer mild to bitter and vice versa. There may even be 
some consumers who would switch from one to the other if the price differ- 
ential were altered. The same argument can be applied to similar journeys 
by coach and train : that is, the same preference pattern can be identified. 
For many purposes, for example explaining the market shares of various 
brands,, we can consider mild and bitter as being separate products, that is 
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having separate market demand curves. If. on the other hand, we are directly 
interested in the share of passengers carried by coach and rail from C 
to D, then coach and rail journeys should be considered as different var- 
ieties of the same product. The definition of product needs to be modified 
in the light of the particular problem under consideration. 
(ii) Consider two cars which are identical except that one is self- 
coloured and the other is a two-tone model. The two-tone version may cost 
more, but there will be consumers who prefer a plain coloured car to a two- 
tone car even if both were offered at the same price. Provided the two-tone 
version is offered as an option common to all varieties of the product at 
roughly the same price, and provided the proportion of consumers who prefer 
two-tone cars is the same for each variety, then no practical problems are 
created in the explanation of demand by vertical quality differences. The 
sales of the two-tone variety may be added to the sales of the plain colour- 
ed variety. This technique for dealing with multi-specification varieties 
(optional extras on cars etc. ) has been widely used. (See Cowling and Cubbin 
(1971a), (1971b) ; Cowling and Rayner (1970) ; Griliches and Ohta (1973). ) 
The third example poses more difficult questions. Consider 
two tables which are identical except that one is constructed of pine and 
the other of oak. The oak table may be very much more expensive, but some 
consumers may purchase the pine table even if it were more expensive than 
the oak table. Again the nature of the problem under investigation dict- 
ates the solution. In many cases the analysis would have to be carried out 
for the two types of table separately, with the condition that the measures 
of quality employed are the same in both cases. 
I 
The three examples given above illustrate the practical import- 
ance of defining 'quality' closely, and of attempting to define the differ- 
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0 
ent types of quality difference with reference to the assumed preference 
patterns attached to those qualities defferences. A consideration of 
individual preferences is of help when dealing with aggregates since 
it 
allows us to shed some light on some of the tricky problems of 
defining 
'product'. 
The distinction between vertical and horizontal quality diff- 
erences proposed above relies on the idea ot monotonicity. It may be argued 
that the "axiom of monotonicity" applied in the goods (rather than charac- 
teristics) case is one of the least acceptable elements of consumer theory. 
We must therefore be wary before attempting to define types of Characteristics 
on the basis of monotonic or non-monotonic types of preference patterns. As 
set out above the proposed distinction is intended to help in the problem 
ot selecting the relevant quality characteristics of goods for inclusion in 
a model of variety demand,. ' trom that point of view we must be reasonably sure 
that the distinction is goint to be helpful in the actual job of selecting 
characteristics. What matters from the theoretical point ot view is that the 
distinction does indeed identify those characteristics which influence demand 
in a particular way common to all the selected characteristics. Thus the 
proposed distinction must avoid the rather unhelpful definition of quality 
as anythi. ng which influences the demand curve but is not otherwise taken 
account of by the demand function. 
We may advance two major reasons why few, if any, character- 
istics will exhibit the properties of a 'vertical-' quality. Firstly it may 
be argued that in practice other-things never are equal and hence for which- 
ever characteristic is under consideration more of it will have bad as well as 
I 
good effects. Thus a longer car may well be roomier, but It will also be more 
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difficult to park. Secondly it may be argued that monotonicity must eventually 
break down. Just as a surfeit of champagne may haVe unpeasant effects, a. car 
which stops too quickly or goes too fast may be very dangerous. This second 
problem is fairly easily overcome. It makes little sense to consider, for 
example, all cars as varieties of the same product. For many consumers estate 
cars and high-powered sports cars may not be substitutes. By defining the 
product group more closely the problem can be avoided. Thus the empirical 
work in this_, thesis applies to only small and medium family saloon cars at 
the lower end of the market. Nevertheless a large portion of the car market 
is covered by such varieties. 
The first objection is more diffiCUlt to overcome. Nevertheless 
in theory it may well be possible to identify vertical quality differences 
on the basis ot the distinction given above. Consider the variable 'length' in 
cars. Within reasonable bounds it seems sensible to suggest that a londer car 
will always be chosen given equal prices, provided that all other things really 
are equal, inclucting the turning circle and ease of parking. It is alright 
to treat length as a vertical quality difference it 'parkabilityl is included 
in the price-quality regression, allowing the ceteris paribus assumption to 
be satisfied, statistically at least. If 'parkability' is not included we have 
to recognise that there is a problem. Thus the distinction does not rely on 
our actually being able to identify two models which, in the real world, conform 
to the ceteris paribus requirement; all we require is that in theory if the 
ceteris paribus assumtion wassatistied we may. then reasonably assume that the 
given pattern of preferences would be observed. By contrast the variable 
'weight' is not a vertical quality characteristic of cars since it is not 
possible to assume that all consumers will prefer a heavier (or lighter) car 
given that all other characteristics were held equal. In practical terms the 
question really depends on how many other characteristics the ceteris paribus 
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assumption embraces. It is reasonable to include petrol consumption as a vert- 
ical quality if some measure of other aspects of engine performance are also 
included. With a variable such as length rather more variAbles Will have to 
be covered by the ceteris paribus assumption before we can admit length as a 
vertical quality difference. 
THE PRICE - QUALITY RELATIONSHIP. 
More strictly this section is concerned with the relationship 
between the set of prices and the set of vertical quality differences 
which exists between different varieties of the same product. Horizontal 
. quality differences are ignored ; however, it may be argued that horizont- 
al quality differences, possibly. because of their incidental cost, are least 
important in those product groups where vertical differences are most import- 
ant (consumer durables, hous6s, some services, etc) . 
Within the same product several vertical quality differences 
may exist. The problem is that the different vertical qualities are not 
commensurable. The discussion above indicates that differences in the 
vertical qualities attached to varieties of the same product are revealed 
in prices. By estimating the function 
ý. l Pi =f Vj i) 
where. pi i=l,..., n sI ay, are the prices of the n varieties, and Xjig 
j=lg... gk i=l,..., n . are the levels of the k qualities embodied in 
the n varieties, incommensurable quality differences can be converted 
into commensurable price differentials. However, vertical quality differ- 
ences may not be, the only factors affecting price, SO 6.1 may be more 
accurately defined as 
6.2' Pi 
where Zi is a vector 
quality differences and 
contains the essence of 
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g(xji zi Ui) 
)f variables affecting prices other than vertical 
Ui is a random disturbance tem. Equation 6.2 
the so-called Hedonic Price Principle re-advanced 
by Griliches (1961),, but originally appearing in Court (1939) 
Stigler has called the idea embodied in equation 6.2 a fairly 
straightforward extension of the basic logic. " (1966, p. 78) 
4 
Equation 6.2 is derived from observation of the real world, 
the technique used being regression analysis. Regression analysis has two 
advantages for this purpose. Firstly, proxy variables may be used in place 
of vertical quality variables for which data is unobtainable (for example,, 
'comfort' in cars). Secondly, the scales on which the quality levels are 
measured need only be ordinal, since ordinal scales may be described by a 
series of dummy variables, but at some cost in loss of degrees of freedom. 
Griliches (1961) suggests that the existence and usefulness of 
a function such as 6.2 is an empirical rather than a theoretical question, 
and that 6.2 "... can always be made into a tautology by specifying enough 
factors or qualities. " (Griliches (1961, p. 175 , footnote)). Both these 
statements are misleading. If the arguments Xji of 6.2 refer only to 
vertical quality differencess then the existence of a relationship such as 
6.2 is clear from the arguments given above, and further 6.2 will not be 
tautologous unless the variables Zi are specified to allow it to be so. 
Care has to be exercised in the job of selecting the variables Xji (and Zi). 
Based on the discussion above a potential variable Xj, will be admitted 
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if it satisfies the following criteria 
(i) the variable must be a vertical quality differencet or bear 
a constant relationship to a vertical quality difference, where 'vertical 
quality difference' is defined as above. 
(ii) 'options' (as in example (ii) above) must not be included. 
The question of 'options' and intra-variety variation is discussed in 
Appendix 6.1. 
(iii) no vertical quality variable should be included which is not 
in principle applicable to all the varieties in the product group. If 
some quality was specific to a sub-set of the available varieties there 
is a possibility of incommensurability. If we wished to construct a 
hedonic price series for the commodity 'buckets', a dummy variable indic- 
atinq whether metal buckets were galvanised or not would be inadmissable 
since plastic buckets cannot be galvanised. The relevent variable to include 
might be the "ability to resist rust formation". These criteria are 
somewhat more demanding than those which have been previously employed, 
and would exclude some variables which have been used in previous studies 
(see the discussion concerning the variable "weight" in studies of auto- 
mobile sales below). Griliches and Adelman (1961) state that "... naturally, 
only those quality dimensions whose coefficients are statistically signif- 
icant should be retained for the quality index. " A quality dimension might 
not have a significant coefficient because not all varieties exhibited 
Ahat quality dimension, although in principle they could all do so. 
An example of what happens when a variable which is inadmissable 
by the above criteria is actually included in the price-quality regression 
as an independent variable is provided by Triplett (1969). He considered 
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the use of the variable "weight" to explain new (U. S. ) passenger car 
prices. Use of the weight variable leads to good results in terms of 
explanatory power, but for confusing reasons. The desired underlying 
relationship (in the Triplett study at least) was expressed as 
6.3 pI= Zh 
where p' is some transformation of the prices of the varieties (e. g. 
loge P) 9Z is a vector of 
'quality levels' and h is a vector of the 
implicit prices of those qualities. Weight, w, is included in the 
vector Z. But weight is also a function of the quality levels, since 
any increase in engine size and power, luxury, provision of optional 
extras, etc. adds to the weight of the automobile. Hence there exists a 
relationship 
&. Zg 
where g is a vector of coefficients on the quality levels. Thus Triplett 
argues that when weight is included as a variable in the hedonic price 
series the actual equation estimated is of the form 
6.5 - p' =c+ dw 
where the coefficient on the weight variable, d. reflects a complex 
relationship between the h' s, the implilcit prices of the true quality 
attributes. 6 The use of weight as a quality variable is particularly 
naive if intertemporal comparisons are to be undertaken. It is undoubtedly 
true that modern technology permits lighter and stronger automobile bodies 
and frames than was hitherto possible. We might expect weight to explain 
price to an extent in a product like television sets, but no one wishing 
to buy a portable set would think extra weight a desirable attribute, 
ceteris paribus. 
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The discussion given above would be of very little practical 
concern if the explanatory power of hedonic price series was in practice 
normally-poor. Fortunatelys the hypothesis that a large proportion of 
the variance between prices of coexisting models can be explained by the 
variance in the levels of the characteristics embodied in these models is 
well supported by the available evidence. The "state of the art" with 
respect to the hedonic price hypothesis has been reviewed by Griliches 
(1967,1971) .7 Typically, writers report high values for R2 and corres- 
pondingly low standard errors. The (hedonic: price) hypothesis has most 
frequently been examined for automobiles. Results for U. S. cars have been 
reported by Griliches (1961); Griliches and Adelman (1961 
, 
); Griliches and 
Ohta (1973); Triplett (1969); and Dhrymes (1967,1971). Cowling (1972) 
and Cowling and Cubbin (1971a, 1971b, 1972) report results for the U. K. 
car industry. The tractor market has been analysed for the U. S. by Fettig 
(1963) and for the U. K. by ýCowling and Rayner (1970); Rayner and Cowling 
(1970); and Rayner (1968). The investigations of refrigerators in the U. S. 
by Dhrymes (1967,1971) illustrate the extensive use of dummy variables 
to describe ordinal quality scales. 11 An interesting application of the 
hedonic approach applied to a regional housing market has been supplied by 
Cubbin (1970). Most of the studies cited employ the functional form 
6.6 In pi =a+IO. L. + u. i J1 I 
to estimate the price-quality relationship, where pi is the price of the 
i th variety and X ji 
is the level Of the j th quality embodied in the 
i th variety. 8 
I 
j[ see also Triplett (1966). 
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A MODEL OF DEMAND INCORPORATING VERTICAL QUALITIES. 
Much of the work using the hedonic price principle has been 
directed towards the problem of adjusting cost-of-living indexes for the 
quality changes which take place through time. Thus the problem (recurrent 
in the literature) of trying to discover whether a change in quality has 
taken place, and what the effects of that change are, need not concern us 
here. In particular we need not worry unduly about the problems associated 
with the introduction of "new commodities". ' At any point in time the 
varieties of a particular product available have all survived the competitive 
environment. Two potential problems are evident with any price-quality 
relationship. Burstein (1961) has shown that if a variety of a product 
incorporates a new feature, and is sold in an imperfect market, the infer- 
ence cannot be drawn that the new feature is more highly valued by all 
consumers than the cost differential attributable to that feature. This is 
merely a reflection of the fact that in an imperfect market the partial 
elasticity of demand with respect to any quality dimension is less than 
infinite. Dhrymes (1967) points out that different firms may employ diff- 
erent pricing policies, so that the same (vertical) quality difference is 
differently evaluated by different firms, hence there may be some doubt 
concerning the quality contribution of a particular. vertical quality to the 
price of a product. Whether or not these two problems are important dep- 
ends on the interpretation given to the price-quality relationship, and the 
interpretation given depends on the use to which it is put. We have argued 
above that at, any point in time there exists a relationship between prices 
and vertical qualities, and that the relationship will be monotonic and 
incre. asing with respect to each of the vertical qualities (except for a 
disturbance term). Neither of the potential problems mentioned by Burstein 
I see Nicholson (1967)-* 
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and Dhrymes alters the fact that such a relationship exists. 
r The discussion above indicates that in theory there exists a 
perfect monotonic increasing relationship between prices and vertical qual- 
ities. Its observations consist of data relating to different varieties 
of the same product, all of which have survived the competitive environ- 
ment at some point in time. Estimation of the price-quality relationship 
for any particular product yields a residual for each variety, denoted 
in 6.2 by Ui j which following Cowling et al. 
" we may call the "quality- 
adjusted price. " Since the Uils are derived from regression analysis, 
Ui =0 for the average observationi. 
*A negative residual indicates that 
when vertical quality differences are taken into account,, the particular 
variety is priced lower than average ; in everyday terms it is a "good 
buy", A positive residual indicates the reverse : if only vertical qual- 
ity differences are-taken into account, then the particular variety appears 
as a "bad buy", given the existing array of prices and associated vertical 
quality levels. We might expect that in industry equilibrium 9 all the 
qual i ty- adjusted prices would be equal to zero. This will only be true if 
all firms in the industry-face identical demand curves, and by implication 
identical cost curvesq since by the time equilibrium is reached all high 
cost producers will have been driven out of the market. We will be able 
to observe non-zero quality adjusted prices because of the distribution in 
tastes or because firms have different costs. 
Typically, markets will be in disequilibrium and a range of 
quality-adjusted prices will be observed. t Quality-adjusted prices may be 
incorporated as arguments in a demand function since they indicate whether 
varieties are "good" or "bad" buys. This approach has been used by Cowling and 
see the articles referred to above. 
provided that the usual assumptions-about the error term are met. 
t but see the arguments given below. 
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his co-workers. Their method does however have problems. Typically, the 
observations incorporated into the price-quality relationship are weighted 
by sales or market share, the argument being that such weighting makes the 
relationship "more demand oriented". ' If the resulting value of quality- 
adjusted price is in its turn used to estimate variety demand, then demand 
or market share appears on both the left and right hand sides of the estim- 
ating equation. It does not help if we derive the weight to be applied by 
looking at the same range of varieties during some other time periods when 
tastes were the same. A heavily advertised variety which would have a pos- 
itive quality-adjusted price in an unweighted regression may sell quite 
well, but would be weighted spuriously. If we are attempting to adjust a 
price index for quality changes through time then weighting the observations 
by sales is a desirable thing to do. But we are attempting to explain sales 
on the basis of vertical quality differences, and hence an unweighted price- 
quality relationship of the sort described above is indicated. We might 
reasonably argue that weighted observations reflect the pricing policies of 
fi rms whilst unweighted observations reflect genuine consumption choice. 
At this stage of the discussion three possible methods of incor- 
porating vertical quality differences into a variety level demand function 
present themselves. 
(i) We may follow the reasoning of Cowlingt and include quality- 
adjusted price in the demand function directly. We would expect the partial 
relationship between quality-adjusted price (Ui) and sales (qi) to have 
the form shown in figure 6.1.11 
v see Cowling and Rayner (197-0). 
t Cowling (1972) and also Cowling and Cubbin (1971a). 
128. 
Figure 6.. l 
_ 
A possible relationship between quality-adjusted price and 
demand at the variety level .% 
f 
Varieties which have a positive Ui would still be expected to sell in 
the disequilibrium situation because of the existence of brand loyalty or 
horizontal quality differences. The approach is particularly useful when 
the focus of attention is not quality competition but advertising competit- 
ion, since it provides a neat way of allowing the demand function to make 
reference to qualities without including them explicitly. 
(ii ) (i) may be extended by including both list price (or some trans- 
formation of it) and quality-adjusted price as independent variables. No 
econometric problems are presented since list price and quality-adjusted 
price (the residuals from the estimated price-quality relationship) are un- 
correlated by assumptioný A variety with a relatively high list price may 
exhibit low sales because it is beyond the means of a large section of the 
market ; there may be an income effect at work. (i) is only an appropriate 
method if we assume that income does not have any differential effects on 
demand. The relationship between list price and demand will clearly depend 
on the shape of the Engel curve for that commodity. 
In practice the degree of correlation between U and P will depend on ii 
the specification of the price-quality relation. 
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(iii) We could adopt the method used by number compilers, that is to 
estimate a price-quality relationship using a 'large' number of vertical 
qualities as independent variables, and then incorporate directly 
into the 
demand function only those wich turned out to be statistically significant. 
Many writers have suggested that even for a complex product the number of 
such variables will not exceed six or sevenj2 For some consumer durables 
three or four variables may suffice. Use of this method will allow the der- 
ivation of quality elasticies and thus provide some of the necessary infor- 
mation for a test of the Dorfman - Steiner theorem as it relates to qualit- 
ies. This point is taken up in Chapter 6. A potential disadvantage is that 
a high degree of^multicollinearity is likely to exist between the qualities, 
and good 
* 
estimates of the quality-elasticities hard to obtain. 
Economists usually deal with equilibrium prices and quantities 
in their attempts to employ demand analysis, although typically most markets 
will be in disequilibrium. As indicated above there is no real reason to be- 
lieve that all quality-adjusted prices will be zero for markets in equilib- 
rium. The fact that ditferent firms face ditferent cost functions, that there 
Is a distribution of tastes across consumers and that product information is 
not a free good to consumers are all tactors which permit the existence of a 
range of quality-adjusted prices in equilibrium. In a less than pertect world 
there are doubtless other reasons as well. In this thesis I have followed the 
practice of previous writers in relating values pf quality-adjusted price 
to levels of market share. Of course it could be argued that if in theory 
and/or in practice quality-adjusted prices are a measure of market disequil- 
ibrium then values of quality-adjusted price should be related to changes in 
market share in an attempt to explain m arket adjustment processes. It is 
difficult to see, however, why quality-adjusted prices (measured in the way 
in the sense of estimates with minimum possible variance. The existence of 
a high degree of multicollinearity will lead to erroneous attribution 
of influence on the dependent variable amogst the independent variables. 
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suggested above) should reflect disequilibrium in the market. For example 
if there is general excess demand in the market then this Should be retlected 
in the prices of all varieties in the market, the price of a given variety 
will be higher than it would otherwise be, but that is true of all varieties. 
All that might happen is that the origin around which the quality-adjusted 
prices are distributed will ha. ve shifted. In addition the 'shape, of the 
distribution may well be altered, but that is not important unless we are 
attempting intertemporal comparis6ns of quality-adjusted price; such compari- 
sons are only permissible in limited circumstances and under special assump- 
tions (as in the Simple 'Repackaging Hypothesis of Chapter7). If there is 
excess demand for paricular varieties then the model may be inappropriate. 
A REVIEW OF SOME PREVIOUS STUDIES. 
The only existing studies which attempt to analyse demand rel- 
ationships using the hedonic technique as shown above are those by Cowling 
and Rayner (1970) and Cowling and Cubbin (1971a). One feature of the work 
(taken together) is an attempt to test the Dorfman - Steiner theorem. 
Cowling (1972), (a development of the work contained in Cowling and Rayner 
(1970) and Cowling and Cubbin (1971a)) reports results for five U. K. mark- 
ets : cars, tractorst margarine, instant coffee, and toothpaste. The res- 
ults for the three non-durables markets were consistent with the Dorfman - 
Steiner predictions given the assumptions of the model. For the two dur- 
ables markets the results were-far from satisfactory in this respect. 
Cowling (1972) suggests several possible reasons why this difference might 
occur. With so few observations It is impossible to generalise the result 
that advertising appears highly sub-optimal in the two durables markets 
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(cars and tractors) to other durables markets. It may well be that advert- 
ising plays a different role in durables markets to that which it performs 
in non-durables markets. The studies for the non-durables markets did not 
use the hedonic technique. 
List price, quality-adjusted price and advertising may not be 
the only variables which influence demand at the brand or variety level. 
Brand loyalty or horizontal quality differences may also have an effect on 
demand. The use of dummy variables to distinguish brands in the estimation 
of the demand function could pick up some of these differences. The system- 
atic differences which may exist between brands but which are not captured 
by differences in levels of the included quality variables, called "make 
effects" by Griliches and Ohta (1973). are clearly potentially important 
determinants of demand. ("flake effects" measure omitted variables. ) Griliches 
and Ohta (1973) confirm the existence of "make effects" in the U. S. auto- 
mobile market. The use of one dummy variable for each variety is clearly 
impossible in a cross-sectional study. However, "make effects" (including 
brand loyalty) may accrue to the products of a particular manufacturer 
rather than to a particular variety. Thus a person who has previously owned 
a B. M. C. Mini may demonstrate brand loyalty by buying a B. M. C. 1300 . The 
number of dummy variables that would have to be included might then be 
fairly small. Cowling (1972) did not use dummy variables to distinguish 
manufacturers, but preferred to exclude "makes" where such effects were 
likely to be greatest 13 The coefficients on included dummy variables may 
often be interpreted in the light of observed facts about the market. 
This chapter has dealt with two major topics so far. Firstly 
an attempt is made to define 'quality' and secondly a method of incorpor- 
ating 'quality' differences into a model of demand was suggested. It seems 
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logi6l to move on to a consideration of ýow the introduction of quality 
variables affects our ideas on inter-firm competition. 
THE NATURE OF QUALITY COMPETITION. 
In line with the preceding discussion we restrict our attent- 
ion to consumer durables markets. In such markets there can be little 
doubt that the desire for variety exhibited by consumers in the aggregate 
is a very genuine one. A private motorist may desire a car for several 
reasons : to go to work, to take the family on holiday, to transport 
goods, to facilitate shopping, etc. The particular combination of trans- 
portation services required dictates the choice of model. The focus of 
attention in this section is not, however, on consumption; rather, we 
wish to consider 'quality competition' in the context of an oligopoly. In 
particular the effects of quality competition on oligopolistic interdepend- 
ence are considered. 
The car market illustrates the problems of quality competition 
very well. It is oligopolistically structured, products are differentiated, 
innovation is important,, the product is complex and Andustrydemand fluct- 
uates. We may reasonable suppose that each of the big firms in the U. K. 
car market recognises their mutual interdependence. In particular, we may 
assume that if one firm attempts to increase its market share in the short- 
run by some means, then rival firms will retaliate in some way. 
Price and quality-competition are linked to a much greater 
extent than price and advertising competition. Quality change may thus 
provide a means of implicitly changi. ng price, or masking a price change. 
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A manufacturer may alter an existing model or replace an existing model 
by a new one, -thus altering both price and quality. Such price changes 
differ from price changes in the absence of specifications changes in 
two important ways : 
1) they take longer to accomplish. Whereas the price of an 
existing model can be altered very quickly, quality changes 
can take much longer from inception to maturity. 14 
2) rivals (and consumers) may well be uncertain about the extent 
of the implicit price change. 
Both features render reaction unlikely in the short-run. In the former 
case this is simply a result of the lags between a change being made by 
one manufacturer and retaliation by another manufacturer. In the second 
case a hurried assessment of a complex situation may lead to a needless 
or inappropriate price change. Retaliation is likely to be postponed unt- 
il the market signals that it is needed; that is, until there is a percept- 
ible shift in sales or market shares. It is difficult to forecast what 
the nature of retaliation to an implicit price/quality change will be. 
Retaliation in the form of a new model introduction may be impossible un- 
less a new model has already been substantially developed and can be pro- 
duced with the existing plant. Reductions in the prices of existing mod- 
els-is possible,, but it is a strategy which runs the risk of further reac- 
tion in the form of reductions in prices. Thirdly, a manufacturer may 're- 
vamp' existing models as a substitute for the introduction of a new model, 
or as a stop-gap policy until a new model is in production. The extent to 
which existing models can be revamped may be limited, and there will still 
be some retaliatory lag before. the revamped model reaches the market. 
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Thus the fact of physically differentiated products in a 
given market mitigates some of the important aspects of oligopolistic 
interdependence. Two testable predictions follow from this argument. 
Firstly,, the demand for new models should be less price elastic than the 
demand for existing models, because they offer a new mix of character- 
istics and have fewer close substitutes than existing models. Secondly, 
a price index adjusted for quality changes should show more flexibility 
(i. e. greater variation about trend), particularly in a downward direct- 
ion, than an index derived solely from list price changes. Cowling and 
Cubbin (1971b) tested this prediction for the U. K. car market and found 
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it to be upheld for the period 1956-68. 
It is clear that the role played by new models is crucial not 
only in quality competitiono but also price competition. We might also 
note that advertising strategies often seem to be linked to new model intro- 
ductions. New models differ from established models in three respects. 
Firstly, new models incorporate cost reducing innovations. This point is 
discussed above. Secondly, new models may have fewer close sub- 
stitutes than existing models, Thirdly, buyers are less able to make an 
accurate evaluation of new models. It is because new models incorporate 
cost reducing innovations that the argument that new model introductions 
leave the way open for implicit price reductions has so much force. In 
the opposite situation,, where the prices of existing models have to be 
held fairly stable in an environment of rapidly rising costs, new model 
introductions allow implicit price-cost margin increases. " The hypothesis 
that new models have fewer-close substitutes than existing models relies 
'for its appeal on several factors. New models incorporate the latest tech- 
nology and in style-type goods (e. g. cars) the latest styling. Insofar as 
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new technology renders the new product superior to existing models, the 
effect is to reinforce the effect of modern styling, to make the new mod- 
el markedly different from existing models. In soma sense new models be- 
long in. a different vintage. If the models in question have a fairly long 
market life we might expect there to be substanti, ally fewer new models 
than existing-models. 17 17 7ýv- 
From a theoretical standpoint the brief discussion in this 
section carries the implication that the Cournot model may well provide 
a reasonable approximation to reality where quality competion is concerned. 
The twin difficulties faced by would-be retaliators of evaluating a quality 
change and responding to it given existing production capabilities are the 
major readons why retaliation may be seen as unlikely. The model of Appendix 7.1 
implicitly assumes Cournot-type reaction to quality changes. 
__________ 
SUMMARY. 
This Chapter has discussed the nature of quality competition 
and attempted to derive an operational classification of types ot quality 
differences. It was suggested, that the relationship between the prices of 
a set of varieties of a given product and the vertical 
, 
quality levels embodied 
in them is monotonic-and increasing with respect to each quality level of the 
vertical type. In all everyday situations the relationship is a stochastic 
rather than an exact one. The possiblity of explaining deamnd by quality- 
adjusted prices (the residuals from the estimated price-quality relationship) 
was explored. Finally brief consideration was given to the nature of quality 
competition and it was concluded that the Cournot, hypothesis was apllicable 
to quality competition situations. 
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APPENDIX 6.1. 
'WITHIN MODEL' QUALITY DIFFERENCES, DUMMY VARIABLES, 
-'STRIPPING', 
AND 
THE SELECTION OF OBSERVATIONS. 
Some products, especially consumer durables, come in a large 
number of makes,, brands, models, variations,, sizes, etc. We may distin- 
guish two types of quality differences between the different varieties of 
a given product. "Within model" quality differences are those quality 
differences which are exhibited within the range of variations on the same 
basic model. For example, in December 1971 twelve different variations of 
the Ford Escort were available from new. Apart from two estate variations 
and two high performance variations, the remaining eight variations diff- 
ered only in terms of engine size, the number of doors and the trim prov- 
ided (and, of course, price). "Between model (or variety)" quality diff- 
erences are those described in Chapter 5, for example those quality diff- 
erences which distinguish a Ford Escort from a Vauxhall Viva. Data limit- 
ations often force us to confine our attention to between model differences, 
the major such limitation being that sales data is not normally available 
for the different variations of the same basic model. Neglect of within 
model quality differences mV' not be a tremendous loss provided manufacturers' 
pricing policies are consistent across the variations of a particular model. 
In fact the pricing policy of manufacturers seems to be to price the basic 
variation in a given range of cars and base the prices of the different var- 
iations on the basic variation price. Some evidence is presented for Brit- 
ish Leyland cars and Ford cars. 18 For British Leyland list prices were reg- 
resse. d on data for the Mini, 1100/1300, Marina, Maxi and 1800 ranges. The 
British Leyland results are 
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A 
Pi 521.58 + 0.127 Xi + 23.77 D, 
(46.09) (5.51) (2.62) 
78.26 D2+ 59.75 D3 cý 157.08 D4 
(3.7) (2.60) (8.72) 
50.19 D5 + 32.76 D6 + 38.72 D7 
(3.34) (2.10) (4.34) 
+ 87.78 D8 + 172.46 Dq + 168.05 Djo 
(4.39) (7.80) (11.35) 
2 28 = 0.985 
where figures in brackets are standard errors 
Pi = list price in pounds 
xi = engine cubic capacity in 100's of c. c. s 
DI=0ifa two door vari ant, 01fa four door vari ant 
D2=I if variant is a sClubman', -0 otherwise 
D3'=I if variant is an estate,, =0 otherwise 
D401 if variant is a 'GT' l=0 otherwise 
D5 =I if variant is in 1100/1300 range ,-0 otherwise 
D6=" if variant is 'deluxe' .=0- otherwise 
D7 =I if variant is Super' ,=0 otherwise 
D8=I if variant is in the Marina range .=0 otherwise 
I D9 *=I if variant is ITCI 9a0 otherwise 
D 10 01 if variant is a Wolseley ,-0 otherwise 
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Model ranges included in the Ford results are all Escort variants (except 
the two high performance variants), and all Cortina and Capri variants. 
The results are as follows 
ýj 632.04 + 15.07 Xi + 26.79 D, 
(84.4) (16.66) (3.01) 
44.88 
* 
D2 + 76.39 'D 3+ 91.24 D 
(4.73) (8.2) (8.02) 
230.33 D5+ 123.4 D6+ 153.87 D7 
(16.43) (14.33) (14.64) 
108.11 D8 
(10.5) 
23 R2 = 0.990 
where figures in brackets are standard errors 
pi = list price of the ith variant in pounds 
Xi. - engine cubic capacity in 100's of c. c. 's 
D, =0 if variant has 2 doors, -I if variant has 4 doors 
21 if variant has luxury interior trim, -0 otherwise 
3=I if variant is in the Cortina range, =0 othemise 
D41 if variant has luxury interior and exterior trim, 
0 otherwise 
D5=I if variant is IGXLI, =0 otherwise 
D if variant is an estate, -0 otherwise 6 
D7 I if variant is in the Capri range, m- 0 otherwise 
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DS =1if vari ant isa 'GT' ,=0 ot erwi se . 
Differences between the pricing policies of the two manufacturers do exist. 
Ford charge over twice as much for an estate version on average than do 
B. L. M. C. The possibility arises of an Escort saloon being a better buy 
than a 1300 saloon, but a 1300 estate being a better buy than an Escort 
estate. On the other hand, both manufacturers charged about M extra 
19 
for a four door saloon. We might then adopt the approach of including 
both the standard saloon and standard estate versions in the price-quality 
relationship, but exclude other variants. The results indicate some of the 
differences which arise when the available data is not sufficiently disagg- 
20 
regated to distinguish between versions of a model. 
Another related problem exists. Within a product group some 
varieties may have features as standard which other models do not, (but 
might offer as optional extras). Two solutions are available. Dummy var- 
iables may be included to cover the features, or the prices of those variet- 
ies which do not include features available as standard on other varieties 
can be adjusted by adding on the supposed prices of the missing features. 
This second method is (paradoxically) known as 'stripping' and has been succ- 
essfully used by Cowling and Rayner (1970) in their study of tractors and 
Griliches and Ohta (1973) in their study of the U. S. automobile market. Both 
methods are needed to minimise specification error. If the feature involved 
is, say, a power braking system, the correct variables to be employed in the 
price-quality relationship might be stopping distance, ease of operation of 
the brakes, etc. To include such measures is normally impossible, and hence 
some other method of allowing for the problem is called for. The method 
chosen for dealing with the problem will normally depend on the feature under 
consideration. Inclusion of a dummy variable for the feature is preferable,, 
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but in many cases wasteful in terms of degrees of freedom. 'Stripping' may 
then be a useful technique when the missing feature is available as an 
extra at relatively small cost. 
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NOTES*TO'CHAPTER 6 AND APPENDIX 6.1. 
1. Or at least Griliches (1961) holds that it is that simple. Even 
Griliches and Ohta (1973) dismisses most of the problems associated 
with the Hedonic Price Principle and maintains the 1961 line. How- 
ever, other writers feel that the H. P. P. is beset by quite difficult 
problems and many of these are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
2. In common with the Lancaster (1966) system of classifying products, 
the current system does not require a consideration of 'new' products 
as such. 'New' products are seen as offering a different combination 
of existing vertical qualities,, but incorporating 'innovational qual- 
ity changes'. We may roughly define an innovational quality change 
as a change which is considered an improvement by some buyers in spite 
of what additional cost is involved (if additional cost is involved) 
so that the new variety of the product is bought along with existing 
varieties. The new variety may displace one or more of the existing 
varieties. The introduction of a new variety will alter the relation- 
ship between the set of prices and the set of quality levels ; the 
monotonic nature of the relationship is however preserved. 
3. The particular problems exhibited here are only a subset of the older 
collection of problems encountered when trying to define 'product'. 
All three examples point out particular "breaks" in the substitution 
pattern between potential varieties of the same product. Houthakker 
(1951) makes the same point when he writes ... it is hard to say 
exactly what makes an item of consumption a quality of some more comp- 
rehensive commodity, rather than a commodity by itself ". (p. 155) 
4. In nearly all practical cases we assume either Zi-0 for all i 
ax.. 
or J' 0 for all i and all i 
i 
5. The discussion leans towards including only 'performancel variables 
in the price-quality relationship. The question of whether perform- 
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6. 
ance variables or physical characteristics variables are more approp- 
riate is taken up in Chapter 7. 
p' = Z'h and w' = Z'g where w' and Z' are some transform- 
ations of w and Z-6.3 and 6.4 will then still permit the use 
of linear regression techniques$ but the estimating equations are more 
generalised. 6.5 would then be P' =c+ dw' 0 
The equations 6.3 and 6.4 might be more accurately written 
7. Griliches (1971) contains several of the papers subsequently referred 
to, as well as a comprehensive bibliography of work performed up to 
1971. 
8. A full discussion of the appropriate functional form for the price- 
quality relationship is contained in Chapter 7. 
9. 'Industry' is here defined as that group of fims or divisions of 
firms which produces the varieties used as data in the price-quality 
relationship. 
10. Further evidence to support the use of unweighted price-quality 
relationships is presented in Chapter 7. 
11. We are here implicitly assuming that the price-quality relationship 
is linearl, yielding residuals Ui such that -- < Ui< +00 with 
Ui=0 For price-quality relationships of other functional forms 
the argument can easily be appropriately altered. 
12. For evidence see Cubbin (1970); Cowling and Cubbin (1971b, 1972); 
Cowling and Rayner (1970); Dhrymes (1967); Griliches (19619 19679 1971); 
Griliches and. Adelman (1961); Lancaster (1967); Rayner (1968); Rayner 
and Cowling (1967); Triplett (1966,, 1969). Although fourteen refer- 
ences are cited some papers are based on the same (or very similar) 
estimates of the price-quality relationship. The papers by Cowling and 
Cubbin refer to an estimated relationship for U. K. passenger cars; by 
Cowling and Rayner to tractors; and by Griliches (1961,1967) and 
Griliches and Adelman (1961) to U. S. passenger cars. 
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13. In particular Jaguars and Rovers were excluded from the sample partly 
because of the high reputation of Jaguars for "excellence" and Rovers 
for "reliability". Both "excellence" and "reliability" were omitted 
quality variables. 
14. There may be specifications changes which can be rapidly executed. 
A car manufacturer could decide to offer radial tyres instead of 
cross-ply tyres as standard on a given model, thus implicitly reduc- 
ing price. Retaliation could then be immediate. 
15. Cowling and Cubbin felt that their results were consistent with the, 
notion of a firm facing a kinked demand curve with respect to list 
price changes. The kink could be avoided by changes in quality. 
Appendix 4.1. refers to the period 1967-71 and in the latter part 
of this period the reverse kink seems to offer a better explanation. 
16. In periods of severe cost inflation manufacturers may be prevented 
from putting up the prices of existing models as much as they would 
like, either for reasons of losing goodwill or legal reasons (as in 
periods of "price restraint"). New model introductions then provide 
a means of restoring price-cost margins, although the extent to which 
margins can be restored will depend on prices of existing models. 
Thus in. periods when there are limits to the rate of increase of 
prices we would expect a quality-adjusted price index to be more 
17. 
flexible in an upward direction than a crude price index. 
Precisely when a 'new' model becomes 'old' is difficult io say, 
but presumably the transfer depends more on the rate of introduct- 
ion of new models rather than time per se. 
18. The data refers to specifications as at December Ist. 1971 and was 
taken from the publication "Motorists Guide to New and Used Car 
Prices"s Blackfriars Press Periodicals Ltd. 
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19. The insignificance of the cubic capacity variable, Xi 9 is probably 
due to the fact that the dummy variables taken together almost complete- 
ly determine the engine capacity. This is particularly true for the 
B. M. C. observations where brand names almost completely determine 
engine size. Again the brand names largely determine engine size in 
Ford cars. In particular the smallest cars are all Escort variants. 
The terms GXL and GT do not necessarily imply larger engine cap- 
aci ti es. 
20. It is highly unlikely that advertising data will be so disaggregated 
since one piece of 'copy' is frequently best employed promoting an 
entire model range. 
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CHAPTER 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE HEDONIC TECHNIQUE. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The chapter considers two distinct areas. Firstly, a consider- 
ation is given to the possible sources in microeconomic theory of a theoret- 
ical underpinning for the hedonic technique presented in Chapter6:. Such a 
consideration will throw some light on three questions which frequently 
appear in the literature on hedonic techniques. The questions are : 
what are the appropriate weights to be used in the price-quality 
regression 7 
(ii) what is the appropriate functional form for the price-quality 
relationship 
(iii) should the qualities in the price-quality relationship be 
'performance variables' or 'physical characteristics' 7 Perform- 
ance variables enter the consumer's utility function, but not 
the cost function and vice versa for physical characteristics. 
The second area considered is that of incorporating information gained by 
application of the hedonic technique into a model of optimal quality-setting 
behaviour at the firm level. To this end the Dorfman - Steiner theorem is 
restated in terms of implicit prices on qualities. This second topic is 
dealt with in Appendix 7ý. l 
1. ý 
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1 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS*OF*THE''HEDONIC TECHNIQUE'-. 
We may identify three possible theoretical models underlying . 
the hedonic technique. 
(A) The household production model. 
This model is strictly neoclassical in spirit. It combines elements from 
both the marginalist models of consumption and production to produce a 
model of 'household production'. The idea was first fully worked out by 
Muth (1966) who stated the central hypothesis of the household production 
model as "... commodities purchased on the market are inputs into the prod- 
uction of goods within the household. 111i Such production was characterised 
by conventional production functions. The goods produced, in turn, were 
arguments of a conventional utility function of the household. The house- 
hold purchases market commodities x 199909xm in order to jointly produce 
the goods 
_Z 
1 and Z22 which yield utility according to 
T-1 U'U (ZI 9 Z2) 
We assume that only two goods are produced for the sake of simplicity of 
expositions, such an assumption does not restrict any of the results to be 
proved. Suppose that the transformation function between commodities and 
goods is 
7.2 F(XIsseepXme 21,22) - 
and that 7.2 is homogeneous in both commodities and goods and has the 
usual neoclassical properties of a convex production possibility frontier 
given the levels of the inputs (comoditfe-s) and concave isoquants given 
I Muth (1966, P. 699) 
. 
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the levels of the outputs (ZlI Z2) . Assume that the household faces the 
budget constraint 
7.3 y= I-pixi i= 
190 
00 sm 
The household maximises utility subject to the budget constraint 7.3 - 
The solution to the utility maximisation problem is two-stage. Firstly, 
the cost of producing any given bundle of goods is minimised, the result 
will be a cost function with commodity prices and goods as arguments. 
Utility can then be maximised subject to the constraint of the (derived) 
cost function. The solution has been fully worked out by Muellbauer (1972). 
However, here we are only interested in deriving a demand curve on the bas- 
is of the model. We proceed as follows. For the first part of the solution 
we minimise 
, 7.4 I-pili 
subject to the transfomation function 
7-2 F(x, .9o. xmI ZI 0z 2) 0 
The solution to this part of the problem is the cost function 
J7.5 Ilizi + 11 2Z2 
where 
J7.6 
ac j= Is 2 az 
The second part of the solution yielding the derived demand curves for 
the 9 oods Z, and Z2 is derived by maximising the utility function T-1 
I-* 
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subject to the cost function 7.5 . The demand functions for Z, and 
Z2 
are then the solutions to the equations 
7.7 ;u+ Oc 0 3 r., -17-1 
au Bc 7.8 + IN 22 
7.5 rl IZI+ R2Z2 -c0 
where X is the value of the Lagrangian multiplier. In order to consider 
the neoclassical household production model outlined above as a basis for 
the hedonic technique, some far-reaching assumptions have to be made. Take, 
for example, the problem of applying the model to the market for cars. In 
order to make sense of the model the commodities xI 906*9x M must 
be taken 
as physical characteristics and the goods ZI and Z2 as performance 
variables. The justification for the hedonic approach is then supposed to 
be the cost function 7.5 - It is easy to see that 7.5 can only provide 
a justification for the hedonic approach if the household technology is 
non-joint and exhibits constant returns to scale. These two conditions will 
ensure the following necessary* results : 
(i) the cost function 7.5. will be linear, i. e. the cost function 
will be 
7.9 CaCIzI+c 2Z2 cl' C2 constants 
(ii) C -, c is equal to the 'income' y of the household. 
Let us take the second condition first. We suppose that the household 
operates under a two-tier system in deciding its consumption behaviour. It 
first of all decides how much it wishes to spend on a car, thus determining 
its budget constraint for the second tier of the process (described above). 
. 10 
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If there is a large number of different varieties of car available the 
household should be able to find one particular variety which meets its 
requirements; that is, one which embodies the desired levels of the perf- 
ormance variables at the correct price. Note that an essential assumption 
in this argument is that all available cars satisfy the relationship 
II 
7.10 P= ypi Xi 
where the price of the car is P and pi are the m prices of the m 
physical characteristics xi pi= 10 ... m. The first condition above is 
cruciall since if and only if it is met will consumers having the same house- 
hold technology but different tastes be facing the same shadow costs. 3 In 
short, it is essential for the hedonic technique that the 11P be independ- 
ent of Z, and Z2. of U and the household's income. It is easy to show 
/11 intuitively how 7.9 arises from the conditions of non-jointness and con- 
stant returns to scale in the household technology. Consider the output 
combination ZI= 19 Z20. Let the'minimum cost of producing this comb- 
ination be lpixl, = cI where x, 
i9i=1,.,,, 
m . are the optimal levels 
of the inputs required to produce the given output combination. If there 
are constant returns to scale the optimal input levels to produce the out- 
put combination Z Z* 9Z=0 will be x, x Z*, ,i-1,..., m , with 121 
minimum cost c, Zt The same argument can be applied to the output combin- 
ations Z 0, ZI and Z0, Z= Z* . where c if 2222= FPix2 
there is non-jointness in the production of ZI and Z2 the minimum cost 
of producing any combination of Z, and Z2 must be c, Z I+c 2Z2 
f 
It is not possible on the basis of this model alone to derive 
a demand curve for cars in general or a particular model of car. Howeverg 
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in a perfect world all available models would conform to the con tion 
A 
7.11 Pk = C'Z'k + c2Z2 k 
where Pk is the price of the k 
th model and Z. 1,2 are the Jk 
levels of the performance variables embodied in the kth model. The 
world is not perfect however, and hence relationship 7.11 will not be 
exact. We may therefore argue that demand for specific varieties will be 
related to the residuals from an estimation of 7.. ll in the manner sugg- 
ested in Chapter 6. Thus the price-quality relationship indicated on the 
basis of this model has the following features : 
(i) the appropriate estimation technique is unweighted linear 
regression ; 
(ii) the appropriate functional form is linear 
(iii) the independent variables should be specified as performance 
variables. 
The objections to the use of this model as a justification for the hedonic 
hypothesis are clear. Perhaps the least restrictive of the assumptions 
embodied in the model is that of constant returns to scale in the household 
production function. On the other hand the assumption of non-joint tech- 
nology is harder to swallow. For example, the performance variables 'fuel 
econony', 'acceleration' and 'top speed' are clearly the results of joint 
production. The corollary of the non-joint, constant returns case is that 
if one of the assumptions is broken then even if all consumers have the 
same utility function the shadow costs (n, and Y will vary according 
to the household's income,, and the model will no longer yield an equation 
consistent with the hedonic hypothesis. 
0 
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(B) The Lancaster Model - 
In general suppose that we can write the household production relation as 
zi = fi(Xit---, Xm) 
7.12 
Z2 m f2(Xlb@@*Oxm) 
$1 
The consumer then maximises utility subject to the twin production constraints 
17.12 and the budget constraint. The Lagrangian function is 
17.13 L=U (Zi »Z 2) +{ fl(XI, ***'xm)- Zll + ý{f2(xl"*"xm) - Z21 
+ ll(y - ipixi) 
In the absence of corner solutions, the marginal conditions are 
7.14 "Pi 
Dfl 
+ 11 ix 
i 
A 2 
. 
af 2 
ax i 
i 
3.15 x= zu x= zu 
The solution implies that the ratio of the marginal utilities of Z, and 
Z2 must be equal to the ratio of their shadow costs of production (11, and 
H2) 1 i. e. 
xIH1 
f7.16 x2 
Further, at the optimum the marginal utility of any good divided by its 
price. (shadow cost) should be equal to the marginal utility of income; i. e. 
t-7.1 7x1x2 112 
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Thus the marginal conditions 7.14 may be wri tten 
af 
7.18 +2 Pi ni axi 2 Txi 
A specific example of this kind of model is that due to Lancaster (1966). 
In this model we have 
7.19 
Z, = ib, 
i 
xi 
Z2 = lb 2i xi 
that is, each unit of market commodity xi is composed of a fixed amount 
b1 of Zi and b2 of Z2 Figure 7.1 shows the production possib- 
ii 
ility frontier corresponding to a given income and given market prices 
where there are three market commodities 
Fi gure 7.1 . Production Possibility Frontier in the Lancaster Model. 
zi 
z2 
. 
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The shadow prices H, and iý , corresponding to the linear programming 
problem of minimising the cost of purchasing a given bundle Z, 9 Z2 
subject to xi ;ý0 for all i and the given prices, can be calculated 
provided there is divisibility and more market commodities than Z's 
(goods). For purchased goods 
7.20 Pi = 11 1b ii + 11 2b 2i 
7 . 20 corresponds to 7 . 18 for this particular problem. If the b Ji 
's 
(the amounts of the i 
th 
good embodied in the i 
th 
market commodity) 
observed, linear regression can be used to estimate the shadow costs gi 
that imperfections in the market prevent 7.20 from being an exact rel 
ionship. Thus the Lancaster model may be seen as a particular example 
the household production model, which although it imposes constraints c 
the forms of the production functions for ZI and Z2 (they must be I 
and additive) does overcome the problem of Jointness in the production 
zi and Z2 
th th (the amounts of the good embodied in the i market commodity) are 
observed, linear regression can be used to estimate the shadow costs given 
that imperfections in the market prevent 7.20 from being an exact relat- 
ionship. Thus the Lancaster model may be seen as a particular example of 
the household production model, which although it imposes constraints on 
the forms of the production functions for Z, and Z2 (they must be linear 
and additive) does overcome the problem of Jointness in the production of 
If consumers' indifference curves are similar enough in shape 4 
they will all choose points on the same ray from the origin, and for a prod- 
ucer to sell anything he must price according to 7.. 20 . The arguments of 
Chapter 6may then be applied to the problem of choosing a suitable demand 
function. 
If the indifference curves are dissimilar, different consumers 
will choose points on different rays from the origin. It may be reasonable, 
however, to define the market commodity group fairly closely with respect to 
pricess and to weight the observations of 7 . 20 by value shar6 
5 thus pick- 
ing up some form of median relationship. 
i 
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The model is immediately applicable without the need to redef- 
ine the x's as physical characteristics. A potentially serious object- 
ion is that we will wish to apply the model to market commodities which are 
not divisible, for example cars. It is likely that any model we attempt to 
construct would fall foul of this objection. It is possible to view the 
the household as optimising as though it would choose the perfect car, an 
amalgam of features from existing cars,, and then picking the available var- 
iety closest to the optimum. The price-quality relationship indicated on 
the basis of the Lancaster model has the following features : 
(i) the appropriate estimation technique is linear regression, 
unweighted or weighted by value shares according to the assump- 
tions made about the likely distribution of tastes ; 
(ii) the appropriate functional form is a linear one ; 
(iii) the independent variables should be specified as performance 
vari ab l es. 
Both the household production model as described under heading (A) and 
the Lancaster model as described under heading (B) indicate a linear form 
for the price-quality relationship. In practice the most frequently encount- 
ered empirical form is the semi-log function 
7.21 log Pi lb 
It is easy to show that such a relationship cannot result from the household 
production model. Suppose the production functions are of the form 
7.22 ZifJ (b 
Ji b im XII009oxm) 
2 
From 7.18 we have 
I 
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7.18 = r, 
I', ýf2 
Pi 1 axi ,+ 1ý Ui 
but 7.21 implies that 
7.23 pi =e 
IT IbIi+ Iýb 2 
Thus the production functions must satisfy the relationship 
;f2 
ý11 + 112b 2 
7.24 + 1ý -=e ; xi ; xi 
which is impossible except for trivial versions of fj(i) 
1 
(C) The Simple Repackaging Hypothesis. 
One (and probably the only) alternative to the household production model 
as an underlying model of the hedonic technique is the "simple repackaging 
hypothesis". This hypothesis was advanced by Fisher and Shell (reprinted 
in Griliches (1971)),, and states that a quality improvement in a particular 
good is equivalent to more of the old good. Hence market goods of a partic- 
ular kind can be aggregated; the aggregate is simply the sum of the quality 
indices weighted by the number of units of each good purchased. Formally 
we write the utility function 
7.25 SU =U (xi »x2"** Oxn) 
where x, is the aggregate of goods of type x 1, as described above and 
x 10649x are other, market goods. x* is the sum of the quality indices 2nI 
weighted by the number, of units of variety x, purchasedl i. e. 
7.25 Xi =j1ai xi 
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where m varieties of product x, are purchased and 
I 
7.26 a, =g (b b i 1ý 2 
where b, 
i 
and b2 
i 
are the amounts of the characteristics b1 and b2 
embodied in variety j. Clearly for 7.26 to be a rationale for the 
hedonic technique (in the sense of the term as used in this thesis) the 
a, 's must be prices, then the variable x, is defined as the total amount 
spent on varieties of product x, . Alternatively (since it is not very 
helpful to just define arguments of the utility function as expenditures 
on various products) we must assume that some relationship exists between 
prices of varieties of product xI and the aj's The advantage of the 
simple repackaging hypothesis is that it gives a rationale for adjusting 
price indices for the quality-changes which take place through time. 8 
Nothing could be simpler than regarding quantities of existing, improved 
goods as more of the goods which existed in some previous period. The sim- 
ple repackaging hypothesis does not yield a price-quality relationship 
which can be incorporated into a theory of demand. At best the simple re- 
packaging hypothesis suggests a relatively stable (through time) techno- 
logical relation between goods and prices. The form of the price-quality 
relation is a priori unkfiown. Simple repackaging implies an unchanging 
technological relationship of the form of 7.26 through time. An approp- 
riate estimation technique would then be pooled time series cross-section 
regression using time dummies to pick up price changes common to all the 
varieties of the product. By contrast, the Lancaster hypothesis implies 
the use of single-year regressions, since even if tastes remain the same 
through time, the set of varieties available will change and there will be 
no guarantee that the. implied price-quality relation will be stable through 
time. 
a. 
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EMPIRICAL vs. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE SPECIFICATION OF PRICE-QUALITY 
RELATIONS. 
Chapter 6 essentially discusses the empirical approach to the 
problem of specifying price-quality relations, although 
to apply some basic theory to the question of selection 
iables. Chapter 7 discusses the possible theoretical ba, 
price-quality relationship. In the course of Chapters 6 
distinction was made between "physical characteristics" 
variables". 
an attempt is made 
of independent var- 
ckgrounds for the 
and 7 the further 
and "performance 
Both the empirical and theoretical approaches to determining the 
form of the price-quality relationship have advantages and disadvantages, giv- 
en the current state of knowledge. Ideally we would like to base the specif- 
ication on a sound theoretical model. However it has to be admitted that the 
three models proposed above are somewhat limited; indeed several misgivings 
about each model are cited above. Of the three the simple repackaging hypoth- 
esis is the least specific and leaves several specification problems to be 
settled by the empirical approach. The objections to the household production 
model are so severe that it is not considered further as a 'live' alternative. 
The Lancaster model results in a linear price-quality relationship only be- 
cause linearity is imposed on the transformation functions 7.12. It may be 
argued that the linearity restriction on functions 7.12 is undesirable, but 
the fact remains that only the linear additive production fumctions 7.12 
yield a potentially useful (in the sense of simple and being capable of est- 
imation) price-quality relationship. t 
The balance. of the available empirical evidence seems to be in 
favour of a sqmi-log form for the price-quality relationship (see Chapter 6), 
t see footnote 7 to this chapter a'nd section (B) above. 
N 
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although some writers have successfully employed other functional forms. If 
the theoretical evidence of this Chapter points to any functional form for 
the price-quality relationship in particular, then it suggests that the lin- 
ear one might be the most useful. The empirical work in this thesis concen- 
trates (with some exceptions) on the use of the linear price-quality relat- 
ionship for two major reasons. Firstly, little empirical work has so far been 
done employing linear price-quality relationships and, secondly, despite some 
misgivings, I believe it does have desirable theoretical properties which derive 
both from its inherent simplicity (it yields constant shadow prices on qualit- 
i. es for example) and from the arguments given above. Favouring a linear price- 
quality relationship here is not meant as a criticism of work which has emp- 
loyed other functional forms. 
Neither is the choice (in empirical work) between the use of phys- 
ical characteristics and performance variables as explanatory variables in the 
price-quality relationship as clear cut as the arguments of this Chapter might 
suggest. In practice physical characteristics and performance variables will 
be causally related, indeed that is the nature of the transformation functions 
7.2 (in the Household Production model) and 7.12 (in the Lancaster model). 
Hence in practical terms it will make little difference whether performance 
variables or physical characteristics are used in empirical work; physical 
characteristsics may often stand as proxy performance varaibles. 
None of the above means that we may ignore the theoretical app- 
roach completely. After all an empirical procedure without an underlying 
theory (as the Hedonic technique in its Griliches (1961) form is) must always 
be regarded with some suspicion even if, a priori, it does seem highly plausible. 
At the very minimum the theory of this Chapter does shed some light on the 
specification problem, -and suggest specifications which might otherwise have 
been igno. red. 
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SUMMARY. 
The discussion of Chapters .6 and 7 as 
it relates to the price- 
quality relationship is summarised in Table 7.1.. The argument present- 
ed in Chapter6.. is characterised by the term 'local approximation theory'. 
The neoclassical household production model is not included because of its 
limited applicability. The only space which has not been previously dealt 
with is the estimation technique column of the local approximation theory 
row. Clearly whether we regard the price-quality relationship as being 
reasonably stable through time is a matter of assumptions. Stability will 
obviously depend on the state of technology, manufacturers' pricing policies 
and the stability of the industry. There are good reasons why we might opt 
for the pooled cross-sectional regressions in testing the local approximation 
theory. Consumers may not only consider the current array of available 
varieties, but also the varieties available in previous time periods,, given 
that price levels for all goods may not be the same currently as in the past. 
This assumption will be particularly valid if we are Aealing with a repeat 
purchase. Such intertemporal comparisons are only valid if the price-quality 
relationship is fairly stable. In particular innovation may render inter- 
temporal comparisons difficult. 
The local approximation theory suggests that consumers take the 
array of prices and qualities set by firms as given; any interaction between 
firms and consumers takes the form suggested in Chapter 6. Price-quality 
relationships derived from theories of household technology take the oppos- 
ite point of view : firms are assumed to take the price-quality relationship 
proferred by consumers as given. The simple repackaging hypothesis is based 
on the assumption of a fixed technology through time and the derived price- 
quality relationship must come from firms. Although the specification of the 
price-quality relationship is derived from either firms or consumers exclus- 
t 
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ively it will be modified by the normal longer-run market processes. Var- 
ieties which do not fit into a price-quality relationship derived from con- 
sumption behaviour will die, births (i. e. new varieties) which are success- 
ful will alter the entire price-quality relationship no matter whether it 
is derived from a theory of consumption or production. 
4 
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APPENDIX'7.1 . 
AN EXTENSION OF THE OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS TO PROVIDE A TEST OF OPTIMAL 
QUALITY SETTING AT THE FIRM LEVEL. 
Suppose that the demand function facing the firm may be written 
7.1.1- qi = qi(pi; kl ..... k ;x..... x ; 2) mi li ni 
where x, 
it***Pxni 
are the levels of the n qualities which can be meas- 
ured along a continuous scale embodied in variety i, k, ...., km are the 
levels of the variables other than price and the x's which influence 
demand and are under the firm's control and Z is a vector of exogeneous 
variables which influence demand. If total cost is a continuous twice diff- 
erentiable function of output and the continuous quality dimensions, the 
optimality conditions with respect to the continuous quality dimensions may 
be written : 
xji Wax 
7.1.2 
R 
LI 
i npi 
where R is sales revenue 
0 
;c- is the marginal cost of raising the level of axji 
quality dimension j 
nxi i 
is the elasticity of demand with respect to the 
level of quality dimension. j 
'n Pi is the price elasticity of demand 
7.1.2 -. is rwrely a restatement of the generalised theorem of Chapter 2. 
The problem with attempting. to test for optimal behaviour with respect to 
setting the levels of the Iji Is is that the costs of increasing quality 
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ac 
are unobservable, that is =X is unknown. Analysis of a model of dem- 
ji 
and like that proposed in Chapter6 will provide a solution to this prob- 
lem. Suppose that the demand function for variety i may be written 
7.1.3 qi = qi (Ui , kl i ..., 
k 
gi 9 
Z) 
where Ui represents quality adjusted price and is determined by xji 1, 
i=l,..., n and some of the variables k nis..., okmi * Ui is strictly the 
residual from the price-quality regression, thus pi and Ui are related 
by the function 
7.1.4 Pi u- Pi Ni ; fi Aaufte ; xi botobx ;k9... sk ) i ti i ni 91 mi 
where 
iI @a* $At i 
are the estimated coefficients on the independent var- 
iables in the price-quality regression : 
7.1.5 ýi = ýAiq. oeq Rt i; 
XY4--"Xnj; k gi ...., 
km 
i) 
The actual specification of the residual depends on the functional form of 
the price-quality regression, thus 
7.1.6 ui= ui(pit Pj) 
and thus 
zui zui ýpi 
+ 
zui Bpi 
ax 
ji ap I 
-ýX-Ti 5xi 
where 
Zp 
ax ji 
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7.1.9 9i+i=0 -15-i -15T 
Op i is the estimated implicit price of xji Uji 
If the cost function for variety i is 
7.1.10 TC = ci(qi; x, ..... x ; j,... gkf ) ii 
The profit function for variety i is 
7.1.11 piqi(Ui; k, 
i ...., 
kji; Z) - ci(qi; x, 
is***sxni 
; klisoo*tkf 
i) 
Examining only those profit-maximising conditions which relate to price 
and the continuous qualities we have 
cqU 
7.1.12 0 (pl- 
ýpi i äpi 
+ qi 
arli zc. aq. BU. Zc 7.1.13 .=0=111i 3x ii 
(P 7q 
i) 
-zui -ax 
jDXj1 
Division of ?. 1.12 and 7,1.13 will yield 
BC 
I- ;UI 
/ax 
J1 7.1.14 
ax J1 
-qi BU i/lPi 
And using 7.1.9 we derive the condition 
ac. Dpi 
7.1.15 1= qi - ax ji , -, 
axii 
7.1.16 is the usual marginal condition of price theory, that the level of 
ýI 
,I 
xj i should be determined where the rýarginal cost of 
the addition 
. 
al incre- 
ment of xji is just equal to the (estimated) marginal gain in revenue 
attributable to that increase. 7.1.15 may be used to eliminate the un- 
known marginal cost from 7.1.2 to yield the condition 
7.1.16 
xjjqjaýj nxji 
... Ri TI pi 
or 
7.1.17 ji 
Pi/lxii, 
Pi Pi 
where x 
Pi 
is the portion of the price which is accounted for by jiaxii 
q uality j. The implicit price is derived from the estimated price- 
quality relation,, whilst, the elasticities may be obtained by estimating 
the demand function in the form 
Several points need to be made about this optimality test. 
Firstly, it is clearly most applicable when the qualities are being def- 
ined as physical characteristics and least appropriate when a performance 
variable definition is being employed. Secondly,, the method as described 
is applied only to qualities which can be measured on a continuous scale. 
We might argue that it could be applied to qualities which are measured 
nominally or ordinally in the price-quality relation since ex ante (i. e. 
at the planning stage) such qualities will be continuously variable. Such 
might be the case where 'trim' on cars is concerned, but not where the 
available technology permits only discrete choices, for example between 
jI 
possible braking systems. Thirdly, we are assuming optimality to test for 
optimality. In this the method is no worse than that used to test for opt- 
imality in firms' advertising behaviour. The only difference between the 
I quality and advertising cases is that in one case the price of the discret- 
i 
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ionary variable is known and in the other it has to be estimated. Fourthly, 
the method is nothing more than a test, 2x post, for optimal quality-setting 
behaviour. Integrating price and quality into a model of firm decision 
making using quality-adjusted price misses some of the important elements 
of the price-quality competition problem. A price change is not really 
symmetric with a change in quality since the changes have quite different 
characteristics. Quality changes usually require investment and hence the 
retaliatory lag is quite different to those incurred when price is changed. 
Differences will also occur in consumption. Although in equilibrium the 
effect of a price cut will be identical to the effect of a quality increase, 
both will change quality-adjusted price; one would expect the consumer to 
reach equilibrium faster in response to a price cut than to a quality change, 
because of the difficulty in assessing the change and the utility to be der- 
ived from it. Although the test itself does not require the estimation of 
a demand function incorporating quality-adjusted prices the theory behind 
the test does assume the existence of such a demand function. 
I 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 AND APPENDIX 7.1. 
1. The only work which seems to have been done in this area is that 
by Muellbauer (1972). The discussion here is based on that paper. 
2. The Muth (1966) rather than Muellbauer (1972) terminology is being 
used here. Commodities are things which are purchased on the market 
and as such yield no direct utility. They are purchased because 
jointly they can provide goods which are direct sources of utility 
and are defined in a neoclassical sense. Thus the purpose of buying 
an automobile and petrol (commodities) is to yield transport services 
(goods). 
3. Muellbauer (1972) proves this theorem rigorously. 
4. Which requires homotheticity and similar tastes, or if tastes are 
non-homothetic, similar tastes and similar incomes. 
5. Or since the prices of market products are all approximately equal, 
by absolute shares. 
6. An examination of the papers contained in Griliches (1971) will 
confirm this. 
7. The Lancaster version of the household production model may be easily 
applied given other (probably less plausible) production functions 
to generate alternative price-quality relationships. For example con- 
sider the production functions 
Jbjixi 
Ze1,2 
then aýplying equation 7.18 we immediately generate the price- 
quality relationship 
lb 
Pi 1 b, ie 
Ib 
2-xi 
2b2 e i 
Only the linear additive production functions yield a potentially 
useful price-quality relationship. 
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8. Even here it has severe limitations, since most quality change will 
not be of the simple repackaging type. Modern cars may stop more 
quickly than previous models. This feature augments the safety of 
the product, but can hardly be considered as yielding 'more' of the 
ol d car. 
90 7.1.9 is the condition for a linear price-ouality rýOationship. 
For a log-linear price-quality relationship U log PF i- log Pi 
and alli =. I and Bui 1 given V BP 0. X 
p 01% p Bpi i Bpi i Bpi api 
Incorporation of these relationships into the model of Appendix 6.1 
'0% yields the optimality condition Xji zp/zXjl nX The 
Pi 
nP 
difference between this condition and -7.1.17(the replacement of Pi 
with Pi) reflects the different specification of the quality-adjusted 
price variable. 
i 
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CHAPTER 8. 
A DYNAMIC PRICING MODEL. 
INTRODUCTION., 
This chapter extends the theme developed at the end of Chapter 
6 and attempts to develop a theory concerning the 'life-cycle' of a var- 
iety of a product. An optimal pricing path is derived from the theory and 
compared with actual pricing paths adopted by manufacturers. 
DEMAND OVER THE 'LIFE' OF A VARIETY. 
We may identify four separate factors which change or shift the 
demand curve for a given variety through time. We may call these the "age 
effect" o the "competitive reaction effect", the "stock effect" and the "ad- 
vertising stock effect". The age effect has already been partly dealt with 
in Chapter 6. It was suggested that new varieties of a consumer durable 
1 
incorporated style changes and the latest technology. In addition, the 
bundle of characteristics presented by a new variety should be "more relev- 
ent" in market terms than the bundles embodied in existing varieties. That 
is, given that tastes change, new varieties should embody bundles of charact- 
eristics closer to the theoretically optimal bundle than do the varieties 
which have been on the market for some time. When the variety has been on 
the market for some time, it will itself gradually become an 'old' variety, 
and other newer varieties will have entered the market, depressing demand 
for the variety in question. Two possible predictions follow from such an 
argument. Firstly, there is the hypothesis of Chapter 69 that demand for 
new models is less price elastic than demand for-old models. Secondly,, we 
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might expect the demand curve for a new model to shift downwards through 
time, i. e. as the variety "ages". 
The "competitive reaction effect" inevitably influences the 
age effect since it relates to the rate of competitive introduction of 
new varieties. If the new variety introduced by the firm is successful 
in sales terms we would expect reaction by rivals to be more likely than 
if the new model were relatively unsuccessful in sales terms, and hence 
made little inroad into rivals' sales. That is, we postulate that com- 
petitive reaction is prompted by market share or sales considerations 
rather than with the profitability of the new variety. We assume that 
rivals have some latitude where their planned new model introductions are 
concerned. At the very minimum, manufacturers will be able to "revamp" 
existing models and hence alter the bundles of characteristics they embody. 
At best, manufacturers will be able to bring planned new model introduction 
times substantially forward to combat the success of some other fi rm's new 
model. Hence, the innovating firm is faced with a dilemma. If the firm 
introduces the new variety at a relatively low price and it gains a sub- 
stantial market share, then reaction in the form of retaliatory new model 
introduction will take place more quickly than if a higher price were charg- 
ed. The result will be that the age effect will be accelerated and the 
demand curve will shift downward. If, on the other hand, the firm charges 
a higher initial price, current demand will suffer but future demand will 
be higher since the age effect will be less influenced by competitive reac- 
tion. There isa trade-off between current and future demand. 2 
The "stock effect" reinforces the age effect. The stock effect 
exists because we are concerned with a durable good. As stocks of the par- 
ticular variety increase, current demand is depressed. For simplicity we 
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assume that stocks are a function of cumulative sales; Acting in an oppos- 
ite fashion to the stock effect is the influence of replacement demand. 
Replacement demand might exert its influence later in the life of the prod- 
uct, than the stock effect. 
The "advertising stock effect" works in the opposite direction 
to the age effect. Old models have an advertising stock associated with 
them, which is in part reflected by 'brand loyalty'. New models may be 
more difficult to sell than old models because there are barriers induced 
by the advertising stock associated with existing models. Williamson (1963a) 
presents a model in which the cumulative selling expense associated with 
a variety influences the demand curve for that variety. Schupack (1972) 
has developed a model in which advertising raises the limit price (by rais- 
ing entry barriers) and influences the speed at which rivals enter the mar- 
ket. In the current model we again assume that cumulative sales are import- 
ant, that as more units of the new variety are sold, the new variety becomes 
more familiar to consumers. The brand loyalty barriers of other models are 
broken down and the stock of knowledge concerning the new variety increases. 
COSTS OVER THE 'LIFE' OF A VARIETY. 
Unit costs may be influenced by cumulative output. If the var- 
iety is a variety of a complex product, then experience of production may 
lead to lower unit costs as the production process becomes "debugged" ; that 
is, it may become more efficient through time. Clearly, the notion of fall- 
ing unit costs as experience grows is similar to the 'learning-by-doing' 
hypothesis advanced by Arrow (1962) and extended by Sheshinski (1967). al- 
though in this case experience is measured by cumulative gross investment. 
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We assume that at any point in time output and sales are equal. 
Cumulative sales then exert three distinct influences on the profit position 
of the firm. Firstly, cumulative sales acts to depress current and future 
demand via the age effect, competitive reaction effect and stock effect. 
Secondly, replacement demand and the advertising stock effect are both in- 
creased by cumulative sales and tend to bolster demand. Thirdly, unit 
costs at any given level of output are lower for higher levels of cumulative 
output (= sales) via an "experience effect". 
THE FORMAL MODEL. 
We define the variable r(t) such that 
t 
8.1 r(t) q(t) d(t) 
0 
that is, r(t) is cumulative output at time t. Let the demand function 
facing the firm at time t be 
8.2 q(t) '= h[r(t)] q(p, PrIl Z) 
where 
p is the price charged by the firm 
Pr is a vector of rivals' prices or some index of 
rivals' prices 
Z, is a vector of variables other than prices and the 
'effects' given above which influence demand. They 
may be endogeneous to the firm (e. g,. advertising) or 
exogeneous. 
h[r(t)] summari 
, 
ses the effects exerted on the demand function 
through time by cumulative output and h[r(o)] =h00 
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We might expect that early in the life of the variety h' [r(t)] >0 as the* 
advertising stock is built up; during the "middle life" of the variety 
h' [r(t)] <0 as the age, competitive reaction and stock effects exert their 
influence; and finally, h' [r(t)]=-: 0 as replacement demand and the other 
effects even out. Oligopoly theory suggests that 
8.3 P= P(pr) 
For convenience we write demand function 8.2 as 
8.4 q(t) = h[r(t)] q*(p) 
The path of sales through time is described by the derivative of 8.4 
with respect to time,, i. e. 
8.5 h'[r(t)] ýq*(p) + h[r(t)] ap 
where from 8.1 
8.6 ý= q(t) 
We assume that at any point in time unit costs are constant and given by 
8.7 c (t) -cL+ glr(t)lc 0 
where 
CL is the lower bound of unit costs 
CO is constant 
9 NO)l = g(, 
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g[r(-)] =0 
91 [r(t)] <0 
Thus total costs at any given point in time are given by 
8.8 TC(t) q(t) c(t) 
The firm maximises the present value of the stream of profits, V, where 
V is given by 
8.9 VfT [p(t) - c(t)]q(t) e-ptdt 
0 
where p is the discount rate (taken to be positive and constant) subject 
to the transition equation 
8.6 ý= 
and the boundary conditions h[r(o)] =h0 and g[r(o)] = go 9 Using 
the Pontryagin Maximum Principlet we form the Hamiltonian function, H 
8.10 H e-Pt I(P - CL - g(r)CO) h(r)q*(p) + xh(r)q*(p)] 
after dropping time subscripts. The first-order conditions for an interior 
maximum of V are 
3 
8.11 aH Fp- 
8.12 ;H TF, 
8.13 X (T) =0 
8.6 ý=q (t) 
and the boundary conditions h[r(o)] =h0 and g[r(o)] =. g0. Condition 
tsee Intriligator (1971). 
4 
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8.11 may be written (after cancellation of the term e-pth(r)) 
8.14 
4 [p -C- g(r)CO + X]2e + q*(P) L ap 
or 
_q*(pl _ [p C 8.15 Tq-', vTz-p L- g(r)Cý 
-pt Condition 8.12 may be written (after cancellation of the term e 
8.16 [P - CL - g(r)C, +x] hl(r)q*(p) - g: l(r)C, h(r)q*(p) 
Differentiating 8.15 with respect to time we obtain 
_ q*(p) 
2 
8.17 2 
LSý )6+ 91 (r) ýC 
(aq*/3p)2 ; p2 0 
Substituting for x (from 8.15) and i (from 8.17) into 8.16 we obtain 
the trajectory for p given by 
8.18 2+ 
(P) a2 * 
g(r)Cj q1ý' -P Bq p -PIP - 
CL 
(; q*/ap)2 ; p2 
h'(r)q*(p) 
aq /ap 
(since r q(t)). 
Given an expression for 5 we may find the trajectory for q by substit- 
ution into 8.5 . In many practical situations 8.18 will 
in fact be a 
good deal simpler. In particular, if the demand function is separable and 
linear, semi-log linear or log linear with respectto q and q*(p), then 
the term q*(p3 
2Y 
will be, a constant. The sign of 5 cannot be 
(zq*/; p)2 ap2 
unambiguously determined on the basis of qualitative information concerning 
costs, demand and the discount rate alone. Some quantitative information, 
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particularly in relation to the demand function, is requireo in order to 
detemine the sign ofs and eventually the path of, ý. 
AN APPLICATION OF THE FORMAL MODEL. 
The formal model attempts to provide a 'theory' of demand 
over the life of a particular variety of a product. Several implicit ass- 
umptions are made, but one of the most important is that the variety should 
not change substantially through its life. Thus if major specifications 
changes are made to the variety then, for the purposes of this model, the 
variety must be deemed changed. The formal model is here applied to four 
models of passenger cars. All four cars were small four seat saloons 
which had a substantial market life, and were unchanged with respect to 
body shape and style and basic mechanical details during the period under 
study. 5 Annual data for the four models was available for the period 1957- 
68 inclusive. Again the data* used Was -made available to me by Keith 
Cowling and John Cubbin. The only available advertising data was at 
the company, rather than brand or model, level. Above-the-line advertising 
does not seem to be an important determinant of demand where the passenger 
cars are concernedý "ý The index of rivals' prices used was one which was 
adjusted for quality. It is calculated in Chapter9 . Model A had a 
very long market life, which is not entirely captured by the data. By 1957 
it was already well established, and any advertising stock effects should 
have ceased to play a major role in determining demand for model A. It 
was eventually taken off the market shortly after 1968. Model B was int- 
roduced in 1959 and is still (Spring 1974) on the market, and looks like 
being so for some time. Models C and D were both on the market during 
the period 1959-67 inclusive. 
tsee Chapter 4 above and Cowling (1972). 
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RESULTS. 
Several different specifications of demand function 8.2 were 
tried. The results reported in Table 8.1 are for the estimated demand 
function 
Pi1 
8.19 msi 
t=a0. 
't 
h[r(t)] Vi 
Pri. t t 
where 
Msi is the market share of variety i in period t 
t 
Pi 
t 
is the list price of variety i in period t 
Pr 
t 
is the value of the quality-adjusted price index 
in period t 
v it is a random disturbance term 
Using market share as the dependent variable is consistent with the formal 
model, given some assumptions about the term 
'5'qi For the purposes of 
this model we assume that 
34 
-0; i. e. that total market size is invar- Bqi - 
iant with respect to the sales of variety i. Given 00 multiplic- 
ative separable nature of 8.19, and the Cournot assumption 
8.20 
ap 
rt0 
api 
t 
8.18 becomes (after dropping subscripts) 
8.21 - 
(a+'-) ý=-a. pp [P c qp aaLC g(r)] + 
h'(r) 
0a 
A semi-log form of 8.19 yielded results which were very little different 
from those reported in Table 8.1 Including list price and the value of 
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the price index separately as independent variables led to higher F-scores 
in some cases, but by and large wrong signs on price variables. Inclusion 
of only the price relative reduces multicollinearity. 
Two forms of the function h[r(t)] were applied : 
8.22 In h[r(t)] =a+ b[r(t)] + C[r(t)]2 
and 
8.23 In h[r(t)] = a' + b'[r(t)] 
8.23 is theoretically more appropriate in the case of model A where 
all the cumulative output effects could be expected to work in the same 
direction. Results for models B. C and D are reported for the functional 
form 8.22 . 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS. 
Some of the results of Table 8.1 are encouraging. The price- 
elasticities of demand, given the Cournot assumption 0, are of 
r 
the correct sign and in the cases of models A, B and C of approximately 
the correct magnitude. On the other hand the coefficient on the price var- 
iable is poorly determined. Part of this must be due to the fairly high 
degree of multicollinearity which exists between the independent variables. 
The correlation matrices showing the extent of this are given in Table 8.2. 
The function h[r(t)] shows the assumed pattern. For model A 
h' (r) <0 in all years; for models B. C and D, h' (r) >0 in the early 
years. and h'(r) <0 in later years. Model B was introduced in late 
1959 and the turning point of the function h(r(t)j occurred during 1964. 
Model C was introduced in 1959 and the turning point occurred in 1960. 
I 
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Model D followed the same pattern as model C. 
Demand information alone is not sufficient to determine the 
optimal trajectory for price. -As 8.21 shows, cost information is also 
required. However, provided we assume that at no point in time will it 
be optimal for the firm to charge a price lower than unit cost, we may be 
able to say something more about From 8.21 we have 
8.24 ý, =, p+[p-c 
h'(rl qp RTT RTT L- 
Cog(r)] - aý, - 
where 
a 
< lp - CL - Co g(r)] 
p>o 
Clearly, the sign of ý depends in part on the sign of W(r) In the 
early stages of a model's life it is possible for 0 when W(r) > 0.7 
In the later stages of a model's life when W(r) <0<0 seems more 
likely. The optimal trajectory for q inacts similar problems: from 8.5 
the trajectory for q is given by 
8.25 h' (r) q q* (p) +h (r) tp 
When ý and h' (r) have the same s. ignj which seems likely, the sign of 
ý is undetermined, given 
t <'O. 
It is fairly easy to show that only in the cases of models B 
and C will the available data yield a likely sounding result. From 8.24 
we may derive an expression for the proportional rate of change of p: 
pa P-C L-Co g 8.26 P- + -T -a-+- Tp p 
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Given likely values of the discount rate, P. and the gross mark-up 
P-C -Cg (r) Lp0 the first two terms on the right-hand side of 8.26 will 
be small. In the case of model A the maximum value of the term 
h'(r)q is approximately -0.22$ and hence this term is likely to dom- a+T- 
inate the expression for -ý and yield the prediction of large and ever- p 
increasing proportional rates of fall of price. In the case of model D 
values of the term - 
h'(r)q are very high. In the year of introduction CL+ I 
of model D (1959) the value of the term was approximately 3 For model 
B values of _ 
h'(r)q lie in the range -0.251 -ý- 0.043 . For model 
C 
the range is -0.581 -* 0.090 . The negative values occur at the end of 
the model' s life and the positive values at the beginning. 
SUMMARY. 
The model of demand proposed early in the chapter was tested 
using data pertaining to four models of passenger cars. The 'effects' id- 
entified theoretically 
t had the predicted result on the demand curve. 
The estimated price elasticities had the 'correct' sign and were approx- 
imately of the correct magnitude. 8 Although it was not possible to con- 
struct a theoretically optimal pricing path (because of the lack of cost 
data) and compare it with the actual pricing path, it was shown that the 
predicted values of parameters of the demand situation did not lead to 
a priori "sensible" values for the proportional rate of change of price. 
However, it would be too much to expect that such a simple model would 
predict believable changes in decision variables. Two particular comments 
nay be made. Firstlyt the specification of the demand function used con- 
t age effect, competitive reaction effects stock effect and advertising 
stock effect. 
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strains the price-elasticity of demand for a model to be constant through 
time,, whilst the theoretical suggestion was made that this would not be 
the case. Secondly, if consumers were able to predict firms' behaviour 
then their behaviour might be altered. Thus if a firm reduces a model's 
price this might lead to the prediction of further reductions by consum- 
ers, leading to a smaller initial demand. Not including this might lead 
the model to predict large falls in price over time. 
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TARI 17 AI 
Regression results for dynamic pricing model. Dependent 
variable In MS i0 
VARIABLE MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C. MODEL D 
Constant 2.9268 0.1500 2.7306 6.5450 
(0.8254) (0.0265) (0.8356) (0.3781) 
Pi 
t -2.9048 -2.1703 -3.2074 -5.8960 
Pr (1.1683) (0.4904) (1.4290) (0.5374) 
t 
-3.9715 4.5355 4.3514 2.2356 
r(t) X10-6 XjO-6 X10-7 X10- 
6 
(6.1490) (1.9696) (0.3286) (0.2672) 
-5.6421 -1.7797 -1.2567 
r(t) 2 X10-12 XIO-12 X10-11 
(2.8763) (1.0768) (0.5561) 
d. f. 2,9 3j, 6 39 5 3,5 
F. 95.8554 4.2833 5.9493 1.7203 
R2 0.9552 0.6817 0.7812 0.5079 
D-W 1.2808 1.4766 1.8570 2.9987 
t-values in brackets 
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TABLE 8.2 
Correlations between the independent variables for the 
regression given in Table 8.1 . 
MODEL A 
r(t) 
ln (PIPr) 0.8553 
MODEL B 
r(t) 
ln (P/Pd 0.9422 
r(t) 
MODEL C 
r(t) 
ln (P/Pr) 0.4455 
r(t) 
r(t)2 
0.8580 
0.9701 
r(t)2 
0.4291 
0.9733 
MDEL D 
r(t) 
In (p/p. ) 0.7396' 
r(t) 
r(t)2 
0.6041 
0.9714 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8. 
The discussion here is related to a consumer durable, but much of 
what is said can equally well be applied to other types of product. 
2. The problem has elements in common with the 'limit pricing' problem. 
In both cases entry into the market by rivals is related to current 
aspects of the firm's policy. In particular, the model given here' 
is quite closely related to the limit pricing models of Pashigian 
(1968) and Phelps and Winter (1970). See also the more general 
articles by Jacquemin (1972b) and Jacquemin and Thisse (1972). 
3. Here, as elsewhere, we assume that the second-order conditions are 
satisfied. 
4.8.13 is identical to the instantaneous profit-maximisation condition 
except for the multiplier X. 
5. Minor improvements and modifications were made to the models through 
time, but these modifications tended to be common to all vehicles 
and largely unadvertised. Thus model A in this study received 
many minor improvements. including better side lighting,, stronger 
shock absorbers, etc. 
6. Hence advertising stock is not included as an independent variable 
in the estimated demand functions. When it is included its estim- 
ated coefficient has the wrong sign in the majority of cases. 
7. A sufficient condition for p>0 when h(r) >0 is h'(r)q > P. 
Maximum values for the term h'(r)q are as follows 
Model A= -0.423 approx. 
Model B=0.05 approx. 
Model C=0.199 approx. 
Model D' = 20.77 approx. 
8. They are, -however, insignificantly different from zero. 
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CHAPTER 9. 
ESTIMATES OF THE PRICE-QUALITY RELATIONSHIP. 
INTRODUCTION.. 
Chapters 6 and .7 proposed 
three major alternative bases for the 
price-quality relationship; the local approximation approach, the Lancaster 
hypothesis and the simple repackaging hypothesis. The three approaches sugg- 
ested different underlying forms for the price-quality relationship. This 
chapter contains estimates of some of these forms of the price-quality rel- 
ationship and discusses the implications of the results derived from those 
for the competing hypotheses. The data used refers to U. K. passenger cars 
during the period 1957-68. 
HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED. 
The three underlying theories noted above are not necessarily 
competing hypotheses. The local approximation approach and the Lancaster 
hypothesis are both essentially theories of consumption whilst the simple 
repackaging hypothesis is an assumption about technology, although it could 
be argued to imply a particular pattern of consumption behaviour. It was 
shown in Chapter 7that only the Lancaster hypothesis implied a very definite 
functional form for the price-quality relationship. In particular it is poss- 
ible for the simple repackaging hypothesis and the local approximation app- 
roach to co-exist. It might not be possible to settle on any one hypothesis 
no matter how sophisticated the hypothesis testing technique. 
Chapters 6 and 7suggested a theoretical distinction between 
vertical qualities, performance variables and physical characteristics, and 
associated these different definitions of 'quality' with the local approx- 
imation approach, the Lancaster hypothesis and the simple repackaging 
6. 
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hypothesis respectively. The data available for this stucLy does not, in 
practice, allow for such sophisticated distinctions to be employed, in testing. 
In fact the same set of independent variables is employed whatever the form 
of the price-quality regression estimated. Although this is a serious 'short- 
coming, we may justly argue that the set of variables chosen satisfy the 
vertical qualities definition well and are at least reasonable proxies for a 
set of performance variables. This point is amplified in the section below. 
The data limitations restrict the available distinctions between 
the theories to questions of functional form of the price-quality relation- 
ship. Figure 9.1 shows the different functional forms estimated in this 
chapter. It also underlines the point that it is not necessarily possible to 
choose between the simple repackaging hypothesis and the local approximation 
theory. Only two out of the (large) possible set of functional forms are 
used, linear and log-linear. The popular semi-lod form is ignored on the 
grounds that it has been well tried by other resparchers! The small number 
of observations in each of the years makes the inclusion of manufacturer 
dummies in single-year regressions impossible. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA. 
The available data refers to the 28 saloon cars listed in Appen- 
dix 9.1. The list includes all the domestically produced smaller cars avail-. 
able during all or part of the period, but no imported carO In practical 
terms 'model' is difficult to defines 'model range' is perhaps a more useful 
concept. The available data was not sufficiently disaggregated to distinguish 
the sales of some models within certain rangesýNo problems are presented if 
we aggregate the data to the model range level, provided all the ranges are 
comparable in 'breadth'. The-only model which contravenes this requirement 
to any extent is perhaps the Mark 2 Cortina (available during the years 1966- 
68). The major problem is that some observations include variants with diff- 
t see Chapter 6' and Muel lbauer (11972a). 
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erent engine sizes (Heralds, Escorts, Vivas etc. ) whereas others do not. 
The data reported treats model ranges as if they were the most popular low- 
priced variant within the rangeý one consequence of defining the product 
fairly narrowly and aggregating the data to the model range level is that in 
any given year the number of observations is small! Where a given model was 
available for only a small part of a year, either because 'it was introduced 
or discontinued in that year, and consequently had low sales. then the model 
was not included for thatyearý In some cases the specifications of a model 
changed during the course of a year, and the available data did not disting- 
uish sales between the differing sets of specifications. In such cases the 
data refers to the variant which had the greater market life during the year. 
In general such changes in specification took place late in the year? 
The variables used in the study are: 
6 
the dependent variable list price 
7 
the independent variables brake horse-power of model (B. H. P. ) 
length of model in inches 
the petrol consumption of the model in miles per 
gallon (M. P. G. ) 
dummy variable for 'gears' =I if model has 4 or 
more forward gears 
0 otherwise 
leg room in the rear of the car in inches 
dummy variable for 'disc brakes' =I if model has 
disc brakes 
0 otherwise 
dummy variable for 'power brakes' =I if the model 
has power-assisted 
brakes 
0 otherwise 
Weights used in some, regressions are market shares. 
t see Table 9.1. 
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All the independent variables satisfy the vertical qualities criteria out- 
lined in Chapter 6. One is a performance variable (fuel consumption), B. H. P. 
cannot be properly considered a performance variable since it does not enter 
the utility function per se, but it is closely related to those performance 
variables connected with the power of the model. The remaining five variables 
are all physical characteristics of the models. The major shortcoming evident 
in the independent variables is the lack of performance variables, neverthe- 
less it may be argued that the independent variables listed above stand as 
proxies for the unmeasured performance variables. (see Chapter 7). 
8 
RESULTS. 
The results are summarised in tables 9.1 to 9.6. Tables 9.1 
and 9.2 have a direct bearing on the Lancaster hypothesis. Tables 9.3 and 
9.4 relate to both the simple repackaging hypothesis and the local approx- 
imation theory. Table 9.5 relates to the local approximation theory alone. 
Table 9.6 points out some of the limitations of the single-year regression 
results in general. It is convenient to consider the results as they relate 
to the specific theories as shown in figure 9.1. 
(i) The Lancaster Hypothesis. 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show three features of the results for a possible test 
of the Lancaster hypothesis. Firstly the coefficients on the variables are 
in general not significant. Secondly the signs on many of the coefficients 
are not as theoretically expected. Thirdly. and perhaps most importantlys 
the coefficients show great variability over time. A fairly natural response 
to these objections would be to aggregate the observations across years, but 
the Lancaster hypothesis rules this out. The Lancaster hypothesis predicts 
that the coefficients will vary through times but the extent and unpatterned 
variation shown by the estimated coefficients in tables 9.1 anti 9.2 is. 
worrying. 
Table 9.6 amplifies the data given for 1966 in table 9.1. The 
191. 
regression for 1966 was the one which was best determined and is taken as 
the example. Clearly confidence intervals for shadow prices in other years 
will be wider still. Table 9.6 shows that there is little evidence in table 
9.1 for the hypothesis that shadow prices change through time. The structure' 
of the multicollinearity between independent variables in 1966 is also shown 
in table 9.6. The surprisingly low partial correlation coefficient between 
length and leg room is peculiar to 1966 only in that it is negative. The 
average for the other eleven years is 0.2855. Originally three 'dimensions' 
variables were used. The variable measuring width in front of the model has 
been omitted from the reported results. It was highly correlated with length 
and by and large poorly determined. It would obviously be helpful to reduce 
the degree of multi col linearity between the quality variables. Two possible 
methods of doing this are available. Firstly we might combine (or eliminate) 
those quality variables which occur in fixed proportions. Cowling and Cubbin 
(1972) combined the 'dimensions' variables to yield the single quality var- 
iable "passenger room". Their results were disappointing; the estimated co- 
efficients usually took on the wrong sign and were poorly determined. Here 
we have opted to eliminate the width variable. It is also worthwhile consid- 
ering combining some of the mechanical performance variables with some dim- , 
ensions varaibles. Thus performance may be more closely related to the power- 
weight ratio than to B. H. P.,, M. P. G. j, or length. Secondly we might correct 
list price by standardising'according to qualities where 'option' prices are 
available; in essence we may use the technique of "stripping" discussed in 
in Appendix 6.1. This technique has been applied where heaters are concerned, 
but unfortunately prices are not available for any other options (e. g. disc 
brakes). Results for approximately the same market were reported by Cowling 
and Cubbin (1972). Their single-year cross-sections used weighted data and 
a wider set of observations, including some much larger models. Although 
their regressions were better determined I individual parameter estimates 
were still poor. In particular, the coefficients on M. P. G. and "passenger 
area" usually took on the 'wrong' sign (negative). 
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We cannot reject the Lancaster hypothesis on the basis of tables 
9.1 and 9.2, rather we should look for a more suitable test of it. Any such 
test would require the two features of more data and the use of performance 
variables as independent variables. The Lancaster hypothesis is a thoery of 
consumption, i. e. it provides a basis for predicting choice between the 
available alternatives for consumption. As such it should include choice 
between new and second-hand varieties of a good, provided there is a well 
organised second-hand market. Such is the case where cars are concerned. A 
consumer with sufficient money to purchase a new Mini may well (rationally) 
prefer to purchase a second-hand Maxi . Immediately we have a new source of 
data for testing the Lancaster hypothesis. A suitable test of the Lancaster 
hypothesis where tastes are homothetic over a reasonable range of incomes 
would be to estimate linear single-year cross-sectional regressions for all 
new and second-hand cars available in a given pHce. range using performance 
variables as data. No such estimates of price-quality relationships have been 
carried out. 
(ii) The Local Approximation Theory. 
Tables 9.2 and 9.5 present estimates of price-quality relation-- 
ships consistent with the local approximation theory where intertemporal 
comparisons are not permitted. Clearly exactly the same objections can be 
levelled against the results of table 9.5 as were levelled against the results 
of tables 9.1 and 9.2. When intertemporal comparisons are taken into account 
the story is somewhat different. The results which are applicable to the 
intertemporal case are discussed in the following section. 
(iii)The Simple Repackaging Hypothes is /Local Approximation Theory (Inter- 
temporal Case. ) 
A perfectly good case can be made for the argument that the S. R. H. 
provides a theory of determination of the price-quality relationship from 
the supply side whilst the Iýocal approximation theory provides an explanation 
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TABLE 9.3 Price-quality regression : log-linear,; pooled data 
with time dummies ; 1957-68 inclusive. 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT t-VALUE 
Constant 1.4330 5.0156 
log (BHP) 0.4288 7.8035 
log (length) 0.2871 3.1414 
log (MPG) -0.0799 1.2127 
DY. for I gears' 0.0405 5.0287 
log (leg room) 0.0054 0.0423 
DX for 'disc brakes' 0.0139 1.8550 
DY. for 'power brakes' 0.0086 0.5554 
1958 -0.0005 0.0361 
1959 0.0013 0.0952 
1960 0.0016 0.1209 
1961 -0.0036 0.2642 
1962 -0-0144 1.0823 
1963 -0.0187 1.4194 
1964 -0.0187 1.3921 
1965 -0-0171 1.2801 
1966 -0.0095 0.7274 
1967 -0-0065 0.4789 
1968 0.0202 1.4902 
n 171 
F 53.160 
R2 0.8629 
D-W 1.5101 
196. 
TABLE 9.4 Price-quality regression linear pooled data 
with time and manufacturer dummies 1957-68 inclusive. 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT t-VALUE 
Constant 123.492 1.7546 
Brake Horse Power 3.7425 9.7726 
Length in inches 1.0978 4.3194 
MPG -2.0818 -2.4406 
D. V. for 'gears' 32.7787 3.3239 
Leg room in inches 1.9781 1.4146 
D. V. for 'disc brakes' 35.6314 4.5237 
1958 -0.2832 -0.0208 
1959 1.1790 0.0858 
1960 1.5957 0.1162 
1961 -4.5042 -0.3277 
1962 -16.7742 -1.2340 
1963 -26.4228 -1.9394 
1964 -26.2024 -1.8857 
1965 -19.0333 -1.3934 
1966 -19.1958 -1.4235 
1967 3.7413 0.2710 
1968 22.2881 1.5788 
Ford dummy variable -37.3787 -5.0670 
Rootes dummy variable 4.5488 0.5578 
Standard-Triumph D. V. 27.7114 2.8562 
Vauxhall D. V. 5.7925 0.4752 
n 171 
F 66.8948 
R2 0.9041 
D-W 292507 
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TABLE 9.6. 
Confidence intervals for shadow quality prices; 1966 data. 
QUALITY 95% C. I. YEARS IN WHICH SHADOW PRICE 
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT 
FROM 1966 PRICE. 
B. H. P. 3.9056 i 3.8653 1968 
Length 0.2190 ± 0.8379 1957,195891962,1963,, 1965. 
M. P. G. -3.1227 ± 6.1721 1957,1968. 
Gears -8.7936 ± 97.94 1963 
Leg room 3.4754 ± 14.357 
Disc brakes 47.476 ± 56.76 
Partial correlation coefficients between qualities; 1966 data. 
Length M. P. G. Gears Leg room Disc brakes 
B. H. P. . 6201 -. 8288 -. 0637 . 2486 . 6895 
Length -. 4764 -. 0698 -. 0119 . 4068 
M. P. G. . 3000 . 0412 -. 4709 
Gears . 0924 . 2425 
Leg room . 3118 
0 
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of how that relationship may be related to consumption behaviour. The two 
theories may be seen as complementary rather than competing. Tables 9.3 and 
9.4 present estimates of the price-quality relationship consistent with both 
the above theories. The regressions are well determined. Only the leg room 
coefficient is insignificant. The negative coefficient on fuel economy 
(M. P. G. ) 
does not imply that, ceteris paribus, a more economical model will be sold 
for less. Fuel economy is negatively correlated with some of the included 
quality variables (e. g. B. H. P. and length) and negatively correlated with 
omitted quality variables, particularly those which would add weight to the 
car (e. g. optional extras, more padding in seats etc. ). Approximately half 
the coefficients on the 'year' dummy variables are significant in table 9.4. 
Both the coefficients identifying Ford models and Stan dard-Tri umph models 
are significant-. 
The S. R. H. implies a reasonably stable technology through timeq 
whilst the local approximation approach requires reasonably stable tastes. 
Some evidence supporting these two assumptions is provided by the fact that 
one model of car included in the sample appeared virtually unchanged with 
respect to specifications in all twelve years. Several other models appeared 
in at least nine of the twelve years. 
A QUALITY-ADJUSTED PRICE INDEX FOR CARS. 
We may construct a quality-adjusted price index for cars from 
the results of table 9.4. Given that the regression hyperplane passes through 
the point of means, the coefficients on the year dummyvariabb-s shnw thp 
change in price which occurs for the average car (the model with the average 
price and average bundle of characteristics) each year. The derived price 
index then relates to the price of this 'average' model during the period. 
, The man price of all models included in the sample is 1527 68p. In 1963 the 
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identical model would have cost 1527 68p. less E16 77p., the latter figure , 
being the estimated coefficient on the 1963 time dummy in table 9.4. Convert- 
ing this information into an index with a value of 100 in 1957 yields the 
quality-adjusted price index shown in column 1 of table 9.7. Column 2 of 
table 9.7 gives the values of a quality-adjusted price index for cars calc- 
ulated by Cowling and Cubbin (1972). Their method of constructing a quality- 
adjusted price index relied on estimating sinqle-year price-quality regressions 
and thus deriving the price of a quality-constant car from those regressions 
for each year. Column 3 of table 9.7 gives values for an "established models" 
index calculated by Cowling and Cubbiný The sample of models used in period 
t was restricted to those models which also appeared in period t-1. The index 
does not take into account changes in quality-adjusted price brought about 
by the introduction of new models or improvements'in old models. The three 
indexes are shown in Figure 9.2. 
Both the quality-adjusted price indexes are much more flexible 
downwards than the established models index. This result is in line with the 
hypothesis put forward in Chapter 7, that in a situation of oligopolistic 
interdependence list prices would tend to be rigid whilst the probability 
of rapid reaction could be largely removed by making simultaneous changes in 
prices and specifications. The comparison with the established models index 
is ideal, since the established models index reflects changes in list price 
only. Its remarkable stability during the period 1957-64 (reflecting list 
price rigidity) contrasts markedly with the variation about trend shown by 
the two quality-adjusted price indexes during the same period. Comparison of 
the two quality-adjusted price indexes sh9ws the index calculated above (the 
'Morris' index) to be more stable than the Cowling-Cubbin index, at least 
't Cowling and Cubbin (1972). 
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TABLE 9.7. Price Indexes for U. K. Passenger Cars 1957-68. 
CHAIN HEDONIC INDEX ESTABLISHED MODELS 
YEAR MORRIS COWLING-CUBBIN INDEX 
1957 = 100 1956 = 100 1956 = 100 
1957 100.00 110.24 107.83 
1958 99.94 110.85 100.47 
1959 100.22 109.49 106.49 
1960 100.30 110.11 107.51 
1961 99.14 111.06 107.51 
1962 96.82 103.11 107.13 
1963 94.99 97.92 107.67 
1964 95.03 95.91 109.43 
1965 96.39 99.57 114.27 
1966 96.36 99.21 114.20 
1967 100.70 107.10 120.52 
1968 104.22 111.10 120.83 
1957 = 100 1957 = 100 1957 =' 100 
1957 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1958 99.94 100.55 98.73 
1959 100.22 99.31 98.75 
1960 100.30 99.88 99.70 
1961 99.14 100.74 99.70 
1962 96.82 93.53 99.35 
1963 94.99 88.82 99.85 
1964 95.03 87.00 101.48 
1965 96.39 90.32 105.97 
1966 96.36 98.99 105.90 
1967 100.70 97.15 111.76 
1968 104.22 100.78 112.05 
202. 
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FIGURE 9.2 Price Indexes for Cars 1957-68 
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1 
up to 1967. This observation must be in part explained by the fact that the 
Morris index uses pooled cross-sectional data whilst, the Cowling-Cubbin 
index relies on the use of estmates derived from single-year cross-sections 
with their attendant problem of great variability of shadow prices through 
ti me. "0 
SUMMARY. 
Single-year cross-sectional estimates of the price-quality 
relationship for U. K. cars were poor. It was suggested that this was due to 
the limited number of observations in each time period. The price-quality 
regressions yielded no evidence for or against the Lancaster hypothesis. A 
possible alternative method of testing the Lancaster hypothesis was advanced. 
Any new investigation of the price-quality relationship in cross-section 
. 
could most profitably be conducted along these lines. Pooling the available 
data improved the level of determination of the price-qualiýy regression and 
the shadow prices on qualities. 'Make effects' also appeared to be of some 
importance. A quality-adjusted price index for cars was constructed. The 
index agreed much more closely with another quality-adjusted price index than 
with an index relating only to list price changes of established models. The 
downward flexibility of the index supported the hypothesis of Chapter 6. 
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APPENDIX 9.1. 
MODELS OF PASSENGER CAR INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE USED TO ESTIMATE THE 
PRICE-QUALITY RELATIONSHIP. 
AUSTIN 
L. M. C. 
FORD 
HILLMAN 
MORRIS 
STANDARD 
TRIUMPH 
A35 
A40 
A55 
Mi ni 
1100/1300 
1800 
Angl ia 
Consul 
Classic 
Corsair 
Cortina 
Escort 
Popul ar 
Prefect 
Zephyr 4 
Imp 
Hunter 
Minx 
Super Minx 
Minor 1000 
Oxford 
8/10 
Herald 
1300 
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VAUXHALL Victor 
Victor 101 
Victor 2000 
Vi va 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9. 
1. Probably a serious omission in view of the success of the Volkswagen 
'Beetle' and the Renaults 4 and Dauphine during the period. 
2. Market share data was provided by the firms involved, and was provided 
at different levels of aggregation by different firms. 
3. Some of the bottom priced variants in the model ranges had very low 
sales, in these cases the data refers to the lowest priced variant 
having substantial sales. Such a decision only has to be made where the 
available data has to be aggregated. Appendix 5.1 suggests that the 
errors introduced'by the process of agqregating the data to the model 
range level may be fairly small. 
4. Information on the dates of introduction and discontinuation of models 
was obtained from the publication Motorist's Guide to New and Used Car 
Prices. Four wdels were affected in this way. 
5. Often specification changes would be announced by manufacturers at the 
Motor Show during the autumn. This practice has largely ceased since 
1968.1 
6. Values for price and quality variables were obtained from test reports 
in the magazines Autocar and Motor. The data was collected by John 
Cubbin of the Department of Economics, University of Warwick. 
List price includes the price of a heater where this is not standard 
equipment. No other standardisation of the price data was possible, but 
in fact the only models which incorporated features into the standard 
price which were extras on some mo-els were classified as 'luxury' models. 
A dummy variable for 'luxury' models was not significantly different 
from zero when included in the price-quality regression. 
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8. It was suggested in Chapter 6 that 'length' could only be validly con- 
sidered a vertical quality difference if all other variables which a 
change in length might be associated were also taken into account in the 
price-quality relationship. Clearly in practical terms such a requirement 
may be impossible to meet and we will always face an ommitted variable 
problem. Cowling and Cubbin (1972) have suggested that length is positively 
associated with stylishness (without giving any hard evidence). On a priori 
grounds such a suggestion would seem highly unlikely. Admittedly some 
models may be longer than is strictly required by engineering constraints 
allowing more freedom in styling, but to suggest that a longer car is 
more 'stylish' than a shorter car as far as a large proportion of con- 
sumers are concerned seems very odd. Alternative methods of dealing with 
the problem of styling are suggested later. 
9. Models for which all four manufacturer dummy variables take on the value 
0 are B. M. C. models. Dhrymes (1967) reports results for the U. S. auto- 
mobile industry which have a similar implication. By regressing price 
on qualities for the three major manufacturers separately he was able 
to show that coefficients on qualities varied between manufacturers, 
and in many cases the differences were significant. In addition inclus- 
ion of the number of units sold as an explanatory variable improved the 
regressions, quantity had a significant negative coefficient. Thus 
Dhrymes argued that the estimated coefficients in his price-quality 
relationship reflected the 'cost plus mark-up' pricing policies of the 
manufacturers,, n. ot implicit prices in the sense of an implicit consumer 
valuation. The negative coefficient on quantity may merely refect the 
fact that there are more potential buyers for low-priced models. 
Griliches and Ohta (1973) also supports the significance of 'make 
effects'. 
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10. Cowling and Cubbin recognise that this problem exists, but rightly 
argue that their interest is in estimates of predicted model price 
rather than shadow prices on qualities. Estimates of predicted price 
will be comparable between time periods if the structure of the multi- 
collinearity between independent variables is the same during each time 
period (see Johnston (1963) 
. 
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CHAPTER 10. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 'QUALITIES' AND VARIETY DEMAND. 
INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter considers methods of incorporating, quality variables 
into the demand function at the model, brand or variety level. Chapter 6 
suggested two basic methods of accomplishing this. Firstly the residual from 
the estimated price-quality relationship could be used as an explanatory 
variable taking the place of prices and qualities. Secondly quality variables 
could be introduced into the demand function explicitly. Both methods are 
used in this chapter. Optimality tests for quality levels (as described in 
Appendix 7.1) are conducted using estimates of quality elasticities derived 
from the second method of demand estimation, and estimates of shadow quality 
prices derived in Chapter 9. 
INCORPORATING 'QUALITY-ADJUSTED PRICE' INTO A MODEL OF VARIETY DEMAND. 
Chapter 6 argued that demand could be related to the residual 
I from an estimated (linear) price-quality relationship in a specific way. 
Chapter 6 went on to provide some theoretical foundation for the price- 
quality relationship postulated in Chapter 6. The crucial point is that some 
of the theories of the price-quality relationship implied that the shadow 
(implicit) prices on the qualities changed through time (the Lancaster 
hypothesis and the local approximation theory without intertemporal comp- 
arisons), whilst others implied that the shadow prices remained constant 
through time (the Simple Repackaging Hypothesis and the local approximation 
theory with intertemporal comparisons). Only if the shadow prices remain 
constant through time, and hence the residuals from the price-quality rel- 
ationship may be compared between time periods, may we pool the available data 
. 
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in the estimation Of the variety demand function. Intertemporal comparisons 
of quality-adjusted prices are only valid where the price-quality relation- 
ship uses pooled cross-sectional data. Given that the variety demand functions 
are to be estimated in market share form, Figure 10.1 shows the appropriate 
form of market share function incorporating quality-adjusted price. In all 
cases we require that the market share functions be homogeeous to degree 
zero in prices and qualities. This condition is implicitly met in the case 
of the Lancaster hypothesis where tastes are assumed to be non-homothetic 
since that case requires that all 'incomes' and hence prices paid be roughly 
2 
constant. Linear price-quality relationships are homogeneous to degree 1, 
and hence the inclusion of the residuals from such a relationship alone will 
not ensure homogeneity to degree 0 in the demand function. The appropriate 
variable to stand for prices and qualities would then be the residual divided 
3 
by the predi cted pri ce. 
Given the poor nature of the estimated single-year price-quality 
relationships reported in Chapter 9, there is little point in attempting to 
estimate single-year market share functions. Demand functions corresponding 
to the bottom right-hand cell of Figure 10.1 are, however, worth estimating. 
4 
Three additional points may be made concerning the theoretical form of the 
market share function. Firstly there will be an omitted variable problem 
due to the fact that the price-quality relationship does not take into acc- 
ount styling variables. In their work on the tractor market Cowling and Ray- 
ner (1970) compensated for this by including the number of years since the 
model was introduced-as an explanatory variable in the variety market share 
function. We may usefully adopt the same strategy here, i. e. we implicitly 
assume that 'stylishness' is determined by the age of the variety. Secondly 
it was suggested in Chapter 6that even though the market was being defined 
fairly narrowly in price terms, some buyers may still be prevented from pur- 
chasing some varieties by income constraints. We could segment the market 
by using dummy variables to 'distinguish varieties in various sectors of the 
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price range, but such a method is rather clumsy. Here we use the variabl e 
list price relative to the mean of list price in each of the years of the 
sample in quadratic form! Thirdly the problem over advertising data still 
exists. The available data is at the company, rather than model, level. Ad- 
vertising is not therefore included as an explanatory variable in the market 
share function for the twin reasons that the data is at an inappropriate 
level of aggregation, and that above-the-line advertising does not seem to 
be an important competitive weapon in the U. K. motor industry. 
t 
QUALITY-ADJUSTED PRICES AND MODEL DEMAND. 
We assume that market share at the model or variety level is det- 
ermined by three variables; quality-adjusted price, the length of time since 
the model was introduced, and listprice relative to oth*er models. Data for 
quality-adjusted prices is derived from the residuals and predicted variety 
prices from the regression reported in Table 9.4. The qua 
5 
lity-adjusted price 
variable used is the residual divided by the predicted price. The length of 
time since introduction, or 'life', of the model was measured in years, and 
5 defined to be 0 in the year of introduction. Results for two forms of market 
share function are reported. Firstly we assume that adjustment to price and 
quality changes is rapid, and hence only current quality-adjusted price inf 
luences demand. The appropriate market share function is 
2 10.1 In q! so + a, QAP + 021 + 03P + Wit it it it it 
where q'it is the market share of the ith. model in period t+u 
it* 
QAP it is the quality-adjusted price of the ith. model in period 
t. 
lit is the 'life' of the ith. mdel in period t 
t see Chapter 5. 
1 i. e. we allow for the possibility that the cheapest model does *not 6me 
in the most popular segment of the price range. 
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I 
Pit is the list price of the ith. model in period t, relative 
to mean list price of models in period t. List price is defined 
as in Chapter 9. 
uit is a random disturbance term. 
Equation 10.1 is consistent with the possible shape of demand curve shown in 
figure 6.1. Secondly we may suggest that adjustment to price and quality 
changes does not take place rapidly, and that both current and past levels 
of quality-adjusted price influence demand. Assume that the market share 
function is 
10.2 In q it 
00 + $1 
T0xT 
QAP i t-T + 021it 
-4 
Uit. 
where 0<x<I. 
period t-L is the first period for which data is available. 
In period t-l 10.2 becomes 
10.3 ; kln q' ; kao $1 
T QAP It-1 it-T + X821 17=1 it-l 
+ xu 
. it-l 
after muliplication of both sides by x. 
Subtraction of 10.3 from 10.2 yields 
10.4 ln q' It ý00 + a2) + 01QAP it + S20 - Wit 
+ Xln q'. +u xu It-1 it it-1 
since cor (ui tui t_j =0 and 
10.5 - Wit ý021 i t-I it 
Results are given in Table 10.1. The first column relates to form 10.1. All 
the coefficients are well determined except that on the variable of central 
interest, quality-adjusted price. That coefficient takes on the 'wrong' sign 
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TABLE 10.1. 
Estimated market share functions for the U. K. passenger, car market, 1958-68. 
Dependent variable In q; it* 
Vari abl e No adjustment lag assumed Adjustment lags assumed 
Constant -3.6542 -4.7911 -1.4429 -0.6099 
(-2.3671) (-3.0367) (-3.8792) (-3.7508) 
QAP it 0.9897 0.9333 -0.3828 -0.2494 (1.2177) (1.1023) (-0.3969) (-0.5821) 
lit -0.0425 -0.0459 -0.0105 -0.0077 (-3.4562) (-3.5899) (-0.7445) (-1.1000), 
p it 6.7015 6.8254 (2.203Q) (2.1534) 
2 pi -4.5005 -4.6144 t (-2.9884) (-2.9412) 
Models -0.0769 -0.0946 -0.0405 (-3.7790) (-3.8365) (-3.7813) 
In qit_l 0.0025 
(0.9288) 
160 160 160 160 
F 20.0111 19.7513 5.2145 4.1231 
R2 0.3938 0.3376 0.0911 0.0962 
D-W 1.9731 1.8099 2.2673 2.2766 
t values in brackets 
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but is, however, not significantly different from zero. The signs on the 
'life' and 'price' variable coefficients are as expected and the coefficients 
are significant. The poor nature of the relationship between market share 
and quality-adjusted price is illustrated by the fact that the gross corr- 
elation coefficient between In (market share) and quality-adjusted price is 
only -0.0230. Examination of the residuals from the estimated equation 
in 
the first column of table 10.1 shows that significantly more negative res- 
iduals occurred during the last five years of the period than during the 
first six. Table 10.2 illustrates this. 
''TABLE'10, '2. 
Pattern of residuals from regression reported in the first column of Table 
10.1. 
Period Sign of residuals 
-ve +ve 
Totals 
1957-63 29(39. ) 49(41) 78 
1964-64 49(39) 33(41) 82 
Totals 78 82 160 
2 
8.2501*, X 
. 01,1d. f. 
6.635. 
Expected frequencies are given in parentheses. 
Negative residuals in the later period indicate that observed market shares 
are considerably less than predicted on the basis of the regression model. 
The simplest explanation of this phenomenon is that the number of competing 
rmdels tended to increase during the period 1958-68. Two alternative ways of 
dealing with this feature of the market were tried; firstly a simple time 
trend variable was included, and secondly a variable measuring the number 
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of different models available ('models') was included as an explanatory 
variable. The results were slightly better in the latter case and only 
these are reported. 
6 The same pattern of residuals occurred whenever the 
'models' or trend variable were not included. Inclusion of the models' 
variable reduced the x2 value calculated on the same basis as in Table 10.2 
(i. e. for the second column regression of Table 10.1) to 0.4. 
The results of Table 10.1 cast doubt on the hypothesis that 
quality recognition by buyers takes the form postulated above. There are 
three main reasons why the results might not support the original theory. 
Firstly, buyers may not recognise quality (at least those quality variables 
included in the price-quality regression) as an important variable in the 
car purchasing decision. Secondly the quality-adjusted price variable may 
be poorly chosen, a different measure of quality-adjusted price may perform 
better. Thirdly we may not have adequately taken account of the changes in 
market demand parameters which have occurred, for example the changes in 
price elasticities at the variety level through time or the greater avail- 
ability of information in later time periods. Before we accept the first 
explanation we must be sure that the other two are not sufficient to explain 
the results of Table 10.1. Evidence from the only other studies which study 
demand in this way would seem to point to the second explanation. Cowling 
and Rayner (1970) obtained well determined model market share relationships 
for tractors with significant quality-adjusted price variables. Their method 
was somewhat different to. the one adopted here. They used weighted linear 
single-year regressions to obtain values of quality-adjusted price. but 
pooled data for quite a long period (1948-65) to estimate the market share 
function. Surprisingly the addition of 4 deflator for quality-adjusted price 
7 
did not improve the results. One feature of the Cowling-Rayner model is the 
very simple3, but effective,, price-quality relationship which is employed; 
list price is, very largely explained-by the two variables belt horse-power 
and type of engine (petrol., Or diesel). Given the type of engine, quality- 
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adjusted price merely indicates the horse-power of the model relative to 
other models at the same price. The quality-adjusted price variable in the 
mdel market share equations is really measuring the shadow price of a unit 
of horse-power for the particular model. Where price-qLlality relationships 
are more complex such simple explanations of the role of quality-adjusted 
price in the market share function are not possible. C, owling (1972) present S 
some results for the U. K. car market. By averaging the estimated model 
residuals for a given manufacturer's set of models a manufacturer or firm 
quality-adjusted price variable was obtained. This variable was of the 'corr- 
ect' sign and was significant in explaining market share at the firm level . 
Again weighted single-year price-quality regressions were used to derive 
values of quality-adjusted prices which were then incorporated into a model 
of demand using pooled data (for the period 1956-68). The-reasons for the 
success of the Cowling model are unclear. 
One feature of the price-quality regression used to obtain 
qual i ty- adjusted prices is its use of dumrqv varaiables to distinguish the 
manufacturer of a given model and hence pick up hypothesised 'make effects'. 
Neither of the two studies cited do this. It was suggested that the dummy 
variables measured (albeit crudely) omitted quality variables associated 
with particular manufacturers. There is, however, no guarantee that the 
dummy variables in fact do this. The positive coefficient on the Standard- 
Triumph variable in Table 9.4 may merely indicate that Standard-Triumph prices 
are higher than other manufacturers given the same quality mix$, ' residuals 
derived from the regressions in Table 9.4 would then yield low predicted 
, prices where Standard-Triumph models were concerneds leading to a possible 
predominance of negative residuals attached to Standard-Triumph models in 
the demand function of Table 10.1. The spuriously low quality-adjusted prices 
would lead to high market share predictions for Standard-Triumph models. On 
the other hand the omission of the manufacturer dummy variable from the 
price-quality regression may fail to take into account some attributes of 
Standard-Triumph models whýich are important in determining their 'correct' 
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quality-adjusted prices. Some evidence cah be gained by looking at the res- 
iduals from the regressions reported in Table 9.4, an identical regression 
which omits the four manufacturer dummy variables,, and the estimated market 
share function reported in column 2 of Table 10.1. In the Standard-Triumph 
case where 'make effects' were not included eleven (out of 14) models had 
positive residuals. Inclusion of 'make effects' reduced this number to five, 
and use of this set of derived quality-adjusted prices led to Stan dard-Tri umph 
models having twelve (out of 13) negative residuals in the estimated market 
share function. In the case of Ford models the opposite pattern is observed. 
In the "without 'make effects"' price-quality regression 38 Ford observations 
had negative residuals; when 'make effects' were measured this number dropped 
to 20 (out of 43). Twenty-five (out of 39) Ford models took on positive 
8 
residuals in the market share function. The data thus seems to support the 
hypothesis that Fords are relatively underpriced and Standard-Triumph models 
relatively overpriced, and that manufacturer dummy variables in the price- 
quality relationship are capturing this, rather than measuring omitted quality 
variables. 
Table 9.3 reports results for an estimated log-linear price- 
quality relationship which does not include manufacturer dummy variables. 
In this case the residuals may be included in the market share function 
without modification since the residual is equal to log P it 0 Homogeneity 
0_7% P it 
to degree 0 of the demand function in prices and qualities is therefore 
guaranteed by the inclusion of the residual. Several possible market func- 
tions were estimated incorporating this measure of quality-adjusted price. 
All yielded negative coefficients on quality-adjusted price, but the only 
form which yielded a coefficient on quality-adjusted price significantly 
different from zero was 
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10.6 
9 log q' - 0.5975 1.5772 QAP. 0.0103 l. it (-3.7143) (-1.9840) t (-1.5174) 1 
0.0405 Models + 0.0013 log qit_l 
(-3.8276) (1.1181) - 
n= 160 ; -F = 
5.1189 ;R2=0.1166 ; D-W = 2.2875. 
t-scores in brackets. 
It would seem that the measure of quality-adjusted price derived on the 
basis of a price-quality regression which did not incorporate manufacturer 
dummies is better fitted to the task of explaining model demand. 
Clearly the measure of quality-adjusted price chosen is 
crucial. We are unable, therefore, to reject the notion that quality 
recognition by buyers, as it has been described earlier, is not an import- 
ant determinant of demand at the model level. A further conseQuence of the 
results given in Table 10.1 and equation 10.6 is that only current values 
of quality-adjusted price are important in explaining current model demand. 
In none of the regressions is the coefficient on lagged market share signif- 
icantly different from zero. Again this result conflicts with those of 
Cowling and Rayner (1970) and Cowling (1972). 
DEMAND FUNCTIONS INCORPORATING-QUALITIES DIRECTLY. 
It was suggested in Chapter .6 that we might estimate model 
demand by including qualities as independent variables explicitly. One ob- 
jection to this technique is that any such market share regressions will be 
bedevilled by multicollinearity between the independent variables. This 
does not matter provided we are only interested in obtaining predicted val- 
ues for market shares, but part of our interest is to obtain quality- elast- 
icities so that we can test for optimal quality setting behaviour by firms 
along the lines proposed in Appendix 7.1. We may attempt optimality tests 
f6 
2? 0. 
TABLE 10.3. 
Estimate of demand function for cars using qualities as explanatory 
vari abl es; 1958-68. 
Dependent variable logloq! it$ 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT t SCORE 
Constant -0.7344 -4.9504 
LogPit -1.9075 -3.0827 
Log P 0.0001 -0.0061 
Log B. H. P. -1.0280 -2.0919 
Log length 2.0448 2.5646 
Log M. P. G. 0.1847 0.3496 
Log leg room 3.8038 3.7664 
Gears 0.0628 0.9356 
Disc Brakes 0.0403 0.7185 
Life -0-0211 -3.5255 
Models -0.0353 -3.4100 
Log q It-1 
0.0010 0.6555 
n 160 
F 11.1231 
R2 0.4526 
D-14 2.0532 
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where the coefficients take on the 'correct' sign and are reasonably well 
detemined. 
Results for a market share function incorporating qualities 
directly are given in Table 10.3. The quality variables are defined as in 
Chapter 9, except that they are expressed as relative to the mean values of 
those variables in each year, and other variables as in the preceding sect- 
ion .. 10 It has been assumed that both current and past quality levels affect 
demand, but that adjustment to qualities takes place with identical lag 
structures. The resulting estimating equation is derived in Appendix 10.1. 
Again a feature of the results is that only current quality levels seem to 
affect current demand, the coefficient on the lagged market share term is 
not significantly from zero. The 'life' and 'models' variables are both of 
the 'correct' sign and significant. The indicated price elasticity is of 
the kind of magnitude we might expect. The significantly determined quality 
variables have coefficients which are either of the 'wrong' sign or much 
larger than expected. We may again put this down to the multicollinearity 
which exists between the explanatory variables. The extent of this is shown 
in Table 10.4. 
TABLE 10.4. 
Correlation coefficients between selected explanatory variables 
used in the regression of Table 10.3. 
log B. H. P. log length log M. P. G. log leg room 
log Pit 0.8859 0.7526 -0.7869 0.2590 
log B. H. P. 0.7969' -0.8766 0.2796 
log length -0.8247 0.2246 
log M. P. G. -0.0840 
. 
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Clearly we may only 'conduct' optimality tests for quality 
levels on the lines proposed in Appendix 7.1 at the most superficial level. 
Appendix -7.1 suggests that the proportion of price "accounted for" by any 
given quality should be equal to the ratio of that quality elasticity to 
the price elasticity. Clearly this requires that the quality elasticity be 
less than the modulus of the price elasticity. In the two cases where the 
results of Table 10.3 yield estimates of quality elasticities which are both 
significant and positive, they are much too high. 
SUMMARY. 
Estimates of market share using quality-adjusted price as the 
only independent variable relating to prices and qualities showed very little 
relationship between quality-adjusted price and market share! This result 
might arise from the use of inappropriate measures of quality-adjusted 
price. The only comparable study ( Cowling and Rayner (1970) ) employed 
13 
a very simple price-quality relationship. An estimate of a market share 
function using qualities per se as explanatory variables was quite well det- 
ermined. The derived price elasticity was of the'expected sign and order of 
magnitude,, but the existence of multi coll inearity between the other explan- 
atory variables (qualities) prevented good estimates of the quality elast- 
icities being obtained. Optimality tests on the basis of Appendix 7.1-were 
therefore not possible. All the results of Chapter 10 suggested that only 
current model price and quality levels had a significant effect on current 
model demand. The age of the model, in terms of time since market intro- 
duction, was significant in determining model demand. 'This latter observat- 
ion suggests that styling and "up-to-dateness" is an important determinant 
of model demand. The use of manufacturer dummy variables in the price- 
quality relationship was shown not to pick-up 'make effects' in the sense 
of manufacturer specific quality variables. Rather such dummy variables 
tended to reflect the general level of prices (given quality levels) of 
the different manufacturers. 
t excepting equation 10.6. 
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APPENDIX 10.1 
A generalised derivation of the estimating equation used in 
the model of demand incorporating 'qualities' directly. Let the market 
share function for the i 
th 
variety be 
q! =a+ alp! +ýB. Xý it 01t j=l j1 jt 
where q! is the market share of variety i at time t, or it 
some transformation of it 
pI is the relative price of the i th variety in period t it 
or some transformation of it 
X! summarises the effects of current and past levels of 
it the relative amount of the j 
th 
quality embodied in 
the i th variety on current demand for the i th variety, 
or some transformation of it, the same transformation 
being applied to each of the k qualities. 
x* is defined by the equation i 
Jt 
10.1.2 x*=LX. T X. 0k iit TýO JIJ t-T 
where 0< ;ki -I 10i=1,..., k . 
period t-L is the first period for which data is 'available 
xi measures the relative amount of quality j embodied- 
t-T in variety i in period t-T , or the same transform- 
ation of it as the transformation of X* 
it 
i. 
. 
e. 
, 
if X 
it 
stands for log Xi then Xi stands 
t t-T 
for log Xi. 
Jt-T 
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Applying the Koyck transformationt to X* we have from 10.1.2 
it 
10.1.3 xLx T-1 xi 
it-I T=I j t-T 
and hence 
10.1.4 
LT 
X1 Ix9i i X' it-1 T=l j t-T 
Subtraction of 10.1.4 from 10.1.2 yields 
10.1.5 X! X. x k xi I it it it-I 
Substituting in the market share function 10.1.1 we have for Xi 
it 
1 
10.1.6 q. = (I +a+zax+X. x 101 Pi ji t. tj jt 
If for all j=l,..., k 10.1.6 becomes 
10.1.7 1 qi =a+ al Pi +ax + xy 8x 0 i* i i t it t i 
and from the market share function (10.1-1) lagged by one period 
10.1.8 aix Xqi Xot 
0 
xal Pi 
and substitu ting into 10.1.7 we obtain the estimating equation 
10.1.9 qj =a+, a+ al Pi 10x+ Xq 01 Pi + i t t it 
where a a Xa 0 
a0 
t see Koyck (1954). 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 10. 
1. The argument may be easily applied to other functional forms of the 
price-quality relationship with correspondingly defined residuals. 
2. A doubling of all prices and qualities would lead to a doubling of 
II 
the residual. 
3. 
Use of the variable Ui /ýi rather than Just Ui necessitates a small 
adjustment to result 6.1.17, since Pi (1ý), j-1,... n, including 
i-7 . 1.17 becomes X )x ji 'Pi/', ji nx.. 
pi (1-u Op i +l)3Ui) npJ, 
4. -'If the"shadow-prices change from year to'year'and*hence"-the demand 
functions change from year to year, then the model cannot be used to 
predict demand for new varieties. A model which implies constant 
shadow prices can be used to predict demand for new varieties. 
5. A model was deemed to be 'new' if a major body restyling had taken 
place, that is the model had to actually "change shape" to be deemed 
'new'. Thus data is included on two different models of Cortina in 
two different (consecutive) time periods. In 1959 Ford introduced a 
model named the Anglia. The pre-existing model bearing that name was 
renamed the Prefect and the pre-existing Prefect model was discont- 
inued. The variable 'life' is thus measured from the date of intro- 
duction of that particular body shape and style rather than ident- 
ifying name. Although the Prefect changed in 1959, the 'new' (1959) 
model had a body style dating from well before 1959. 
6. Although there were great advantages to be gained by pooling data 
to estimate the price-quality relationship, there seem to be very 
few to be gained from pooling observations to estimate. the demand 
curve. Clearly many other variables than quality-adjusted price will 
be needed to explain demand (market share). In particular the struct- 
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ure of the industry may well change through time. Cowling and 
Rayner 
(1970) are the only writers to have previously attempted to estimate 
model demand in this way. In their work on the U. K. tractor market 
they used a conventional trend variable to take account of the tend- 
ency for model demand to become more elastic over time. 
A deflator is indicated where list prices are rising. 
8. Only 13 Standard-Triumph observations and 39 Ford observations are 
included in the market share functions since they were estimated for 
the period 1958-68. Price-quality relationships refer to the period 
1957-68. 
9. The coefficient. on QAPit (= log Pit ) may be interpreted as the list 
01% P it 
price elasticity of market share provided aP it 0. 
ap it 
10. Again t, ýhe residuals showed the pattern described in the previous 
section when the 'models' variable was omitted. The x2 test yielded 
a value of 9.1076 with I d. f. 
It was suggested earlier that buyers were able to make intertemporal 
comparisons when (subjectively) evaluating the price-quality relation- 
ship. If they can do this then the notion that they are not capable 
of fully adjusting to changes in quality-adjusted price through time 
has very little force. In essence the intertemporal comparisons, and 
hence the adjustment process, are undertaken at a different level in 
the imdel . 
2 
Equation 10.6 omits the rel. ative list, price variables Pit and P it 
whereas Table, 10.1 includes these. Part of the "improvement" evident 
in the results-of equation 10.6 may be due to this change; the roles 
played by the quality-adjusted price and list price variables in ex- 
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plaining demand may be partially overlapping. Thus whilst the results 
of Table 10.1 are acceptable in that they yield a maximum value of Pit 
of approximately 0.74 in all cases (indicating that, ceteris paribus, 
a model having a list price about three-quarters of the mean list price 
of models in any given period will have the greatest market share), 
equation 10.6, which omits list price variables, is 'preferable' to all 
the results of Table 10.1. 
12. Hence multicollinearity between the qualities was not a problem encount- 
ered by them. I 
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CHAPTER 11. 
.. SUMMARY*AND CONCLUSIONS. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The approach of the thesis has been to analyse the roles which 
advertising and quality variables have on demand at the model, brand or 
variety level (excepting Chapter 4 which analysed a company level model 
of advertising). The-neoclassical microeconomic view of the firm has been 
taken as the bench mark. Optimal bahaviour patterns for the firm can be 
deduced from the economic model and these derived optimal patterns of 
behaviour compared with actual patterns of firm behaviour. An important 
question arises out of this type of comparison. Given that firms do not act 
literally in the fashion suggested by the economic model, we must analyse 
whether the actual behaviour of firms allows the theoretically optimal 
behaviour pattern to be adopted. This particular problem is discussed in 
Chapter 7. The theoretically derived optimal behaviour patterns were com- 
pared to behaviour exhibited by U. K. passenger car manufacturers during 
the period 1957-68. Although the data was not ideally suited to testing 
advertising models, the a priori assumed importance of physical quality 
differences between models rendered the market particularly suited to a 
study of the role of quality in the competitive process. Three major topics 
were considered and these are discussed below. 
ADVERTISING COMPETITION. 
Chapters 2 and 3 developed the neoclassical model of advert- 
isingg taking the Dorfman-Steiner theoremt as the cornerstone of the anal- 
ysils'. 
, 
The D orfman-Steiner theorem predicts that when the monopolistic firm 
t. Dorfman and Steiner (1954). 
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is maximising profit it will set price and the advertising budget so that 
2.7 "A A 
TP ý -q 
The model was extended to several other situations, the most important being 
ones where sales revenue was a determinant of managerial utility and where 
the monopolist was uncertain about the demand function. A proof of the 
Nerlove-Arrow condition (for optimal advertsing under dynamic conditions) 
using control theory was given. All the situations examined altered the basic 
Dorfman-Steiner and Nerlove-Arrow results, in most cases the indicated 
optimal advertising-sales ratio was higher than in the simple Dortman-Steiner 
case. 
The Dorfman-Steiner model can be bxtended to cover situations 
where there are more marketing variables (including quality variables) and 
where inter-firm competition exists. The precise results of such a generalis- 
ation depend on what is assumed about the competitive interactions between 
rival firms. Some special cases are discussed in Chapter 4. The most convenient 
reference model" to take is the Cournot model, i. e. one where the firm ass- 
umes that changes in one of its decision variables will not prompt retaliatory i 
changes in decision variables by other firms. In the Cournot case the simple 
Dorfman-Steiner rule re-emerges. The results of applying other assumptions 
about competitive reactions can then be compared to the basic Dorfman-Steiner 
result. In particular a price-leadership model is examined. The possibility 
of advertising-leadership emerging as a competitive strategy is considered, 
but it was concluded (on theoretical grounds) that price-leadership was more 
likely to occur than advertising-leadership. Evidence is presented (Appendix 
4.1) to suggest that the U. K. car industry conforms to a price-leadership 
pattern, at least in respect to list prices ot established models. Chapter 
4 also recognises that the use of rules-of-thumb to aid in actual price 
and advertising decisions is widespread. However it is concluded that the 
I 
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use of some rules-of-thumb, for example the practices of mark-up pricing 
and setting the advertising budget as a percentage of estimated sales, 
did not preclude optimising behaviour by firms where optimality is defined 
in terms of the theoretical models of Chapter 3. 
Dynamic models of advertising were considered. Chapter 3 presents 
a tairly general model. Previous attempts to test for the adoption of 
'optimal' advertising policies by firms were discussed. Usually these 
rested on a somewhat paradoxical method of testing; values of estimated 
parameters of the demand function (elasticities with respect to discretion- 
ary variables) were compared with observed values of firms' promotional 
variables, i. e. some measure of advertising expenditure relative to sales, 
per unit price, or profit. Thus writers tested for optimal behaviour on 
the part of firms by estimating a relationship largely determined by the 
behaviour of consumers (the demand function). An alternative to this method 
of testing was proposed. The conditions relating to the optimal stock of 
advertising derived from the model of Chapter 3 were incorporated into a 
stock-adjustment model, and a condition relating current advertising exp- 
enditures to current and past levels of sales revenue and advertising prices, 
and to past advertising expenditures was derived. Although this relation- 
ship (3.51) could not be interpreted as an advertising appropriations rel- 
ationship, its estimation did permit the testing for optimal advertising 
behaviour, ex post, by examining firms' behaviour directly. 
The dynamic model of competitive advertising behaviour considered 
in Chapter 3 is of special interest because it is more general that the Nerlove- 
Arrow model and explicitly considers the price of advertising as a variable 
which determines the optimal path of advertising through. time. The theoretical 
prediction of the dynamic model of advertising behaviour are not susceptible 
to testing by the same methods that are used to test the static Dorfman-Steiner 
model. This is partly because the parameters (discount rate, advertising stock 
decay rate etc. ) of the condition for the optimal advertising stock - sales 
zi Ia 
ratio are much more complicated than they are in the simple Dorfman-Steiner 
case. It was suggested that a possible method of circumventing this problem 
would be to incorporate the optimality condition Tor advertising stock into 
a stock-adjustment model. The estimating equation derived from using this 
approach (3.51) had the advantages that all unobservable parameters of the 
theoretical model (including the price and advertising stock elasticities) 
were estimated in the process of applying regression techniques to the 
estimating equation. The fact that prior knowledge ot the elasticities was not 
required meant that no particular assumption about competitive Interactions 
needed to be made. The regression technique used was necessarily an iterative 
one, but bar the volume of work Involved in estimating the equation no special 
problems existed. The results of estimating the stock-adjustment equation 
were very poor. The estimated parameters bore little relationship to the pre- 
dicted values of those parameters when data on company advertising in the U. K. 
motor industry was used Tor testing. Alternative interpretations of the reg- 
ression results were of no help. What looked to be a promising approach turned 
out to be of little help when applied to the data used in this thesis. Some 
possible reasons why this could be the case were given. One particular diff- 
iculty may be inherent in the method of testing chosen. The stock-adjustment 
approach assumes that the optimal stock can only be attained with time (except 
in the limiting case where the adjustment coefficient Is unity); the control 
theory approach used to generate the optimal level ot stock assumes that adj- 
ustment can be carried out instantaneously (or in practical terms in the space 
of one period). Thus for the two models to be mutually consistent the estimated 
value of the adjustment coefficient should be unity. This was not the case. 
Empirical conclusions on the basis of this work are hard to 
come bys except that the initial results using this approach are discouraging. 
Use of data for other more heavily advertsied products might reverse this feeling 
but there are still thhoretical difficulties to overcome. An earlier study 
of the U. K. market, (Cowling (1972) ) suggests that company advertsing is Tar 
from the theoretically optimal level. It should not surprise us that results 
on a test which is much more specific than the Cowling test should also be 
poor. The problem ot testing dynamic models of optimal advertising behaviour 
remains,, but at least the work done here identifies those problems. -more clearly 
and explores the directions in which the solution might lie. Improvement of 
the method and more appropriate data are called for. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICES, 'QUALITIES' AND MODEL DEMAND. 
Previous writers have made little attempt to provide a defin- 
ition of 'quality' - Chapters '6 and 7made an attempt to rectify this omission. 
It was shown that any relationship between the prices of a set of similar 
goods and their 'qualities' had to take into account both the form of the 
relationship and the definition of 'quality' employed. This is a departure 
from the opinions of previous researchers who,, by and large, have regarded 
the choice of functional form and independent variables of the price-quality 
relationship as an empirical matter. 
Most existing work on price-quality relationships embraces 
the so-called "hedonic principle". Chapter 6 reviewed this work. Chapter 
7 attempted to provide some theoretical determination for the price-quality 
relationship, and in the process some guidance in the matter of choice of 
functional form and explanatory variables. It was suggested that there were 
only two serious candidates for the role of 'theoretical basis for the hed- 
onic principle'. Both these (the.. Lancaster hypothesis concerning consump- 
tion behaviour and the Simple Repackaging Hypothesis, an assumption about 
technology ) were explored and shown to lead to quite different price-qual- 
ity relationships. 
Following Cowling and Rayner (1970) and Cowling (1972) the 
possibility of incorporating the residuals from estimated price-quality 
relationships into a model of demand was examined. This topic was intro- 
duced in Chapter & and extended in Chapter 10. It was postulated that a 
negative residual (or "quality-adjusted price" ) should indicate that a 
particular model had a relatively low price, given its quality mix, whilst 
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a positive residual would indicate a relatively high price after qualities 
had been taken into account. We would therefore expect quality-adjusted price 
to be negati vely rel ated to demand at the model 1 evel . Appendi x 
7,1 gi ves 
a method of testing for optimal quality-setting behaviour at the model level_ 
using data derived from estimated price-quality relationships and estimated 
quality elasticities. 
Tests of the hypotheses contained in Chapters 6 and 7 were 
conducted in Chapters 9 and 10. Only estimates of price-quality relation- 
ships conforming to the Simple Repackaging Hypothesis and the theory pro- 
posed in Chapter 6( the "local approximation theory" ) proved satisfact- 
ory. It was suggested that this was due to the fact that the S. R. H. implied 
a price-quality relationship using pooled cross-sectional data, whereas the 
Lancaster hypothesis required the use of single-year cross-sections. The 
lack of observations in any given year, coupled with the fairly large num- 
ber of (multicollinear) variables used to explain price, meant that indiv- 
idual parameter estimates on qualities were very poorly determined in the 
single-year cross-sectional regressions. A possible alternative test of the 
Lancaster hypothesis was proposed; a test which requires that 'qualities, 
be defined as "performance variables" and that data on second-hand cars be 
incorporated. 
Estimates of price-quality relationships using pooled cross- 
sectional data present a fairly novel departure from the bulk of established 
practice. Estimates of shadow quality prices derived from such regressions 
were well determined, and usually of the expected signs and order of magni- 
tude. The use of dummy variables to distinguish data relating to the differ- 
ent years of the sample permitted the construction of a quality-adjusted 
price index for cars over the period. This index (reported in Chapter 9) 
compared favourably with another (differently calculated) quality-adjusted 
price index for cars. Dummy variables for manufacturers were also included 
(Table 9.4) in an attempt to measure manufacturer specific omitted quality 
variables;. two out of the*four were significant. A further examination of the 
Cat+ 0 
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role of these variables (see Chapter 10) showed, 
however, that they did not 
seem to be measuring omitted quality variables , 
but rather they were reflect- 
ing the differences in the general level of prices between manufacturers, 
after quality differences had been taken into account. Attempts to relate 
the residuals from the estimated price-quality regressions of Chapter 9 to 
model market share showed very little relationship between quality-adjusted 
price and market share. 
The major implications of Chapters 6,7 9 and 10 are as follows, 
Firstly the form of the price-quality relationship is not merely a question 
of empirics, there are strong theoretical reasons for favouring some forms 
more than others. Secondly a great deal of good data is required to estimate 
single-yea r cross-sectional price-quality relationships. Where this 
) is not 
available the technique of pooling the available data and including year 
dummies in the price-quality regression may be a useful alternative. We must 
be aware, however, that use of this technique implicitly assumes that either 
tastes, or technology, or both are reasonably constant over the period of 
the pooling. Thirdly it is advisable to take every available step to reduce 
the inevitable multicol linearity which exists between quality variables. 
Fourthly"there must be some doubt cast on the hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between quality-adjusted price and market share at the model 
level. If there is such a relationship it is very sensitive to the definition 
of quality-adjusted price employed. Despite the fact that the price-quality 
regressions from which the quality-adjusted prices were derived were well 
determined, estimated coefficients on quality-adjusted price in the estirr. - 
ated model market share functions were rarely significantly different from 
iero. Fifthly the most profitable area for future study would seem to be 
-based on the Lancaster hypothesis. Chapters, 7and 9 discuss this. 
Zib* 
QUALITY COMPETITION. 
Chapters 6 and 8 consider some hypotheses concerning the 
nature of quality competition. The basic tenet of the discussion was that 
reaction by firms to simultaneous changes in price and specificationd to 
a model by a rival was almost impossible. Alteration of the price-quality 
mix of a model is hence an important competitive weapon since such action 
circumvents some of the awkward aspects of oligopolistic interdependence. 
Such competition is characterised by new model introductions. Chapter 8 
develops the theme introduced in the last section of Chapter 6 and suggests 
how the model demand curve alters over the market life of the model. It is 
postulated that the deamnd curve for a particular model shiTtS in a predict-, 
able way through time. The effect of time will be to initially shift the 
demand curve to the right as consumer knowledge ot the new variety spreads, 
and then to depress the demand curve as the model becomes older in market 
terms. Using this theory an optimal pricing path is derived via the tech- 
niques of optimal control theory. This optimal path is then compared with 
the actual paths of price exhibited by Tour models of car. The most encour- 
aging result is that even on the basis of such a simple model the hypoth- 
esised deamnd cycle is well supported by the empirical evidence. 
A further prediction of Chapter 7 is that a price index which 
is unadjusted for quality changes should show greater flexibility about 
trend than a price index which relates to list prices only. A manufacturer, 
since he faces no reaction, is able to adjust prices in his desired direction 
much more easily for new models than for established models (where alteration 
of list pri 
. 
ces attracts rapid retaliation). A quality-adjusted price index 
for cars during the period 1957-68 was constructed using data given in Chap- 
ter 9, and the prediction of Chapter 7 is confirmed. 
236. 
Chapter 10 reports empirical attempts--to explain variety dem- 
and using the residuals trom, the estimated price-quality relationships 
"quality-adjusted prices" ). In nearly all the cases the estimated coeff- 
icient on quality-adjusted price was not significantly different from zero. 
In only one case ( equation 10.6 ) was the quality-adjusted price variable 
well determined, significantly different from zero and of the expected sign 
and magnitude. 10.6 was constructed in response to objections (raised in the 
text) to earlier models OT Chapter 10 and in many ways it is theoretically 
the most satisfactory estimating equation. The results of Chapter 10 suggested 
that only current price and current quality levels had a signiticant influence 
on model demand. This result may be regarded as somewhat surprising, but might 
be explained by the ditficulties involved in merely comparing the current 
array of prices and qualities without invoking intertemporal comparisons as 
well. This method of incorporating quality differences into a model of variety 
or model demand does not look as successful in this thesis as it has done 
in previous studies ( Cowling (1972). Cowling and Rayner (1970) ). Results 
are very sensitive to the definition of quality-adjusted price employed, 
where the detinition depends on the form ot the estimated price-quality 
relationship. There seem to be no a priori grounds for preferring one defin- 
ition to another. 
More work, both theoretical and empirical. needs to be done in 
the Tield of demand for durable goods. An understanding ot the factors which 
influence the demand Tor durables is prior to the development of techniques 
of model demand estimation. The availability Of such techniques would be of 
great practical help. This thesis has (I hope ) at least pointed out some 
of the problds involved and attempted to solve them. In particular it has 
tried to use microeconomic theory 4s anlaid, to solution. Surprisingly such 
an approach to the question appears to be fairly n6vel. 
237. 
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